

THE PROVENANCE OF MAN



A SUNNI APOLOGETIC
OF THE ORIGINAL CREATION OF
ĀDAM (ʿALAYH AL-SALĀM)

TAHSEEN N. KHAN

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Cover picture

Al-Tabarī (d. 320 h) narrates that the mountain on which Adam عليه السلام landed upon is in the region, Sarandīb, known today as Sri Lanka.¹ The picture on the cover of this book is believed to be that mountain by many people. It is referred to as 'Adam's peak.'

Allah سبحانه knows best.

¹ Franz Rosenthal, *The History of al-Tabarī* (New York: SUNY Press, 1989), 1:292.

*To my respected parents, from whom I first heard about our
primeval father, Abū Muhammad¹ Ādam عليه السلام, when they read to us
from *Qaṣṣ al-Anbiyā* while we were mere children.*

¹ Ādam عليه السلام is known as “Father of Mankind” (*Abū al-Bashar*) on Earth and will be known as “Father of Muhammad” (*Abū Muhammad*) in Paradise as mentioned by al-Suyūṭī (d. 911 h) in his *al-Durr al-Manthūr* under verse 1:32.

TRANSLITERATION KEY

q	ض	‘	ء(إِ)
t	ط	a, ā	ا
z	ظ	b	ب
a, ‘i, ‘u, ‘	ع	t	ت
gh	غ	th	ث
f	ف	j	ج
q	ق	h	ح
k	ك	kh	خ
l	ل	d	د
m	م	dh	ذ
n	ن	r	ر
h	ه	z	ز
w, u, ū	و	s	س
y, ī, ī	ي	sh	ش
		ṣ	ص

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة والسلام على أشرف الأنبياء والمرسلين
نبينا محمد وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين ومن تبعهم بإحسان إلى يوم الدين

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Introduction

'In the name of Allah, the most Gracious, the most Merciful. Al I praise a He to Allah who taught Adam the names, honored the scholars with knowledge of His religion, and made the compulsory sciences a cornerstone of the comprehension of His Book which He then raised above as a firmament—He alone safeguards the true meanings of all things by His specific clarifications and subtle indications whose consequence disabes the rhetoricians and whose wisdom incapacitates the sages. May Allah send blessings upon His Prophet Muhammad by whom He sealed the succession of prophecy and by whose conveyance the light spread. May He show His mercy to the pure and chaste companions, and may His blessings be upon them all.'

A few years prior to writing this book, one of my teachers requested that I teach the annotated primer in Sunni doctrine *al-Aqida al-Falstawiya* to a group of high school students in a nearby mosque. If only I had become clear that the students were laskadanaical on the subject. However, as we swiftly elucidated New Atheism and the theory of evolution, they effused with engagement. My biology teacher told me that evolution is a *fact*.¹ I told my teacher that I believe Adam was the first man, and he said that is a *myth*. 'Adam was not the first man' began to bounce across the classroom walls. Their excitement was vastly different from my own when I was the r age. Conversely, when I first encountered the theory in high school biology I by the grace of Allah ~~as~~ did not find the theory of evolution to pose an existential threat to my faith (even). At the time, I had found a robust

1. Abd al-Rahman al-Suhayl (d. 953h) a. *Ta'rif wa al-Ahwal fima 'U'ibihim fi al-Qur'an min al-A'mal al-Arabiyya* (Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, a. 751h, 1493-1495). The opening lines from the introduction of al-Suhayl's book immediately captured my attention for aptly serving as the "haram in al-haram" for this book, as the reader will soon come to know why in *Inna Allah*.

and extraordinary research projects like *Islam and Evolution* and *Evolution* may give me the answers existing in my mind but I tapped them to depth even a little bit later after having graduated from college. But I realized how wrong I was. The Qur'an actually depicted the global Muslim mind since its inception. The theory of evolution has been controversial for Muslims through years of evolution being either for or against it. I have even found an entire book written and reviewed as a sign of intellectual freedom and as an attempt to be a standard theological model of the origin of humankind as well as the man possessing this Earth, or simply put, as a sign of a more every-blameless argument. Numerous books at this social platform speak of the current state of whether *Adam* was an original creation.

Becoming almost a century after evolution came as numerous influences for the ex-biblicalists present have taken the view that the Qur'an not only *Adam* but also having biological parents (narrative) specifically comes from the Prophet and Muslim Egypt of history. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his followers with the belief of *Adam* as being the progenitor of the nation on Earth today is not definitely *God* as known from the Qur'an. Others, such as Sir Sayid Ahmad Khan (d. 1908) and Ahmed Raza Khan (d. 1940) went further in suggesting that the entire *Adam* narrative can be made to fit the details of the theory of evolution. In fact, Muzaffar Iqbal expands the list to include many other Muslim scholars who have written works. Abdulrahman Yusuf Ali (d. 1934), Rashid Raza (d. 1940), Ibrahim Ahmad Raza (d. 1908), Murtaza Mutahhar (d. 1992), Muhammad Husayn Behishhti (d. 1908), Javad Bahonar (d. 1980), Sayyid Buzarji (d. 1988), Nuhbatullah Hamidullah (d. 1980), Muhammad al-Jalil (d. 1987). In addition to these scholars we can also mention the influential Egyptian physician Muhammad Fawzi (d. 1988), the Turkish scholar Süleyman Ateş (d. 1983) and the Syrian philosopher Muhammad Nahrour (d. 1941). More recently we

4. Karam Nuh "Islam and evolution: a letter to Sultan Ali" Evolution and Islam. <http://www.maud.com/ISLAM/nuh/evolve.htm>

5. Rashid Raza, *Asrar al-Manâr*, see section under verse 41.

6. Yousaf Shaukat, "The Evolution of Darwin to a Unique Christian Species in Modern Language" Arab Islamic Thought, Islam and Christian Muslim Relations, 26, no. 1, (2015): 23.

7. Muzaffar Iqbal, "On the Sanctity of Species", *Islam & Science*, 12, (Winter 2006): 89.

8. Abd al-Ghaffar al-Ghaffar, "Islamic Theological Views on Darwinian Evolution" Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion, (2016): 9-11.

narrative of Ādam ﷺ with the theory of evolution, the following pages will give exposition to generally represent how Muslim evolutionists engage with the scriptural narrative of human creation.

The contemporary UAE-based Algerian astrophysicist Nidhal Guessem explains that those Muslims who firmly believe in the original creation of Ādam ﷺ employ a "literalistic reading of the Qur'anic verses relating the story of Ādam's creation" and further expresses how he believes

من كلا من الرعبين وقد كان هم شرور مر وبعده يخلق الله في يوم الجمعة و يخلق الله
 في يوم الجمعة عبد من شدة أن ينصف بها في القبيض لا ينصف به لكه وأهل القصور
 يجعلون العدم والملكه داخلين في القبيضين.

Muhammad al-Sanūsī *Sharh al-Aqida al-Sughra* (Damascus: Dar al Taqwa, 2019), 177-179.

Furthermore al-Rātibī d. 675 mentions several conditions that need to be fulfilled for a true contradiction to exist between two singular propositions. They must be identical in terms of their subject, predicate, place, time, potentiality or actuality, conditions or requisites, wholeness or part-wholeness, and ascription.

ولا يحتمل الناقض في المحصرين إلا عند اتحاد موضوعين ويشرح فيه وجود الشره
 والخبره ولكل وعند اتحاد الموضوعين ويشرح فيه وجود الزمان، المكان والإضافة والتقيد
 والعمل

Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Taḥrīr al-Qawā'id al-Muntaqiyah fi Sharḥ al-Risālah al-Shamā'iyyah*, (Lebanon: DKL, 2014), 218.

In this vein, the dispute regarding Ādam ﷺ having parents or not qualifies as a genuine contradiction. The benefit of expressing this plainly now will be appreciated by the reader later in the 'Objections' section where heterodox opinions will be addressed.

Ibn Amr Hār al-Halabī al-Hanafī (d. 879) further explains such contradictions found within rationally possible occurrences (*muhtakikat*):

أن معنى عدم احتمال تعدد لبعض هو أن العقل لا يجوز بوجه من بوجه كون الواقع في
 نفس الأمر مفيض ذلك حكمه جسدي وإن كان من الأمور ممكنة للاستماع بمكان جناس
 القبيضين، وهذا مجموع بيوته في مفهوم معاديه كذا في مفهوم استند إلى الحس وغيره
 فكما أنه إذا ما هذه حركة زيد وبها جسم لا يجوز العوض ألبقة في ذلك نوبت كون زيد
 ساكنا وأخبره سود بن يعطى بن واقع هم هذه النسبة لا يجوز بالعدم العادي كذا.

Ibn Amr Hār al-Halabī al-Hanafī, *al-Taqrīr wa al-Taḥrīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1983), 1:40-41.

In the last model of is an intellectual exercise. This exercise of Al-Sabuni is laudable, and it is good to do it frequently. In *Classical Sources and Methodologies*, Guessoum states:

And there lies the main issue I have with this work, namely the fact that the author omits the possible postulates or expositions he has taken from the mainstream, while noting that these methodological theories were formulated many centuries ago. Even on the various aspects of evolution, namely biological, he sees no paradox in relying on the views of scholars of a thousand years ago when discussing issues that have only become understood in at least the past century. This completely disregards the intellectual and philosophical and theological developments that humanity has witnessed in recent times.

In developing his critique against the "orthodox" opinion, Guessoum makes a crucial assumption (tacitly), the notion that Adam's having had parents was either never entertained by Islamic scholars prior to the advent of Darwinian evolution, or the possibility itself was never fully appreciated on account of not having access to the information we have today about the theory of evolution. This idea of rejecting past exegetes and their consensus on the original creation of Adam is prior to Darwinian evolution is contrary to many Muslim evolutionists. The assertion that past exegetes or claims of consensus (*ijma'*) are now obsolete due to the consensus amongst the scientific community on accepting the theory of evolution will be challenged in a subsequent chapter.

Guessoum's writings host much criticism of those Muslim scholars who adhere to traditional hermeneutical methodologies in understanding the Quran as a account of the creation of Adam etc. Yet his book, *Quran's Question: Questioning Muslim Tradition and Modern Science*, features no attempt to lay out a coherent methodology in understanding the relevant verses or narrations pertaining to human origin; instead, he merely resorts to citing Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), who asserts that:

when the Revealed text contradicts the conclusions reached by reason/philosophy (and for us later science, the religious text

— Abdur Guessoum, "Quran's Necessary Engagement with Modern Science" *Kalam Research & Media*, (2014): 12-13

— Abdur Guessoum, "Book Review of Islam and Biological Evolution: Exploring Classical Sources and Methodologies" (2013): 476-477

metaphors, a matter, miracle, an event, place, a phenomenon, a how which we do not present. It is a question of existence, or of what has an actual evidence even on instance, for we are not really after what is evident, it is only that explanation will be methodical, to secure, despite its own limitations, a work to be given him. Its status as the absolute is seen in a way, or what is the apparent meaning, its scripture should be accepted as the correct meaning, despite that it does not show anything, we are to let it be only so that what is a sign, an even, observed or not, or reason, growth, be a very natural expression, not

Ibn Rushd's approach is that above everything else, understanding the Arabic language and trying to achieve a full or near understanding of the Qur'an is not work to be done by the scholar in his own way. Ibn Rushd explicitly states that a scholar's look towards allegory must correspond to the rules of Arabic language – the point is to work with the conventional and accepted usages of the Arabic language. The scholar must learn Arabic so as to understand the laws of the Qur'an without trying to understand what the literal meaning of the text is. Thereafter, transitioning to an allegorical understanding of the text if it needs to be compared to the actual norms of the given language. In his *Commentary on the Qur'an*, Ibn Rushd does not invent a new framework of how to allegorically understand a passage, nor does he criticize the existing rules concerning scripture interpretation during his time. The claim we cannot favour, as we are allegorically understanding certain verses, Ibn Rushd meant that it must be done so without flouting the known precepts of allegorical interpretation as detailed in the classical manuals of Arabic linguistics and hermeneutics.¹⁴ As such, the bulk of this monography will highlight the significance of just one verse from the Qur'an, its correlation with the rules and conventional expectations of the Arabic language, which Muslim exegetists from both past and present have failed to properly understand.

Furthermore, his discussion of the word leaves out a crucial case, namely, directly for Rushd when reasoning can allegorically understand. When asked if it would be permitted for an atomistic proof (argument) to lead to an allegorical understanding when there already remains a pre-existing consensus (ijma') upon its apparent literal meaning, Ibn Rushd replies that if the consensus has been reached through a means which is certain

¹⁴ Ibn Rushd, *Commentary on the Qur'an*, Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1984, 16.

¹⁵ Ibn Rushd, *Commentary on the Qur'an*, Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1984, 15.

¹⁶ This is a very easily found allusion to the "repleat of hermeneutics" as outlined by Ibn Rushd as noted earlier.

¹⁷ Ibn Rushd, *Commentary on the Qur'an*, Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1984, 16. The author is alluding to the famous statement of the Arabic exegete, Ibn al-Farisi, "The Arabic language is a book of signs" (al-Lughah al-Arabiyyah kitāb al-āyāt).

to state: "Then it would not be correct." On these grounds, Guess may fail to explain how a mutual consensus cannot genuinely exist upon the "apparent meaning" of the verses that speak of Adam's self-original creation. I will also provide details about the matter of consensus later in this study. Instead of Guessoum presenting an application of Ibn Rushd's method of *qiyas* towards understanding the relevant verses and narrations, he simply refers to Muhammad Shakir's book¹⁹ as an example. If someone who "constructs a story of human evolution from the Qur'anic verses that read in total accordance with the modern theory."²⁰

The above from Guessoum are merely samples of typical arguments that are found in the works of other Muslim evolutionists. The common assertion found within their exegesis is that the normative-interpretive hermeneutic employed by previous Muslim scholars cannot be used when dealing with the verses and narrations that speak about the creation of Adam ʿa. The command that suggests the relevant verses regarding Adam ʿa must begin by conceding that he was a product of two parents and not an original creation due to the overwhelming evidence that the theory of evolution has presented. However, this concession would only be acceptable if on one hand, the scientific evidence decisively (*qat'i*) proves that Adam ʿa indeed had parents while on the other hand, the scriptural evidence that speaks of him not having parents is merely speculative (*zann*), either by way of how that scripture reached us and/or by what its words actually connote. This is primarily because it is inconceivable that the Omniscient and All-Wise would reveal something whose import (*al-hukm*) is completely at odds with or even belies reality.²¹

19. Ibn Rushd, *Fi Fihri Ma'na Beirut: Dar al-Mushriq, 1968*, 37.

20. Muhammad Shakir's *al-Kitāb wa al-Qur'ān*.

21. Nadia Guessoum, *Islam: Quantum Question* (London: I B Tauris, 2011), 113.

22. Abu al-Mu'in al-Nasafi ʿa. ʿa. writes in his *Tafsīr al-Azhar* that the Qur'an cannot contradict either divine proof or else it would result in attributing ignorance and foolishness to Allah ʿa.

وَقُلْ كُلُّ شَيْءٍ عِنْدَ رَبِّي بِحِسَابٍ
وَلَقَدْ نَادَىٰ هَارُونَ أَخَاهُ إِذْ رَأَىٰ الْقَوْمَ يَمُوتُونَ أَنِ ارْكَبْ مَعِيَ سَفِينًا وَارْكَبْ مَعِيَ
وَلَا تَكُن مِّنَ الْكَافِرِينَ
فَاسْتَفْتَاهُ عَلَيْهِ فَأَنشَأَ يَدَهُ بِالسَّيْفِ وَقَالَ يَا أَسَافُ ارْكَبْ مَعِيَ
وَلَا تَكُن مِّنَ الْكَافِرِينَ
فَاسْتَفْتَاهُ عَلَيْهِ فَأَنشَأَ يَدَهُ بِالسَّيْفِ وَقَالَ يَا أَسَافُ ارْكَبْ مَعِيَ
وَلَا تَكُن مِّنَ الْكَافِرِينَ
فَاسْتَفْتَاهُ عَلَيْهِ فَأَنشَأَ يَدَهُ بِالسَّيْفِ وَقَالَ يَا أَسَافُ ارْكَبْ مَعِيَ
وَلَا تَكُن مِّنَ الْكَافِرِينَ

Abu al-Mu'in al-Nasafi, *Tafsīr al-Azhar* (Damascus: al-Jam'at al-Islamiyya, 1991), 129.

I likewise ʿa. ʿa. mentions that it is not possible for the Qur'an to

"Do they not then reflect on the Qur'ân? Had it been from anyone other than Allah, they would have certainly found in it many inconsistencies."

The following chapters will attempt to show that the scriptural evidence for Adam ﷺ not having any parents is decisive (qat'i). The crux of this monograph will be dedicated towards proving that the Qur'ân itself decisively²³ indicates this. To the best of my ability, I have written the main text of this work bearing in mind the needs and understandings of the contemporary Muslim reader, while the footnotes were added as supplementary aids for teachers and advanced students of Sunni doctrine. Finally, the forthcoming chapters will only benefit the one who places as an axiomatic premise (muṣallam) that Allah ﷻ is the only Divine ascribed with the most perfect and complete attributes, transcendent beyond likenesses and defects of any kind. Who revealed His inimitable Qur'ân to His most trustworthy and truthful servant, Muḥammad b. 'Aḍālah ﷺ as the criterion (furqan) between truth and falsehood, free of discrepancies, untruths, and doubts. Success is from Allah ﷻ alone.

state other than the truth when Allah ﷻ Himself has referred to it as the "criterion", "guidance", and a "clarification of everything"

وَنُفِصَ شَيْئًا عَلَى صَحِيحِهِ مِنْ بَيْنِ اخْتِلَافِهِ وَإِمْرَارِهِ، فَإِنَّ الْقُرْآنَ سَيِّدُ حَقَائِدٍ وَهَدًى، وَبِرْهَانٍ وَبَيِّنَاتٍ رَتَّبْنَا بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ، رَهْمًا وَحُجَّةً عَلَى الْخَلْقِ عَلَى سَبِيلِ التَّحْصِيلِ وَالْإِعْلَاقِ وَالْعَمْرَمِ، هَذَا لِمَعْنَى بَابِ أَنْ يَحْكِيَ لَيْدٌ مِنْ بَيْنِ يَحْقُ ثُمَّ لَا يَبْنِي عَلَيْهِ

Abū Ishāq al-Shāṭibī, *al-Marwāfuqāt* (Saudi Arabia: Dar Ibn Al-Jarrah 1997) 4:160-23. "Decisively" here means that any other potential, alternative meaning is barred

«نُفِصًا أَيَّ عَلَى وَجْهِ يَقْطَعُ الْإِحْتِمَالَ النَّاسِ عَنْ تَأْيِيلِ

Saḍ al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Tahwīl al-Jawdī* (Beirut: Dār al-Ḍalī, 1996), 1:60-61

In the coming pages, it will be explained why this definition in specific was adopted.

Empirical Methods, Miracles, and Ādam ﷺ

Many Muslims subscribe to the view that Ādam ﷺ was a product of evolution. Many of whom believe this not by any persuasion in the cogency of evolution as a scientific matter, but because they cannot admit the thought of a human being created without a pair of biological parents. The very idea of such a notion is miraculous, and as such does not fit into their philosophical naturalist worldview. This same worldview is further used in negating the occurrence of miracles performed by the prophet of Allah ﷺ and others. To address this issue, I will begin by discussing the nature of all created things followed by explaining how Allah ﷻ is a freely willing agent (*al-fa' al-mukh al-murād*) and necessarily attributed with omnipotence (*al-qadr*) integrated with this will. This will be a discussion about what omnipotence and control to Him and how all of this relates back to the creation of Ādam ﷺ.

Behind the use of the scientific method are certain rational, first principles that underpin empiricism. No natural scientist could ever reject the use of these rational principles, without which every empirical judgment could be contradicted. Every scientist investigates and researches the explanations of phenomena because he fully understands that there must have been a cause for its occurrence. Scientists usually observe natural phenomenon and then conclude that it must have had a cause, due to their firm belief in the principle of causality. Indeed, it is this fundamental belief that drives them to discover the explanations for these natural phenomena.²⁴ But ra-

24. Mustafa Sahar, *al-fa' al-murād*, he says has skepticism in the principle of causality because he is doubting the real world existence of sensory stimuli.

يقول "أقول بأن "السببية في مبدأ "السببية" تعتبر "السببية في وجودها" محسوسة.

Mustafa Sahar, *Manqat al-ʿAlam wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿAdam min ʿIlm al-ʿAlam*, in *al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿAdam*, (Dar al-ʿIlm, Damascus, Dar al-ʿIlm, 2007), 26, 104.

tional conclusions rest on our expectation that causes underlie everything. This is also the case with the conclusions of the scientific method, which presupposes certain philosophical and rational assumptions. Empiricism relies on inductive reasoning whereby incomplete particular results are interpreted and then universalized to reach broader conclusions. The very act of "universalizing" is not rooted in empiricism itself but rather is a judgment of the rational mind. Thus, there are certain accepted, rational constants²⁴ upon which judgments are built.

24. Principle of Identity (PI) (*mabda' al-huwiyya*):²⁵ each thing is identical with itself and different from another. For example, if a "triangle" is essentially a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles, then it is not a "square." Moreover, if at any point, this triangle no longer has three straight sides and three angles but rather possesses four angles or four straight sides, then it would cease to be a "triangle" due to $3 \neq 4$ and $3 \neq 4$.
25. Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) (*mabda' adam al-tanāquḍ*): a proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time i.e., never both (P and not P).²⁶ For example, it is a

24. Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī explains that every human uses these foundations, first principles, and they form the last protection to whatever man knows and seeks to know about that which is real, without which no truth would ever remain:

فكل إنسان يستعملها، وربما لا يعرفها في حالته الابتدائية، أي يستعملها من حيث لا يشعر، وهو آجر تأمين على ما يعرف الإنسان، ربما يريه أن يعرفه من خفايا ولولاهذه تقربت أي حقيقة في الأذهان.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Maṭṭi' al-Aql wa al-ʿilm wa al-ʿālam min Rabḥ al-ʿĀlamīn wa Iʿādih al-Mursalin* (Damascus: Dir al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2164.

26. Al-Taftāzānī (d. 791 h) defines this principle as:

حقيقة الشيء وماهيته ما به الشيء هو هو

Saʿīd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Aqā'id al-Nasafiyya* (Damascus: Muhammad Adnan Darwish, 2005), 57.

27. In this sense, PNC relies on PI to form a logical statement.

Both al-Zarkashī (d. 794 h) and Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 926 h) include the breaking of this principle to be extramentally impossible as well as rationally impossible:

(والصحيح لا فرق) بينهما في استحالة وقوع اجتماع اثنين فكيف يستحيل ذلك على يستحيل فعلاً وإن كان لعقل أن يفرض أمثال إذ لا يلزم من فرض الشيء وهو.

contradiction to say that something is present in one location and simultaneously not present in that very same location in every respect.²⁸

These two foundational principles revolve around the simple understanding (mafhūm) of affirmation (istiqāṭ) and negation (naḍ) – From these two principles, many other rational principles that are used in the field of theology have been derived.²⁹

According to Nūr al-Thaḡayyī, rational judgments (al-ahkām al-aqlīyya al-mathnawīya) regarding all things fall into the following three categories:³⁰

Zakariyyā b. Muḥammad al-Anṣārī, *Fiṭḥ al-Rahmān Sharḥ al-Uqūl al-Aḥiyya* (Amman: Dār al-Nūr, 2016), 102-103.

See also Ibn Balbān al-Hanbalī (d. 1083 h) inclusion of this in his work on *awā'id*.

Ibn Balbān al-Hanbalī, *Qulūb al-Iḥyā* (Jeddah: Dar al-Minhaj, 2015), 283.

28. For example, within the field of quantum mechanics, some scientists have concluded that objects can simultaneously exist in contrary physical states, thereby allegedly disproving PNC. However, upon further scrutiny, scientists have not proven that a particle in superposition has actually manifested in more than one eigenstate at the very same time but have merely shown the potential for it to exist in more than one eigenstate. See the earlier footnote where it was shown from al-Radd al-Shamsiyya that for two propositions to be in contradiction with one another, the two must be the same in actuality (bi al-ḥiṭ) – not merely one of them being in actuality while the other in potential (bi al-quwwa).

29. Such as an effect needing a cause, a physical body occupying space, that which goes through change is contingent, that which is rationally impossible is nonexistent, a compound's existence is dependent upon the collection of its constituents, etc. Al-Rāzī states that many other principles found in mathematics, natural sciences, philosophy, and theology are based on PNC.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Arbaʿin fī Usūl al-Dīn* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Maḥyā al-Aṭhariyya, 1986), 1, 312-314.

30. Aḥmad al-Dardar (d. 1201 h) writes in his famous didactic poem on creed, *al-Kharida al-Bahīyya*:

فالواجب العسل ما لم يتغير الانقياد في ذاته ثابت
والمتحيل كل ما لم يتغير في ذاته الثبوت ضد الأول
وكل أمر قابلي للانقض
والسبب جائز بلا عفا

Table 1

i.	Necessary (<i>waḥḥāt</i>)	Its nonexistence is inconceivable by virtue of what its very essence implies, i.e., the proposition must always be true. An example of a necessary judgment would be that a physical body must be bound by the six spatial directions of above, below, front, back, right, and left.
ii.	Impossible (<i>imkāḥ</i>)	Its existence is inconceivable by virtue of what its very essence implies, i.e., the proposition must always be false. An example of an impossible judgment would be that a physical body is simultaneously in motion and stationary with respect to the same plane.
iii.	Possible (<i>imkān</i>)	Its existence and nonexistence are both conceivable by virtue of what its very essence implies, i.e., the proposition may equally be true or false. An example of a possible judgment would be that a physical body at times can be in motion while other times at rest.

The metaphysical essence of a given thing (*dhāt*), in conjunction with PI and PNC, is at the heart of determining which rational judgment is given

3. The intellect is not independently assigning the rational judgment at random nor is it imposing a given rational judgment upon that thing. Rather, the judgment is inherent to the metaphysical reality of the thing itself as opposed to the intellect independently fixing a judgment upon it.

والحقيق أن أحكام العقل من حيث هي غير مجزئة فليس إلا أن هي التي جعلت
الواجب واجباً ولا إلا أن هي التي جعلت الممكن ممكناً ولا إلا أن هي التي جعلت المحال
محالاً بهذه الأحكام ذاتية للأشياء وليست جعديّة

Sa'īd Fudā, *Maqāṭib al-ḥaqāyiq fī al-Hudūd al-ʿilmīyya wa al-ʿimānīyya* (Amman: al-ʿAdab, 2011), 52.

32. Al-Juwaynī (d. 478 h.) states:

"The result of the preceding inquiry requires, therefore, that intellect is the necessary knowledge of the possibility of things that are possible and the impossibility of things impossible – such as the knowledge of the impossibility of uniting contraries."

to that thing. These rational judgments are derived from understanding the essence (*māhiyya*, *haqiqa*, *dhāt*) of the thing being judged (*maḥkūm alayh*)¹¹ in view of PI and PNC.

Paul E. Walker, *A Guide to Concise Proofs for the Principles of Belief-Reading* (Garnet Publishing, 2000), 10

A. Ghazālī states:

"The impossible consists in affirming a thing conjointly with denying it, affirming the more specific while denying the more general, or affirming two things while negating one of them. What does not reduce to this is not impossible, and what is not impossible is within divine power."

Michael E. Marmara, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* (Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 175

The meaning of "affirming two things while negating one of them]" is to affirm a compound whilst negating one of its components.

Abū al-Hasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324 h) states:

فإن ما ليس حده محال على هذا المحال في كل ذلك ما لم يؤد إلى نوع من محال الذي يمتنع من اجتماع الضدين في المحل

Muhammad b. al-Hasan b. Fūrak (d. 406 h), *Mujarrad Maqālat al-Shaykh Abī al-Hasan al-Ashʿarī* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Diniyya, 2005), 13

A. Bāqillānī (d. 403 h) also includes PNC as a means for acquiring certitude. Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Bāqillānī, *al-Taqrīb wa al-irshād* (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1998), 1190.

Mustafā Šabīrī (d. 1373 h) includes within the possible all that does not violate PNC, circular reasoning, and infinite regression.

Mustafā Šabīrī, *al-Qawl al-Fay*, (Cairo, 1942), 27.

11. Šams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 690 h) states:

فإن ينبغي أن يعلم أن الأمر بالاعتناء في الواجب وسمعه وبتكراره هو بحسب نفس الأمر يعني بالنظر في نفسه مع قلع النظر عن خروجه عنه كمر في عميق نفس الأمر

Šams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, *al-Maʿarif fī Sharḥ al-Sawāʾif* (Cairo: al-Maktabat al-Azhariyya al-Turāth, 2018), 512

al-Sharqawī (d. 1227 h) states:

أن الواجب واجب في نفسه وجد عقل عاقل أو لم يوجد

Given the definition above for the "possible" rational judgment category, we know that these are things that have the potential to either exist or not exist. In other words, with respect to its quality (*imāliyya*) the possible existence (*imkān al-wujūd*) is not an impossibility nor is its nonexistence (*imkān al-'adam*) an impossibility. Said differently, the possible does not imply existence or nonexistence by its very quality and thus these two properties (existence and nonexistence) are equal with respect to it. Therefore for the possible to exist, it would need something besides its very self, or else, had it been on account of its own nature to exist, it would have fallen into the "necessary" category," thereby resulting in a violation of PNC. As a result, a pre-existing preponderator (*murajjih*)³⁴ would be needed for the actual existence of the possible or else it would result in the impossibility of simultaneously affirming "equality" between a.) the two properties of existence and nonexistence in tandem, along with b.) the affirmation of the state of already existing.³⁵ This would be equivalent to affirming the

Abū Allāh b. Hāzīm al-Sharqāwī. *Hāshiyat al-Sharqawī alā Sharh al-Hudhūd alā al-Aqida al-Sanūsiyya* (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥisān, 2017), 134.

34. Hasan al-Aḥār (d. 1350 h) states:

عَمَّ أَنْ الْمَدْعَى هُوَ أَحْتِيَاجُ الْمُسَكِّنِ هُؤُورٍ خَارِجٍ هُوَ رَجَبُ الْوُجُودِ، تَعْرِيرُ الدَّيْلِ هَكَذَا
بِوَحْدَتِ الْمُسَكِّنِ بِنَفْسِهِ لِيَرْجِعَ أَحَدُ حَرْفَيْهِ عَلَى الْآخَرِ بِالسَّبَبِ وَالذَّلِيلِ بَاطِلٌ فَهِيَ الْمَعْدُومُ
ثَبُتٌ بَقِيضِهِ وَهُوَ أَحْتِيَاجُهُ فِي الْوُجُودِ لِمَخْرَجٍ عَنْهُ إِذْ لَا وَسْطَ بَيْنَ وَجُودِ الشَّيْءِ بِنَفْسِهِ وَهُوَ
الْوُجُودُ الْوَاجِبُ وَيَبْقَى وَجُودُهُ مِنْ غَيْرِهِ وَهُوَ الْوُجُودُ الْإِمْكَانِي.

Hasan b. Muḥammad al-Aḥār. *Risāla fī Hudūth al-ʿĀlam* (Amman: KR&M, 2018), 62.

35. al-Ghazālī (d. 505 h) defines this principle of causality as:

وَعَنْ لَا يَرِيدُ بِالسَّبَبِ إِلَّا الْمَخْرَجَ

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. *al-iqtisād fī al-ʿIrqād* (Irbid: Dār al-Minhaj, 2019), 131. A "murajjih" causes the state of existence to preponderate over that of non-existence, and what is meant by cause (*sabab*) here is nothing more than preponderance. Sunni scholars assert the principle of causality purely on rational grounds, not from empirical observations.

36. Ibn ʿAshīr (d. 1042 h) states in his famous poem:

حَدِثَةُ كُلِّ مَخْلُوقٍ مُصَنَّعٌ لَوْ حَدِثَتْ بِغَيْرِ الْأَكْوَانِ لَاجْتِمَاعِ التَّسَادُيِ وَالرَّجَحَانِ وَذَا عَمَلٍ

Muḥammad al-Marakashī, *Sharḥ Ibn ʿAshīr* (Beirut al-Maktaba al-ʿAsriyya, 2005).

existence and nonexistence of a thing at the very same time, an obvious contradiction.³⁷ Thus, establishing the need for something other than the possible itself for its existence to be actualized.³⁸ This "need" indicates that after coming into existence (i.e., being preceded by nonexistence) every existent thing (*ḥadīth*) by virtue of this very "need" is imperfect (*naqṣ*), and thus cannot be necessarily existent (*wājib al-wajūd*). The need for every originated event to have a preceding cause, and for *that* preceding cause" to have a preceding cause of its own, will continue until this chain of causes and effects must necessarily come to an end with what is necessarily existent (*wājib al-wujūd*), i.e., Allah. For lest we fall into affirming infinite regression,³⁹ an impossibility. Moreover, to simultaneously attribute independence and dependence to this first "cause" would result in a further contradiction.⁴⁰

37 Due to PNC.

38 This is unlike that which is currently nonexistent. For the nonexistent does not require a preponderator.

Abū al-Mu'in al-Nasafī states:

العدم ذي فلا يقتضي تدليلاً ولا تخصصاً بخلاف الوجود

Abū al-Mu'in al-Nasafī, *Taḥsīnāt bi-Adilla* (Damascus: al-Jaffa & al-Jabī, 1990), 78.

39 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī (d. 1373 h) states:

إذا كان لا بد لكل حادث من علة، والذات لم من الرجحان من غير مرجح له، ولم من «مناقض». فإما أن تكون العلة أيضاً حادثاً كالمحول، أو قديمة وجبة فعل بشي، ثبت المطلوب، أعني وجود الواجب الذي يكون به عن الله كما يكون عنه في اصطلاح فلاحة الغرب من «العلق». وعلى الثاني لأوله يلزم أن تكون هذه العلة القريبة، المنصبة بالمحول مستندة إلى علة أخرى بعيدة. وهي علة العلة. فإن كانت هذه البعيدة قديمة وجبة ثبت المطلوب في المرحلة الثانية، وإن كانت ممكنة حدثت من علة أخرى، أبعد من الثانية، التي هي علة العلة وهكذا تدور بينة إلى أن يستلزم بعض، أي عدد الحوادث الحادثة إلى غير نهاية، فيلزم مستمر لحال، أو يقطع التسلسل في عده بحكم قديمة راجية، ويثبت المطلوب.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Minḥaf al-Aḥl wa al-Uḥd wa al-Adam min Raḥb al-Adām wa ḥudūḥ al-Mursalā*, (Damascus: Dar al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2166.

40 al-Ṣanūsī (d. 895 h, defines divinity as independence and freedom from having any need from anyone or anything, while all else are in need of it.

يد معنى الأفرعية استغناء الإله عن كل ما سواه واقتدار كل ما عداه إليه

Bearing the above in mind, I can further be asserted that based on the attainment of a definition for the possible category, it is very quickly having the characteristic to either "possibly" exist or not exist must be an intrinsic attribute (*sahādhārya*) that cannot be removed from it, since the very conception of the quality of the possible necessitates this, or else it would result in an inversion (viparyaya) of the realities of things as we know them.⁴ Whereby the possible now becomes the necessary, resulting in a violation of PNC. This is different from other attributes that are extrinsic (*avādhārya*) such that its removal, or modification would not prevent conceiving the essence of that possible thing.⁵ Furthermore, when the attribute of "possibility" for the possible is intrinsically necessary (*anupādāya*), then it necessarily follows that the possible cannot have an independent effectuation (*atitha dhātū*) of its own,⁶ neither to originate itself

Abraham al-Buhārī, *Kitābunnaṣaybi fī Bayan al-Aḥwāl al-Sunaniyya* (Leopoldus: Dā al-Farḡ, 1901), 38.

4. Sa id Fōda, *Aqsam al-Hakim al-Aql wa Bayan Ma manna wa al-Astaqa Baya al-Aql wa Bayan al-Nuql* Amman: a. 132 (1911) p. 10.

42 Ibn Sina al 425 h states that an example of this type would be the color of a human:

لهم معناه واحظر الرجال وفهم ما هو ردي له واحظر الرجال معناه يحسن أن
عهم عوصوم الا بعد فهم ذلك لمي "لا كالانسان والحيوان" فذلك انهم
خير من فهم ما لانسان فلا تفهم لانسان الا وقد فهم وانما حيوانه رثا ما ليس
دائما فقد تفهم ذات المصروف محررا ذواته ككوبه أيضا أو موجود مثلا

Şa'ib Huda, *Taşınan al-Manşeq* Amman: Dār al-Naṣr, 2014) 92.

43 a. Demăni (d. 1244 b) states:

تكون الشيء من الخلق يؤثر بطبيعته أو على سبيل التعليل أو يؤثر بهما. فذلك الذي في
سائر المقدمات الخاصة أو يؤثر بالاختيار المقدر خصصا لذلك ومما هو في الأصل
من دم المقدرية (أو الإرادة) أي هو كالنقد المقدر الخاص بأمير بدم (في) أي في
المراد المقدر الخاصة (أي في) مع عدم إمكانه (أي هو كالنقد المقدر الخاص بأمير بدم
سكانه ما عند إمكانه) (أي الأفعال يصبح معنى المقدر بتقديمها قبل تعقب المقدر الخاصة
لأن معنى المقدر الخاصة للدم ما ذكر) أي استحالة ما عدم إمكانه وهو ممكن في
مطلق المقدر الخاصة أنرت فيه يستحيل أي يوجد في الجملة من كمال الخاص
ويستحيل أن يتحقق على عدمه لما في إمكانه على عدمه من رفع الواسع

Abdullah A. Al-Q. al-Duman, *Shari'at Aspek-aspek Kiblat al-Sayyid: Himpun Ngar*

nor for its continued existence thereafter. It supposedly we were to assign the property of independent effectuation to the possible, this would result in the no longer being subject to the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ or that He is unable to oppose this independent effectuation.⁴⁴ If one were to argue that the decree of Allah ﷻ could just fail in agreement with each instance of the possible's independent effectuation, this would result in a metaphysical overdetermination (*taḥsil al-ḥāsil*)⁴⁵ thereby rendering the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ superfluous. Worse yet, an assertion that the possible's independent effectuation could defy the decree of Allah ﷻ or can entirely take the place of it would result in an inversion of reality such that the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ is no longer absolute and omnipotent over all possible beings.⁴⁶ This would entail that a certain thing can come into existence without the decree of Allah ﷻ which is impossible since the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ

Ḥammādī), 137.

44. Mustafā Šabī states:

ولا يجوز تصور بالأسباب في ذيل التوحيد إلا على تقدير أن يكون سببها مجعولة مسبقة
لأن صفة غير قائمة بتسمين والتعريف ولا يقرب شيء من الأسباب في التكاليف الخاصة بصفة
من ذاته غير ذاته بل بصفة لا يمكن أن يكون إلا الطبيعي لا يمكن أن يكون إلا بالذات غير
المتعارف

Mustafā Šabī, *Maḥqūf al-ʿAql wa al-ʿItqād al-ʿAlam min Rabb al-ʿAlam wa ʿIbādih al-Muṣallin* (Damascus: Dar al-Tarbiya, 2007), 4:34.

45. Once something has been effectuated, then it would not require any other effector to effect anything. In other words, once the cause of a given effect has been determined, assigning to it a second cause is impossible. Therefore, this is an impossibility.

46. al-ʿIrāzālī states regarding the impossibility of the recurrent power (*qudra al-ḥāditha*) being independent:

والتحليل رجوعه إلى عموم بقدر القدرة وأن خروجه عن القدرة يطل عموم معها وهو
بحال لم موجب للعجز والتضام أن حادثات كل جواهر وأعراض حادثات منها في
ذات الأحياء وحادثات وقع بقدره الله سبحانه وتعالى وهو بسببه إحداثها ولو لم يقع
بعض محذورات بعض من الكل يقع بالقدر وذلك ما أبد أن يكون من ثبات صفة القدرة
الله تعالى وعموم حكمها وما تضمن بها من الفروع والذوات

Abu Ḥamid al-ʿIrāzālī, *al-Iqtisād fi al-ʿItqād (ʿUddah, Dār al-Minhār 2019*, 225-226.

See also: Izz al-Ramṣilān al-ʾAbida al-Quḍra al-ʾItāyā wa al-ʾAlam al-ʾArṣ al-ʾAbi, *Dhahab Tabah Foundation*, 2018,, 30.

being absolute is a rational judgment that cannot be restricted or qualified (takhsis).⁴⁶ Additionally if one insisted on simultaneously affirming both the absolute omnipotence of Allah ﷻ that He alone brings into being all possible things as well as to be independent effectuator of the possible, then this would result in the possible being born from the impossible. Given that this consequent is conservably false it then follows that its antecedent must also be false at the outset.⁴⁷

47. Al-Ghazālī states:

فقد نه تعالى سبحانه يحسن محكم فإن الامكان لا يحصر في عدم وجوده ذات القدرة
ولا يختص بعدم دور عدم فلا يمكن أن يدور في حركة يقان بها حد من إمكان معين
بعد ما بها مع ما تعلقت بسننها بالضرورة . نعم أن ما وجب بشئ وجب لشئ

Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī, *al-Ihtisād fi al-'Irqād* (Cairo: Dar al-Munaj, 2019), 207-208.

The Annam-based Palestinian specialist in *kuḥm*, Sa'id Fuda states:

والحكام الشرعية لا يجوز تخصيصها، لأن كل شيء به أهل السنة وجماعته هو أنهم لم يخرجوا
محكما موحدا من أن يكون متعلقا من معتقدات ديرة الله سبحانه وتعالى.

Sa'id Fuda, *Taqrīr wa Sharḥ al-Sawā' al-Muḥall al-Mukhtasar Maḥmūd al-Kharāḍ al-Bahayy* (Amman: al-Asi'ā), 13-14.

likewise Ibn Amr Ḥajj al-Ḥarabī al-Hanafī. Ḥanafī explains how things that do not undergo abrogation – such as rational necessities for Allah ﷻ – are not subject to change:

في التجويز الحسني ومعنى الاحتسان في معنى الأمر فلا يكون الحق بيقار ما موجد لا
يكون سبب نعم نعم بالأمر التي لا تكيل نسخ ما بها لعدم وجود وجود واجب
به وما قدع شريسته ومحمد ذلك لا يختص المصطفى المذكور لا يتأق فيها التجويز
بمعنى القبيض

Ibn Amr Ḥajj al-Ḥarabī al-Hanafī, *al-Taqrīr wa al-Talīb* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1983), 40-41.

48. The absolute omnipotence of Allah ﷻ requires that all possible things be subject to the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ. This extends to the perceived omnipotence that we possess by which we carry out our actions. For any action X we do will only come to actualization after the omnipotence needed to cause vest to carry it out is first actualized before it. But as is obvious, this created omnipotence within us is likewise subject to the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ. Therefore for one to simultaneously claim to affirm both the absolute omnipotence of Allah ﷻ as well as the independent effectuation by the possible would necessitate that this

We also know that Allah *ﷻ* is the freely willing agent (*mufta* or *mukhtār*).⁵⁰ First, by virtue of the universe coming into existence,⁵¹ and second, by observing the specification of it and all that it contains, including prophethood – the bedrock of this religion. If Allah *ﷻ* is not a

Ibn Kamāl Pāshā (d. 940 h) similarly states in his *Risāla fi Talqīq Fiqh al-Tanqīh al-Mumkin*:

بإمكانه في كل وقت كلاً مما يشاء من حيث هو في تلك الصورة الممكنة
عنه وإلا لم تكن تلك الذات لانتهاء مقتضاها من حيث هي

Ibn Kamāl Pāshā *Majmaʿ Rasāʾil Ibn Kamāl Pāshā* (Istanbul: Dār al-ʿUlūm, 2018), 6470.

Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī likewise states:

بإمكانه جازية البدء لا يستعني عن موثر بانه يبدأ أن يبدئ بحاجته رب في الإمكان
والإمكان لازم للماهية لا يحتاج الانقلاب والماهية محتاجة أمراً

Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, *al-Maʿārif fi Sharḥ al-Sabʿ al-ʿAsr al-Makṭab al-Azhariyya* III: Turāth, (2018), 1596.

50 Allah *ﷻ* states in the Qurʾān: “Your Lord creates what He wills and chooses” (28:68).

A. Zabīdī (d. 1205 h) states regarding this verse:

يصدق محضاً كمال في ذاته وصفاته وله الاختيار بين الفعل ومع الفعل وبعد الفعل
والكامل في ذاته وصفاته فاعل مختار اورثك بخلق ما يشاء واختار

Murtadā al-Zabīdī, *Jihāz al-Sawar al-Muttaqin bi Sharḥ Hiyāʾ Ulūm al-Dīn* (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr), 9455.

51 See al-Ghazālī’s proofs for the universe being contingent. Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqṣād fi al-ʿIrqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Munhaḥ, 2019), 129–133, 134–135.

52 A. Sarūṣī states that due to the creator having specified one equal property in place of another for the universe, it becomes incumbent that He is a freely willing originator:

قد عين العالم قد حصص مثلاً عن مثل فتعين أو يكون موجداً بالاختيار

Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sarūṣī, *Sharḥ al-Aqida al-Kubrā* (Damascus: Dār al-Taqwā, 2019), 200.

53 Allah *ﷻ* states in the Qurʾān (14:11):

قَالَتْ نَحْنُ رُسُلُكُمْ إِنْ كُنْ مِنْكُمْ إِلَّا نَبْرٌ تَقْتُلُكُمْ وَلَكِنَّ اللَّهَ يُنْزِلُ عَلَى مَنْ يَشَاءُ مِنْ عِبَادِهِ

freely willing agent, then it would be non-necessary for one specific man to have been selected to receive His revelation amongst many other men.

Once it is understood that (i.) all things that have come into existence must require Allah ﷻ for their initial origination and for their continued existence and that (ii.) He is a freely willing agent, then any miracles or supernatural event that results in the rupture of the norm would be possible so long as it does not result in a violation of PI-PNC. This is because it would be illogical to suggest that something that intrinsically requires Allah ﷻ for its initial origination and for its continued existence at every moment thereafter can somehow be independent from His Divine discretion (*irāda*). The very nature (*mahiyah*) of the staff of Prophet Musa ﷺ for example, requires it to be from the possible, and therefore susceptible to nonexistence at any given moment, after its existence.⁵⁴ After the staff is

“The messengers said to them, “We are indeed only humans like you, but Allah favors whoever He chooses of His servants.”

و قال المرسلون مستمعين له يوسف

“I have chosen you, so listen to what is revealed” 20:23.

Presumably, it was on account of these verses that al-Rāzī (d. 606 h) stated in his final book that if Allah ﷻ were not a freely willing agent, it would impair the concept of prophethood whereby one man amongst many was chosen to receive revelation.

لا يثبت أن هذا الحديث اعتادة منتهية إلى أن لا نرم العرب بمحدودة محدودة لا أوله
وذلك بوجوب عدم العدم رقدم العالم يفتح في بنيان العالم المختار و يفتح في العالم
الاعتاد يسمع من القول بصحة البرهان فثبت أنه لا بد من الاعتراف بوجوب انتهاء هذه
الحوادث اعتادة إلى أول ومبدأ.

Taḥrīr al-Dār al-Rāzī, *al-Munāẓib al-ʿAlīyya* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya 1999), 8:34.

54. Al-Rāzī explains that everything aside from Allah ﷻ is contingent (*mumtadhi*) and that every contingent is susceptible to existence or nonexistence and that this property is intrinsic (*maḥmūl*), to its very quiddity (*mahiyah*). Moreover, al-ḥaq is intrinsically necessary to be essence must necessarily be in perpetuity, for as long as the essence is. Thus, the susceptibility of nonexistence for the possible is always plausible:

ما يثبت في مسألة حدوث العالم أن كل ما سوى الله تعالى فهو محدث، وكل محدث قد
يحدث في عدم وعدمه والوجود وهذه القابلية من دارم ماهية وكل ما كان من دارم ماهية
قدرة وحب أنوار في جميع زوايا دارم ماهية قدرة قابلية لعدم من دارم ماهية كل ما سوى

Coming back to the discussion regarding the creation of Adam ʿā, it may be argued that a human (*inān/bashar*) is normally born from two biological parents, and since Adam ʿā is described as a *bashar* in scripture, he must be attributed with a pair of biological parents. However, the words *inān* and *bashar* in Arabic do not analytically require that one must be born to two biological parents.⁵⁶ Furthermore, as the following pages will demonstrate, being born from a pair of two parents is not an intrinsic (*dhātī*) necessity for a human. As such, no violation of PNC is entailed by believing that Adam ʿā was created without a pair of biological parents. The Quran itself attests to this by stating that Isā ʿā was created without a biological father,⁵⁷ yet his humanity was never brought into question. If a Muslim decides to obdurately reject the possibility of an *inān/bashar* being created without a parent(s), he would fall into disbelief (*kūfūr*) for

Maqṣad al-Maṣṣaḥif (Darmstadt: Dār al-Furūq, 2007), 2: 248–249.

56. Al-Ashʿari states that due consideration to textual connotations will be given when specialists of that language use such connotations in the meaning of that word. Here, al-Ashʿari suggests that Arabic linguists have not included the word “*inān*” to mean that it must be a product of semen:

وهذا غير ما في لسان الذي هو من مطلق بانه هو كان بسان لأنه من بضعه ومن معنى أنه من بضعه بحد ذاته هو بضع بيروني ما كان هذا التركيب لخصوص حرمه يعني هذه البنية منه بسان الشخص ما هو عليه من التركيب والبنية عند أنه كان انسان لأجل أنه هذا التركيب بحد ذاته كل ما كان على مثل تركيبه انسان واجب في اطلاق الاسم عليه بل تعريف أهل اللغة

Muhammad b. al-Hasan b. Furak, *Maqṣad al-Maṣṣaḥif al-Shaykh al-Hasan al-Ashʿari* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1987), 29.

See further definitions in:

Manṣūr Abd al-Ḥakīm, *Qasṣat Ahl al-Adab min al-Tarikh al-Jamāʿi* (Darmstadt: Dār al-Kutub al-Arabi, 2013), 20–32.

57. Al-Bajūrī (d. 1276 h) states:

ولا يرد أن في ذلك شبه محقق وهو أنه لأن الله عز وجل خلق آدم من طين
العتل بلا يتقرب الواجب جائراً مثلاً

Ibrahim b. Muhammad al-Bajūrī, *Tamḥīl al-Maṣṣaḥif* (Amman: Dār al-Nur, 2016), 49.

58. In propositional logic, the case of Isā ʿā would function as the particular negative (*isālah maṣṣaḥif*) (contradict) on (*naqḍ*) of the universal judgment that “all humans possess a pair of biological parents.”

59. See verses 41/2, 19/5, 9/29–30, and 43/59 regarding Isā ʿā being a human.

rejecting the humanity of Isā ﷺ. If on the other hand, he was to affirm a father for Isā ﷺ, then consequently it would lead to affirming a spouse for Maryam ﷺ, another blasphemy (kufr).⁶⁰ Thus, the Muslim evolutionist who denies that an insan/bashar could have been created without a parent is left with only two choices, both equating to kufr. Moreover, Allah ﷻ mentions in the Qur'an that after dying, each human will be resurrected and judged on the Day of Judgment:

"To Him is your return all together. Allah's promise is always true. Indeed, He originates the creation then resurrects it so that He may justly reward those who believe and do good. But those who disbelieve will have a boiling drink and a painful punishment for their disbelief."⁶¹

Allah ﷻ further states how the disbelievers deny the bodily resurrection in the Hereafter:

Do people not see that We have created them from a sperm-drop, then—behold!—they openly challenge Us? And they argue with Us—forgetting they were created—saying, "Who will give life to decayed bones?" Say [O Prophet], "They will be revived by the One who produced them. He fits it, for He has [perfect] knowledge of every created being. [He is the One] Who gives you fire from green trees, and—behold!—you kindle fire from them. Can the One who created the heavens and the earth not easily resurrect these [deniers?]" Yes. He can! For He is the Master Creator, All-Knowing. All it takes, when He wills something to be, is simply to say to it: "Be!" And it is!⁶²

60. See verses 3:42, 4:171, and 19:16-23 regarding Isā ﷺ not having a father.

61. 10:4

بِهِ مَرْجِعُكُمْ حَمِيدٌ" وَعَدَ أَنَّهُ حَيُّ زَاهِدٌ خَلْقُكُمْ يَعْبُدُ فَيُخْرِقُ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا
وَعَبَدُوا لِصَلْبٍ ثَقِيلٍ رَدَّ فِي صُكُورِهِمْ شَرِبَتْ مِنْ غَيْبِهِ وَعَذَابُ أَلِيمٍ بَمَا كَانُوا
يَكْفُرُوا

62. Abu al-Barakat al-Nasafi (d. 710 h) relates agreement of the Muslims on the resurrection being bodily:

أهل الإسلام متفقون على إثبات المعاد الجسدي

Abu al-Barakat al-Nasafi, in *Umm al-Furūd fi'l-Furūd* (Damascus: Maktabat Dar al-Farā, 2020), 323.

63. 36:77-82

tion of a human on Earth without any parents on the Day of Judgment but deny the possibility of it on Earth now?⁶⁶ We observe time after time that animals are created by means of sexual reproduction involving a pair of two living, adult parents. However, we have also come to know that many different organisms, amphibians, crustaceans, reptiles, and insects are also known to reproduce both sexually and asexually while even some mammals have been found to reproduce asexually in laboratories. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Allah sw informed us in the Qur'ān regarding the case of Isā عليه السلام, the she-camel of Šālih عليه السلام, the serpent of Mūsā عليه السلام, and the bird of Isā عليه السلام all of whom were created without sexual reproduction. These examples and those narrated in unequivocal terms in the Qur'ān indicate to us that while being created through sexual reproduction is the norm, it is by no means the only possible process by which animals can be created. Our ability to arrive at this is a rational conclusion. Based on this rational conclusion, the mind immediately recognizes that no violation of first principles, such as PNC, occurs in these examples and incidents. For that which can be different from the norm (*akhalīf*) in actuality could never be in violation of a rational constant such as PNC nor could it be posited that this norm is a necessary concomitant⁶⁷ with the essence of that very

Abd al-Mālik b. Yūsuf al-Tawarrī, *al-Shāmil fi Ḥikāyat al-Dīn* (Tehran: Tehran University 1981), 63.

Al-Ghazālī elaborates further by stating that the necessary relationship between a cause and its effect is only certain when the number of causes is limited to one. In the case that more than one cause is conceivable then the mere negation of just one cause does not necessitate the negation of the effect:

العلاقة التي بين السبب والمفعول (يقوم من تقدير عدم سببه عدم المفعول) لا بد يحكي للمفعول، لا عنه واحد، بل تصور أن يكون له سبب آخر، فيترجم من تقدير شيء كسبب في مفعول ولا يترجم من تقدير شيء كسببها في مفعول مطبق في يترجم في مفعول سبب الحلة على الخصوص.

Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtisād fī al-Fiqh* (Jeddah: Dar al-Minhaj, 2019), 179.

67. Similarly the example of the resurrection would function as the particular negative (*ṣaḥābiyya*) of the judgment that “all humans are created through either sexual or asexual reproduction.”

68. In fact, every Muslim must admit that from the time of the creation of the first man on Earth till after the Day of Judgment, the number of times a human will be created without any means of sexual or asexual reproduction will outnumber the times a human will be created through both kinds of reproduction combined.

69. I.e., *lāzim lil-dhāt/mahīyya*.

thing. Accordingly, hearing of a human being created without a parent(s) would admittedly be atypical (read: "*kharij al-'ada*" but not irrational."

To Whom Do We Attribute Cause?

At this juncture, it will help to flesh out the difference between what is meant by the metaphysical reason (*waḥd al-ʿiqṣār*) for a given occurrence versus its actual conjunction (*naṣṣ al-ʿiqṣār*). This difference is succinctly explained in al-Ghazālī's example that every rational person would immediately acknowledge the certain death of anyone whose neck has been severed. A philosophical naturalist would attribute the outcome here to be one of absolute rational necessity (*ḥukm dārūrī*) such that it would be impossible for it to ever be otherwise; while the Muslim will attribute the metaphysical cause here to be a result of the governance of Allah ﷻ as per His pre-eternal will. In other words, neither of the two disagree in the constant conjunction (*naṣṣ al-ʿiqṣār*) between death and the severance of the neck, rather the disagreement lies in the metaphysical cause.⁷⁰ Likewise, there is no dispute

to. Al-Ghazālī states that there are many wondrous and strange things we have never witnessed before that fall into what is possible for Allah ﷻ. Why then, should we deny their possibility and judge them to be impossible?

وفي معذرت الله عزائب وعجائب وعنى لم يشاهد جميعها فبعضهم يبي أن يكون ممكنة
ويعكم باستحالها⁷¹

Michael E. Marmura, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* (Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 172

Furthermore, al-Ghazālī states that if the impossibility of a thing cannot be proven demonstratively then denying its possibility sheerly due to its strangeness is not correct.

ما لا يبرهان على إحالة لا يبي أن يكون بمجرد الاستبعاد

Abū Ḥamūd al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqṣād fī al-ʿIrqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhaj, 2019), 174.
71. Al-Ghazālī states:

بين حال قائل كيف يتصور هذا بعبارة؟ والمتكلمون شكوا فيه وقالوا ليس الجزم سبب
مستوف ولا الأكمل سبب لتشيع ولا التدرج عنه للإخراف. وبكى الله تعالى بخلق الإخفاق
الشيخ عبد البرهان هذه الأمور لا بها فبعضهم يبي أن يكون هذا العبد وحقيقته في
كتاب المبادئ الفلاسفة والعبد صحيح إياه الآن أن استكماله في آخره بان رتبة جرد
فبعضهم يشك في دونه وليس في العقل من يشك فيه وهو معروف بمحسوس لم يرد وبأحدث
عن وجه لا يبرهان وإنما النظر في به من هو مبروم ضروري ليس في الإمكان بغيره أو هو

n that for any given mans existence, whom we meet in *this* world there is the conjunction of sperm meeting egg. The dispute lies in someone claiming that this is an absolute rational necessity such that the chance of an anomaly is impossible while the Muslim will not aphysically consider sexual reproduction to be in accordance with the customary order of affairs in the world as set by Allah ﷻ. Had Allah ﷻ willed a rupture in this norm, then a human could be created via another means, as was done in the past and will occur in the Hereafter.

Demystifying the Parentless Human

It could further be argued that we have never heard of a man being born without a set of biological parents, and so the default judgment regarding any individual should be exactly this. Doesn't this "default judgment" carry any probative value?

In answering this question, it will help to recall what Quessoury stated that when "the Revealed text contradicts the conclusions reached by Reason/Philosophy (and for us later science) – the (religious) Text must be allegorically understood."⁷¹ The use of "science" as a criterion for forcing allegorical interpretations of the Qur'an is highly problematic for various reasons. First, it must be understood what exactly is being said when scientists issue normative judgments arrived at by means of the scientific method regarding a given incident or phenomenon.

The physical sciences i.e. science only indicate that which materially exists or materially does not exist and are confined to physical observation or detection. The scientific method cannot ascend to making metaphysical judgments regarding whether a given thing must necessarily exist, necessarily cannot exist, or could possibly exist and possibly not exist – meta-

محكمه جريان منه الله تعالى بنموه مسببه لا ريبه اي لا تخش منه بر والتعبير "مهر
نظر في وجه لا قبر لا في نفس لا قبران فيهم هـ ويجمع أن يشكك في موت من
جرت رقبته ويؤمن مجرد وأن اعطاء موته يدين لا يثرب فيه

Ahi Hamida, *Chahid: Martyr of the Egypt* Dār al Ma'ārif 1961, 90-191

By this, the notion that Muslims cannot function as evolutionary biologists without having some kind of internal contradiction is dispelled – the Muslim scientist will simply be in the pursuit of determining the conventional laws by which the universe has been designed to operate on by its Maker, while the atheist will be in the pursuit of determining what he believes is an absolutely necessary cause.

71. Nidhal Quessoury, *Islam & Quantum Question* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 22.

72. Refer to Table 1, for definitions of these terms.

physical questions are not amenable to the scientific method. Rather, the assertion of universal, peremptory judgments of his kind (i.e. metaphysical) regarding existence and nonexistence is squarely within the ambit of pure reason, not empirical science.⁷⁴ The drawbacks of using scientific inquiry as a criterion in making judgments regarding when the Qur'ân should be allegorically interpreted can readily be perceived by the following description given by Mustafâ Sabrî:

In relation to existence, the scope or potential possibility of existence (*imkān*)⁷⁵ is vastly broader in scope than the scope of actualized existence (*wuqū*):⁷⁶ while the scope of actualized existence (*wuqū*) is broader than the scope of necessary existence (*dawr al-wuqū*):⁷⁷ and finally the scope of non-existence (*lāwuqū*),⁷⁸ is broader than the scope of impossibility of existence (*istihāl*).⁷⁹ Thus, empirical/nonne judgments (read "science") only pertain to the two categories of actualized-existence (*wuqū*) and non-existence (*lāwuqū*), while the remaining three categories of «existence» (*imkān*, *dawr al-wuqū* and *istihāl*), can only be ascertained by reason. Moreover, even within these two categories that empirical judgments relate to (actualized existence and non-existence), it alone cannot universalize a given judgment that lies in the non-existence (*lāwuqū*) category.⁸⁰

74. Sa'îd Fûda states in this vein:

والدلالة العادية من شأنها أن تثبت على ما وقع فيه ذلك على ما هو عليه ووقوعه معلوم
بأخص ما دلالة ما لعقل توسط العادة، فالعناد هو وسعة الدلالة على التجويز فهي باطنة
بعدم وجوبها عند العادة بل قبل على استحالة ألا تقع فيصير ذلك عدم وقوعه مجرد
احتمال عقلي

Sa'îd Fûda, *al-Sharh al-Kubrî* (Beirut: Dâr al-Dharrî, 2014), 405.

75. All that could exist

76. All which has ever existed or will exist in the future

77. That which preternaturally has always existed, continues to do so, and will forever eternally exist

78. Includes all that does not exist

79. All that can never possibly exist.

80. Mustafâ Sabrî states:

ثم جدير بالذكر هو خير فتح بالنظر في محم بيتنا عبد هو محال في حين أن بيوتهم مرد عظيم
لأن محال حتى كما ليس بواقع لهم يريد على غير الواقع بعدم إمكان الوقوع وفي حين أن

Figure 1 is a visual representation of the scopes for existence and non-existence as explained by Şahri




Figure 1 :
Scope for existence

التجربة اذ انه على محذور الوقوع أو اللاتوقوع لا تصعد إلى مرتبة حكمكم بضرورة، ومع ذلك
استحالته غير الوقوع إذ احكمكم بالضرورة، أو الاستحالة أو الإمكان من اختصاص يدق
رئيس من شأن التجربة فالإمكان وسع نطاق من الوقوع بكثير ووقوع صيق وضرورة
الوقوع أصيقي كما أن الاستحالة التي هي معنى عدم الإمكان أصيقي من عدم الوقوع
وهذه خمس مراتب الإمكان ووقوع وضرورة الوقوع وعدم الوقوع واستحالة الوقوع
صاحكم التجربة في الوقوع و اللاتوقوع فقط حتى إذ حكمكم في اللاتوقوع لا يكون كناية
بعدم معنى الكلمة أما الدلالة الباقية فالخاصكم فيها العقل

Muṣṭafā Şahrī, *Manẗiqat al-ʿAql wa al-ḥurūf al-ʿAlam min Rabb al-ʿAlamīn wa
ḥadīth al-Mursatīn* (Jannasus, Dā al-Tarbiya, 2007) 4:31



Figure
Scope for non-existence

The reason why Ṣabīr asserts that science cannot universalize a given judgment of those things that are from the non-existence (*ghāybiyya*) category is because sense perceptions, observations, experimentation, and induction are only useful for affirmative propositions whereas some inferential reasoning is required to infer negative propositions. Thus, the extent of what the scientific method can tell us with surety is that whatever we have experimented or perceived is indeed exactly what was detected, but it cannot go farther in informing us regarding the rational possibility or impossibility of something occurring that is anomalous to what has been tested, without resorting to reason.⁸¹ In other words, empirical methods alone cannot conclude the rational impossibility of an experimental anomaly, just as empirical methods alone cannot reveal the rational necessity of an obtained experimental result.⁸² How then can it be rationally said

81. Muṣṭafā Ṣabīr states in this vein:

3. نيسر للمعلوم احديده بيبينه كل التجارب خاصة، حق الكلام بالشيء و الإثبات في
الوجوب والاستحالة الذي حد فوه من تجارب التجربة، و لمزل فيهما للعقل في حد رد
محرره قاصرة على إدراكه وهو الشيء إلى جسد التجربة في هذا يضرب من معرفة هو
تخرج إليه غنوت بضعه خاصة، فالتجربة فقط العقل أكثر من، أو لا وفور من المعاديين
يكون بلوغ الوقوع حد الوجوب واللا وقوع حد الاستحالة

Muṣṭafā Ṣabīr, *Maṣṣūf al-ʿAql wa al-Haqq al-ʿAlam min Qurʾān al-ʿAlam wa Ṭibāʾih al-Mursala* (Damascus: Dar al-Ṣarb wa, 2007), 2: 21.

82. Ṣaʿīd Jada, *Tafṣīl al-Shaṭṭ al-Sawt al-Masṭūf al-Muṣṭafā al-ʿAlam al-ʿAlam al-Bahiyā* (Amman: al-ʿAslīn), 16.

that a certain miraculous event mentioned in scripture is "impossible" or "possible" based on empirical methods alone? Our rational or "defective" judgment *judgment* that every human has a set of two parents is undoubtedly correct from our repeated observation of it. But if we were to imagine for just a moment that we have never witnessed (or heard about) the creation of man except that we knew it could be rationally created by means of different processes than the mere first instance of us witnessing a man would not yield to us by which of these processes it was created from.⁸³ This first ever observation would only provide us with the fact that there had to have been a process behind its creation.⁸⁴ Knowing that it is rationally possible to conceive⁸⁵ of a human not having full biological parentage, the normal judgment of possessing full biological parentage cannot ascend to the level of declaring the absolute and categorical impossibility of a human without parents.⁸⁶ This is precisely why al-Razi related that it was the position of Abū al-Hasan al-Ash'ari, the eponymous Imam of

83. Again based on what was previously mentioned, that man can be created through sexual reproduction or asexual reproduction and without reproduction if there is no sex, that the mere affirmation of a human's existence does not by itself necessitate the affirmation of sexual reproduction being its antecedent. This is due to the possibility of the consequence being a result of several other potentially viable antecedents. Al-Ya'qubī explains this in repeated detail:

وهو راجع إلى فلا يمتنع راجع لعدم راجع لعدم يمتنع راجع إلى هو لا يمتنع
بل راجع لعدم راجع إلى يمتنع يمتنع راجع إلى يمتنع يمتنع راجع إلى يمتنع

Abū Aḥmad al-Ya'qubī, *Sharḥ Tahdhīb al-Muntahā* (Amman: Dar al-Nur, 2018), 340.

84. Al-Maḥṣul, d. 11, h. explains how the observation of an effect need not tell us the realities and specifics of its cause, but just the necessity of a "cause":

والكثرة تبدأ على تكثير ولا تدل على كميته ومشبهه يكونان يمتنعان مبدأ
وإذا فكلان تكثيره غير تدل على كميته وتكثيره ولا مشبهه وفي تدل على تكثيره
مشبهه تدل به فيه تدل على كميته ولا تدل على كميته ومشبهه وكثيره يمتنع
والنجر والصباغ.

Abū Maḥmūd al-Najjar, *Arḥab al-Tawḥīd* (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 2003), 94.

85. See previous footnote above for how rationality is defined.

86. Related from Figure 1 that the scope of actualized existence (mawjūd) is broader than the scope of necessary existence (dārrīyat al-wajūb). Consequently, all affirmation of the more general does not necessitate the affirmation of the specific. Therefore, that which is rationally necessary need not always be rationally necessary, as is the case here.

the Sunni Ash'arite school of systematic theology, that the occurrence of a man without a set of two biological parents is from the rationally possible.⁸⁷ From the definition of nomic judgments (*ahkām adriyya*) as given by al-Sanūsī,⁸⁸ it is clear that our nomic judgments regarding the natural world are primarily based on repeated observations of the order found within the universe.⁸⁹ How we normally judge what can and cannot occur in the universe returns to this ingrained and intuitive nomic judgment. It is only when we step back and analyze things for what they truly are (*fi dhārihā*), based on first principles, that we discover their associated rational judgments. The key lies in understanding each judgment, nomic (*ādī*) and rational (*aqlī*), for what each of them truly delineates.⁹⁰ Determining

87 Al-Rāzī states regarding Abū al-Hasan al-Ash'ari's position,

إن منهجه أنه يجوز حدوث الإنسان من غير الأبوين

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Matālib al-ʿAlīyya* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1999), 8:21.

88 Al-Sanūsī defines nomic judgments as the affirmation of a relationship between two things through repeated sense-perception with the rational acceptability of a possible anomaly, along with denying any causal influence of any one of those two upon the other. He defines the nomic judgment slightly differently in two different works.

وإن حكم بعادي فهو إثبات الربط بين أمر وأمر وجود أو عدماً بواسطة التكرار مع
صحة المختلف وعدم تأثير أحدهما في الآخر ألبتة

Muhammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Ma'ārif, 2009), 68.

وإن حكم بعادي محيطة، إثبات الربط بين أمر وأمر وجود أو عدماً بواسطة التكرار
تكرار بينهما على الحسن

Muhammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ Umūr al-Barāhīn* (Cairo: Mu'assasat al-ʿAdabiyya al-Khidma al-Thaqāfiyya wa al-ʿIlmiyya, 2015), 10.

89 It is erroneously believed by some that because of the immediacy by which our minds believe and accept certain natural phenomena, they then fall under being rational judgments as opposed to nomic judgments. However, nomic judgments would be inclusive of even such judgments that we have blindly accepted as truth from science even though we have not personally witnessed them or even understood them. See to this effect Abū Ishāq al-Baṣrāmī (1091/1), in *Maṣṣab al-Rubṭāniyya fi Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt al-Sanūsīyya* (Cairo: Kullīyat al-ʿUlūm, 2015), 69–90. To summarize the distinguishing difference between a rationally certain

nomically necessary category. However, it must be highlighted here that the crucial difference between the two judgments, rational and nomic, is that the latter was arrived at through physical experimentalations or observations while the former was not. Likewise, we too have never witnessed a disruption of the average acceleration on Earth, generally being 9.807 m/s^2 . Therefore, the nomic judgment for the average acceleration on Earth being 9.807 m/s^2 would also be from the nomic necessities. However, a change in the average acceleration on Earth to be 10.5 m/s^2 would not result in a violation of any rational principles. Conceiving the rational possibility of the average force of gravity being other than 9.807 m/s^2 does not result in an internal contradiction, in contrast to conceiving $1+1=2$. As such, the rational judgment regarding a change in the average force of gravity on Earth would be from the rationally possible category.

Therefore, every supernatural event that is from the rational possibilities can never be denied in absolute⁹¹ terms on the basis of nomic judgments⁹² alone, since rational judgments are not susceptible to restriction or qualification (takhsis).⁹³ Said differently, Nomic judgments cannot be universalized to the extent of overriding rationally decisive judgments.

91. Mustafā Sabrī states:

لأن قيل «هذا محالٌ عادةً» أي بالتحريم، فالمحال فيه، غير محالٍ بالتحقيق.

Mustafā Sabrī, *Mawqif al-Aql wa al-Imn wa al-Āmān min Kull al-Āthar al-Muḥal wa l-Mursal* (Damascus: Dar al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2244.

92. Mustafā Sabrī states:

وفي حقيقة ما أحصت الحروب، وما على مسألة ما أودت معنى فوق أن تكون هناك مسألة إن شاء الله، محتملة الوقوع، أما كونها ضرورية، مستحقة، الخلاف، فتخرج عن حدود التحريم، فتعالى عن أن يكون مبدؤها فلا يجرب بالوجوب والضرورة، أو بالأصل لا يعتمد بالضرورة، وكل ما شهد التحريم لمبيد من وخرج حادثه عقب حادثه، من غير عطف ولا عطف لمبيد، كقول ذلك التعقيب عادةً كما قال «هجوم» لا ضرورة، لا: لا علم كقول المقدم منهما علة للمؤخر، فحينئذ يتكون التعقيب ضرورة، يمكن لعينه أن يفي لا سبيل للمد إليه بالعجربة.

Ibid., 2246.

93. See previous footnotes 47 and 48 for more information.

Said Fuda states:

إن تعد عدة العقوبة صحيح، والواقع شاهد أيضا صحيح يحسن دور أن يحصى تعدد العقوبة ودون أن يرفع الواقع المشاهد بالحس إلى مرتبة الوجوب العقلي.

in an absolute fashion.”⁹⁴ The following breakdown of the types of nomic judgments in Table II will aid in understanding what a nomic judgment can and cannot tell us:

Table II.

I.	The necessary nomic judgment (<i>wājib adī</i>)	That which is based on repeated observation with no actual occurrence of an anomaly e.g. water boiling at 100°C on Earth under normal atmospheric conditions
II.	The impossible nomic judgment (<i>imustahil adī</i>)	The anomaly of the “necessary nomic judgment”, e.g., water boiling at other than 100°C on Earth under normal atmospheric conditions
III.	The possible nomic judgment (<i>mumkin adī</i>)	That which is observed and at other times not observed, e.g., snow in Miami. ⁹⁵

Sa’id Huda Faḥrī, *Sharḥ al-Sawt al-Musaḥḥal wa Mukhtasar Maṭn al-Kharida al-Bahriyya* (Amman), 16.

94. Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī states:

كل ما ورد السمع به ولا يأتيه العقل يجب قبوله

Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī, *Sharḥ al-Umda fi Aqida Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā’a* (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya al-Turāth, 2014), 428.

Likewise, Muṣṭafā Ṣabī explains:

وربما يعبر عن الأول (أي الوجوب) بـ«ضرور» الوجود، وعن الثاني (أي الاستحالة) بـ«ضرور» العدم، وعن الثالث (أي الإمكان) بـ«سلب الضرور» عن الطرفين؛ وبصدرها العدم، لا لتعارضه مع مقتضى أحكامه على الوقوع، أو اللا وقوع، بل يعبر عن سماع الوقوع بـ«وجوب» واللا وقوع بـ«سلب الاستحالة» كونه من أحكام العالين التي لا تدخل في متناول التجربة.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabī, *Mawḍiʿ al-Aḥq wa al-Iḥṣāʾ: Ālām min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa Iḥṣāʾ al-Mursalīn* (Damascus: Dar al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2288.

95. Abū al-Raḥmān Ḥabonnaka al-Miḍnī, *Qawābiḥ al-Muḥīḍa* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2015), 322.

Furthermore, Ibn Amr Ḥājj explains how the nomic judgment can permit contraries when dealing with what is from the rationally possible due to nothing within the essence of the possible preventing an occurrence or change in it in a manner that would result in a rational impossibility:

Although the *necessary* nomic judgment dictates that water boil at 100°C under normal atmospheric conditions, our minds can still *rationaly* conceive that it is within the realm of possibility for water to boil at 150°C – an otherwise *impossible* nomic judgment – had Allah ~~so~~ decreed as such.⁹⁶ For the One who initially specified for water to boil at 100°C, could specify it later to boil at 150°C. The “impossible nomic judgment” is with respect to what we repeatedly observe, not with respect to the metaphysical nature of the thing itself. No violation of PNC occurs when we conceive of water boiling at other than 100°C. The nomic judgment that water boils at 100°C on Earth under normal atmospheric conditions is undoubtedly true, but only due to our repeated observations of its occurrence,⁹⁷ not due to the

إن معنى حصول العادات بخبر انبغض أنه بمرضى وقوع ذلك النقيض بدخولهم بلرم من ذلك محال بداته لأن الأمور العادية تمكنه في حد ذاتها والمخصص لا يستلزم شيء من طرفه محال لبذاته ولا يخفى أن هذا جارٍ في جميع المسكنات الواقعة.

Ibn Amīr Ḥajj al-Ḥalabī al-Ḥanafī *al-Taqrīr wa al-Taḥqīr* Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1981), 1:40-41

96 Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī states:

ومعنى المسكنات استبعاد وقوعه، فيظن مستحيلاً عند بعض، كمعمرات الأبياء الحارقة لسعة الكون، وهو خطأ، إذ لا مانع من عدم العقل، فهي خارجة للعادة، التي هي سبب الكون، لا خارجه للعقل، كما «اجتماع العيصين»، أو «ارتداد عهدها»، لأن سبب كون من المسكنات بالنسبة إلى واقعها جل شأنه، فيمكنه خرقها، كما أمكنه سببها

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawāqif al-Aqī wa al-‘Ilm wa al-‘Āmīn min Rabb al-‘Ālamīn wa Iḥādith al-Murīdīn* Damascus: Dar al-Tarbiya, 2007), 2:112

97 Al-Dusūqī states that the repeated sense-perception of many particulars over time prompts the rational soul to eventually accept the universality of what it perceives.

الإحساس بالخبر كثير، يصور النفس لديه لمحككم الشيء، لأن العقل ربما يدرك الأمر ويرى الخلية

Ibrāhīm al-Dusūqī, *Hāshiyat al-Dusūqī ‘alā al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya* Egypt: Maṭba‘at Kurdistan al-‘Ilmiyya, 1909), 2:143.

Al-Ghazālī states that the continuous occurrence of the same event or outcome, time after time, unshakably fixes in our minds, belief in their future occurrence according to past habit.

رسم العادة بعد مره بعد أخرى يرسخ في أذهان جرياتها على وفق العادة فاصحبه مره

metaphysical essence of water itself.⁹⁸ This extends to all other natural laws of the universe: be it the force of gravity on Earth, the time it takes for Earth to travel around the sun, the melting point of iron, etc.⁹⁹ As such, all "miracles" can only result in a breach of our normal judgments concerning the natural laws of the universe, and never in a breach of our rational judgments.¹⁰⁰ Said differently, all naturally observed laws of the universe lay under the rational judgment of the possible while simultaneously falling into either the necessary or impossible normal judgment.

لا يمكن عبث.

Michael E. Marmura, *The incalculable of the Philosophers* (Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 170.

98. The continuous and repeated observation of two events occurring one after another does not indicate a necessary causal relationship between the two. Khorsh Zādah (d. 893 h) states:

ومرّتين مكتشف أن برب الشيء ذات أو أكثر، وهو معنى بالدور لا بد على
المتنبه

Khorsh Zādah, *al-Tadhārāt fī al-Minhājima bayn al-Ghazālī wa al-Falāsifa* (Damascus: Dār al-Risāl al-ʿAsamiyya, 2018), 306.

99. Mustafā Ṣabr states that natural laws are rooted in empirical methods and observations of a particular set of data points. Even when such laws are accepted as scientific theories/facts they still do not ever reach a point of rational necessity whereby their contradictions are rationally impossible:

لأن القوانين بعين طبيعي مسببة على التجارب وأحداثها، والآحكام استناداً على التجربة
ومساهدة واقعة. جرمية إذ ارتقت بعقل طرف إلى درجة الكلية والفردية فلا يرتقي
إلى درجة الضرورة الفاضية باستحالة تناقضها. بخلاف قوانين الهندسة وسطق مسببة على
حكم العقل، موبد بوجاهته، فيكون كيد وضروري من أول صدوره وهذا الفرق هو الذي
يجعل الدليل العقلي سطحي أفضل، وقوي من دليل التجري، بالرغم من اعتماد الجدل
المفكرين عكسي ذلك.

Mustafā Ṣabr, *Munawif al-Asm wa al-ʿilm wa al-ʿālam min Rab al-ʿAlamin wa Rab al-ʿibād al-Mursalin* (Damascus: Dār al-Turbiya, 2007), 1296.

100. Al-Ghazālī argues that once the Shariʿa establishes the actual occurrence of something, it goes without saying that it must be from the rational possibilities:

مذهب كل الشرع على وقوعه فقد قد لا محالة على جوازه.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtisād fī al-ʿIṭiqāt* (Leuven: Dār al-Minhāj, 2019), 18.

Differentiating Between the Rational and Vomic

Here it is important to make a distinction between phenomena whose cause and effect conjunction (*qat'ān*) rests upon a rational condition (*shart* *uqūb*) versus those whose cause and effect conjunction is unconditional, *naṣṭi*. A Ḥabazī explains this difference when addressing the question of whether Allah *az* can move a hand that is immersed in water without keeping the water that surrounds it immobile in the same space without any change. He astutely responds that for a substance to move to a new location, the location that is directly adjacent to it must first be vacant for it to cross into it, but if the water that surrounds the hand is not permitted to move, then as a result, the hand will likewise not be able to move due to the rational principle that no two physical substances can exist and occupy the same space at the very same time in every respect.¹⁰ As a result, the question is an irrational absurdity by virtue of understanding what it essentially means to be a physical "body" (*jism*) along with the essential meaning of "space" (*ḥayṣ*). All such cases conditioned upon violating a rationally sound principle (*ḥakm* *uqūb*) are impossible (*imāh*), and thus inapplicable to Allah's *az* omnipotence (i.e. *ghayr maḍḍur*). In contrast to this, a Ḥabazī explains, are those phenomena whose cause and effect correlations (*qat'ān*) are merely nominal, included in this would be how fire burns cotton and the sensation of coldness when touching snow, all of which fall under the rubric of matters that are applicable to Allah's *az* omnipotence.¹¹ Such matters do not hinge upon a rational necessity and thus the intellect can rationally conceive an anomaly, as in the case of the

101. The Pauli Exclusion Principle also lends support to this in stating that different physical matter cannot occupy the same exact space at the very same time.

102. Al-Ghazali states:

[illegible]

(re not burning Prophet Ibrāhīm ۞¹⁰⁴ A further example of this crucial difference is found in the Qur'ān,

"Surely those who receive our revelations with denial and arrogance, the gates of heaven will not be opened for them, nor will they enter Paradise, *in if a camel passes through the eye of a needle*. This is how We reward the wicked!"¹⁰⁵

When the mind conceives the size of a normal "camel" and the size of the typical "eye of a needle" it immediately understands that it is rationally impossible (*muḥdā*) for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle.¹⁰⁶ The exegetes remarked that because the entry of those people into Paradise hinges on a condition (*shart* *ḥaḥ*) that is rationally impossible to be fulfilled, it will likewise be impossible for them to enter Paradise.¹⁰⁷ Although when observed in isolation without any such conditions, the mere entrance

يُصور فيه لا لأمره والذي ليس بمطه يصو فيه غير الاقتراح إذ لم يمت العبادات.

Abu ḥānifa al-Ghazālī, *at-taḥḥiḥ fi al-fiqh* (revised: Dār al-Minhaj, 2009) 223-225.

103- 21:69

"We ordered, "O fire! Be cool and safe for Ibrāhīm!"

قَدْ بَدَأُ كَوْنِي بَرْدًا وَسَلَامًا عَلَىٰ إِبْرَاهِيمَ

104- 40

لَا تُدِيرُ كَدِّ بَوَائِبِهِمْ وَتُخَفِّرُ عَنْهُمْ لَوْنَهُ لَا يَفْجَعُ لَهُمُ آتُوبُ السَّمَاءِ وَلَا يَدْخُلُونَ لَهُمْ حَتَّىٰ يُلَاقُوا يَوْمَهُمُ الَّذِي فِيهِ يُصْعَقُونَ ۚ وَتَكُونُ أَعْيُنُهُمْ كَالْحِجَابِ يُرْجَوْنَ فِي الْحُجُومِ وَتَكُونُ كَالْمُحْجَرِ الْمَرْمَرِ

105 To suggest otherwise would be to claim that a larger substance is smaller than or equal to another substance that is smaller in relation to 1. This would be akin to saying that 2 < 1, an obvious violation of P1/PNC.

106 Al-Rāzī comments on this verse

وَمَا خَصَّ الْجَنَّةَ مِنْ شَيْءٍ سِوَا الْحَيَوَانَاتِ لِأَنَّ كِبَرِ الْحَيَوَانَاتِ جَسَدٌ عِنْدَ الْعَرَبِ جَسَمٌ عَنِ الْعَظَمِ الْعَظِيمِ الْجَسَامِ وَمَقَرٌ لِلْمَرَّةِ الْهَيِّجِ الْمَاهِدِ، فَكَانَ وَبِشْرُوحِ جَسَدٍ فِي ذَلِكَ التَّغْيَةِ أَنْصَبَهُ مَحَلًّا لِقَدْ وَقَفَ اللَّهُ عَلَى دُخُولِهِمْ عَلَيْهِ عَلَى حُصُولِ هَذَا الشَّرْطِ وَكَانَ هَذَا شَرْطًا مُحَالًا وَبِشْرُوحِ الْعُقُولِ أَنَّ هَؤُلَاءِ عَلَى امْتِحَالِ مَحَالٍ زَجَمَ أَنَّ يَكُونُ دُخُولُهُمْ جَنَّةً مَرْبُوبًا مَعَهُ نَصَبٌ

raḥmat al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr al-fakhr al-Rāzī* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikar, 1981) 1481-82. Al-Ghazālī explains that it is impossible for an effect that is separable upon a rational necessity to occur without the prior (if limited) or simultaneous necessity

of them into Paradise would be rationally possible but due to it being conditional on something that is rationally impossible it thus becomes an impossibility itself.

Following in this line of reasoning, there is no such rational stipulation found within the theory of evolution, scientific or in our experiences and observations of mankind being born from two parents, that absolutely restricts their creation to just this process alone. Karsza's alternative birth method indicates there *cannot* be a rational condition confining human creation solely to conventional sexual reproduction.¹⁰⁶

Rationalizing the Supernatural

In sum, every necessary or impossible nominal judgment that is rationally possible is subject to the will and omnipotence of Allah ﷻ by virtue of Him being the freely willing agent and omnipotent God that He must necessarily be. A rare, supernatural occurrence is as easy for Allah ﷻ to execute as the normal occurrences we commonly witness. For the common denominator between both the rare and the common is the ultimate metaphysical disposition of being contingent, i.e. from the possible. Once this shared commonality between them is understood, it becomes evident that the omnipotence of Allah ﷻ equally applies to both without any difference or difficulty.¹⁰⁷

الحال غير مقدور ووجوده مشروط بحول الخلق غير معلول.

Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqṣād fī al-ʿIrqād* (n.d.), Dar al-Minhaj, 2019, 224.
107. Al-Bāqilām highlights this by suggesting that whatever is from the possible such as the creation of Adam ﷻ means that it is subject to Divine will and can thus be created *ex nihilo*:

يقول هم في الدنيا أنهم يقوّنهم في هذه الأمور مستحبة كتحفة عبيد بدواً في
مستحبة في بعد في هذه الصانع تعالى في في هذه الصانع أهدوا وتركوا
وقيل لهم ما الدليل على حاشية ذلك وإن قالوا لا بل لم يجدوا حجة ولا يقدر عليه ولا
يوجد ذلك لا جرم مثل ما مدعون فيهم فيجب أن يحسبوا بغيره أن يخلق الله تعالى
لا من شيء ولا من شيء ولا من شيء ولا من شيء ولا من شيء ولا من شيء
بحججه وبقدره لا من شيء ولا من شيء ولا من شيء ولا من شيء ولا من شيء
بأن مراد على ذلك الحقوا بأهل الدهر

Abū Bakr al-Bāqilām, *Tamḥīd al-ʿAqā'id wa-ṭalḥīz al-ʿAqā'id* (Beirut: Muassasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyya, 1987), 2135-136.

108. Ibn al-ʿArabī, Muṣṭafā, (Istanbul: Kaṭibawī, ed. 2005), explains how the

In his argument against the co-existence of miracles, God *sw* makes the following:

because He is omnipotent it does not mean that He is fast going to violate His own laws. So I am not saying that God *cannot* I am saying that God put together the laws so that things function in an orderly manner. Otherwise, what is the point of putting together laws and then doing what one wants every now and then? The world is ordered and harmonious. The Qur'an itself emphasizes that "On the contrary, God is saying 'I am omnipotent but even I am omnipotent, put together laws by which creation proceeds, and I want you to follow laws, and I want you to be orderly to follow the order.'"¹⁰⁹

Firstly, asking "what is the point of" why Allah *sw* does something is essentially asking for the divine wisdom (*hikmah*) behind that action. "The wisdom of Allah *sw* is a reflection of His omniscience and omnipotence."

omnipotence of Allah *sw* applies evenly to all possibilities by virtue of them being subject to His omnipotence due to all of them being innately contingent.

(قوله فيدأ به من قدرت في البعض إلى آخره تقرير الدين بأنه كمال ثبت قدرته تعالى على
تعمير كسب قدرته على التخل من الأرض إلى آية يمكن تقديم حق فكك الذي هو المبدء
قد ثبت قدرته على عالم حادثه بسببه إليه تعالى بعد ابتلا واسطة وأمر خلافة فلا
قدرة تعاقب مقتضى ذاته فلا يمكن بعد ذلك عنه تعالى ينصرون كونه قادر في وقت دور
مع ما يصحح من ضرورة ذلك البعض، الزمكان الذي هو مشترك بين جميع المستجابات
الغير معدية ووجد مقتضى ويصحح ورفع حرم أن يكون قادر على جميع
مستجابات مادامت مستجاب

Ismā'īl b. Muṣṭafā al-Kaṣabawī, *Hāshiyah alā Sharḥ al-Dawān al-Faḥ al-Aḥmad al-Adhudiyya* (Turkey: Dār al-Ṭibā'ah al-ʿAmra, 1898), 236.

109 Stefano Bigardì, *Islam and the Quest for Modern Science: A Conversation with Adnan Oktar, Mehdi Çetinkaya, Mohammad Bani Altan, Zeynep El Yagci, Bruno Cordero and Nadia Cordero* (Istanbul: The Swedish Research Institute, 2014), 175.

110 Al-Sanūsī states

فإنه لا يمتنع من تعالى عبادة عن عبادة بالأمم وقدرته على حكمها وإتقانها على
مقتضى العلم والقدرة وهما واجبان له تعالى

Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ al-Dawān al-Faḥ al-Aḥmad al-Adhudiyya* (Damascus: al-Ṭibā'ah al-ʿAmra, 1900), 236.

Guessoum's ignorance of what Allah ﷻ knows does not then necessitate that the action is void of any wisdom." As for the wisdom of miracles, this will be discussed shortly below. Secondly, where in the Qur'an does it state that Allah ﷻ created the universe on certain immutable natural laws and that He Himself will never violate them? Guessoum did not, and *cannot* bring forth even one verse from the Qur'an to substantiate this point. Rather the Qur'an is full of verses that speak to the miracles of the Prophets as well as others, and how the disbelievers denied their occurrences.¹¹² Thirdly, is there any logical sense in making a case for Allah ﷻ not allowing miracles to occur at the hands of His prophets when prophethood itself is a miracle? Indeed, it is ludicrous to suggest that Allah ﷻ initiates the prophethood of a man by way of an angel conveying His revelation to him, "an act that is supernatural itself, but then would not allow any further supernatural events, such as miracles, to occur thereafter. According to Guessoum's logic,

(Taqwā, 2019) 534

112 Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'an:

رَبُّكَ قَالَ رَبُّكَ بِمُسَدَّدَةٍ إِنِّي جَاعِلٌ فِي الْأَرْضِ خَلِيفَةً قَالُوا أَتَجْعَلُ فِيهَا مَن يُسِفُّ الْوَجْهَ وَيَسْفِكُ الدِّمَاءَ يَنْسُجُ جُنُودًا وَيَقْدُسُ لَكَ الْقَالَ إِنَّي أَعْلَمُ مَا لَا تَعْلَمُونَ

"And when your Lord said unto the angels: Lo! I am about to place a vicerey in the earth, they said: Will you place therein one who will do harm therein and will shed blood, while we, we hymn your praise and sanctify you? He said: Surely I know that which you know not" (2:30).

113 Mustafā Sabrī lists at least thirty-one (31) verses that either explicitly or implicitly allude to the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ having performed miracles, let alone other prophets and non-prophets.

Mustafā Sabrī, *al-Qawl al-Faṣl* (Cairo, 1948), 183-185.

113 Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'an:

قُلْ مَنْ كَانَ عَدُوًّا لِجِبْرِيلَ فَإِنَّهُ نَزَّلَهُ بِهِ رُوحُ اللَّهِ عَلَى قَلْبِكَ بِإِذْنِ اللَّهِ مُصَدِّقًا لِّمَا بَيْنَ يَدَيْهِ وَهُدًى وَبُشْرَى لِلْمُسْلِمِينَ

"Say (O Muhammad, to mankind): Who is an enemy to Jibril? For he it is who has revealed this scripture to your heart by Allah's leave, confirming that which was (revealed) before it, and a guidance and glad tidings to believers." (2:97)

speaking and revealing information to a human in Arabic. Moreover, taking the position that Allah ﷻ does not allow the violation of natural laws entails that the Qur'an itself is not a miracle. If Quesada believes the Qur'an to be a literary miracle, then again, he bears the burden of ex-

See verses 41:19 and 51:2. Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'an:

فَاتَّخَذَتْ مِنْ دُونِهِمْ حِجَابًا فَأَرْسَلْنَا إِلَيْهَا رُوحَنَا فَتَمَثَّلَ لَهَا بَشَرًا سَوِيًّا

"And she had chosen seclusion from them. Then We sent unto her Our *ruh* and it assumed for her the similitude of a perfect man." (9:17)

See also verses 51:24-34 and 11:77-83.

117 Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'an:

وَكُنْتُ رَحِيمًا إِلَيْكَ مَرَّةً مَرَّةً

"And thus, We have revealed to you an Arabic Qur'an." (al-Shura: 7)

See also verses 26:193-195, 42:194, and 54:5-6.

118 Allah ﷻ states in the Qur'an:

وَلَكُمْ فِي رَسُولِ اللَّهِ عَلَمٌ بَيْنَ الَّذِينَ عَلَىٰ عِلْمِهِ مِنَ الْقَوْمِ نُفُوزًا ۚ وَكَانَ اللَّهُ بِكُمْ عَلِيمًا
لَهُ يَكُونُ صِدْقِينَ مِنْ رَبِّكُمْ فَأَقْبُوا بِلِقَائِي وَفُودَهُ ۚ كُنْ وَحِيدًا
عَنْتَ يَكْفُرِينَ

"If you are in doubt concerning that which We reveal unto Our slave (Muhammad), then produce a chapter of the like thereof and call your witnesses beside Allah if you are truthful. If you do it not – and you can never do it – then guard yourselves against the fire prepared for disbelievers, whose fuel is men and stones." (2:23-24)

Al-Sanūsī states that the Qur'an is the greatest miracle of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ whereby mankind was challenged by it, one that all Muslims agree that it is inimitable:

مُعْجَزَةٌ بَعْضُهَا عَلَىٰ بَعْضٍ كَمَا أَنَّ الْقُرْآنَ وَهُوَ جَمْعُ الْمَسْنُونِ قَاطِبَةً عَلَىٰ سَائِرِ
مَعَارِ

Muhammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ al-Aqīda al-Kulīya* (Damascus: Dar al-Taqwā, 2019), 58a.

See also Nizār Hammād's epistle on the Qur'an being the greatest miracle brought forth by the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ.

Nizār Hammād, *Regula fi Kawn al-Qur'an al-Azim A'zama Mu'jizat Nabiyinā Muhammad ﷺ* (Tunis: Dar al-Imām 'Abī Arafā, 2021).

planning how some miracles, like prophethood and the Qur'an, are *qur'anic* as such whereas other miracles mentioned by the Qur'an are *non-qur'anic* by many do not.

Therefore to proffer that "science" might be the standard by which the Qur'an should be judged against to determine if a "natural" domain exists such as the occurrence of a "miracle" is a gross caricature of Qur'anic hermeneutics and does not do justice. Yet, none of this is what traditional Qur'anic hermeneutics opposes science to observation or rather seeks to use it for a long assigned functions. Moreover, any science observation can be used to re-evaluate our teleological expectations for the immaculate, fine-tuned order of the universe, which by extension, the true necessity of an omniscient and a dependent, yet freely willing divine agent. One would ask what is the point of Allah *تعالى* assuming natural laws and then violating them? The answer is that it is this very "order" that enables us to identify when a true miracle occurs – and by extension, a true prophet – when that natural order is breached. The reliable testimonies and accurate reports of miracles by which prophets were identified were all primarily based on sense perception. Thus, the implication that somehow traditional Islamic hermeneutics and epistemology opposes science by relegating it to being entirely speculative, in favor of rationalism alone, is false.¹¹⁹ Rather, *Ah al-Sunnah* has a ways to see an error

119. Abu Qurtubi states consensus upon the *fasaliya* and *dalaliya* of the Qur'an being an immutable miracle that is a rupture from the literary norm and incapable of anyone from matching it in this regard:

لقد صدقوا وصدق محمد به أن وجه الإعجاز هو منع من معارضة تصرفه عند تحدي
بمثلته وأن المنع والتصرف هو المعجزة دون ذات الأمر ذلك أن الله تعالى صرفه
عن معارضة مع تحديده أن ينزل سورة من مثله وهذا لأنه لا شيء بين حدوث
المراد من الأمر أن هو محصور عند ذلك أن منع تصرفه هو معجز يخرج الأمر عن
بصر المعجز ويدخل خلاف الإجماع وقد قال كذا عبد الله بنس الأمر أن هو معجز لأن
بعد عنه ولا تحت أمر خارج لعدم دلالة قوله على أنه الوجه في ما يقتضيه
بإزالة ما ورد معارضه من على أن تصرفه لم يمكن معجز

Abu Abu Ailah al Qurtubi *al-Jam' li Ahkam al-Qur'an* (Beirut: Dar al Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 2004), 154-56.

120. This can be gleaned from major works of classical Islamic logic that include sense perception (mushahada) and empiricist methods (tadabbur) as ways that at times can yield certainty (yaqin). Ahmad al-Mallawi did this. He writes in his gloss on Zakariyya al-Ansari's commentary on the *Ishtiqat*:

methodological framework that sought to uphold and harmonize empirical observations, rationalization and testimony "by utilizing them within their due scope". For the most important tenet of Islam after belief in Allah ﷻ, namely the prophethood of Muhammad ﷺ, is established by the miracles he performed that breached our normal judgments of the natural order we constantly observe, followed by the reliable mass-transmitted testimonials of these miracles to those who were not present.¹²³ The very understanding of the constancy of the natural order is what enabled them to identify these anomalies *contra* miracles while cognizance of the epistemic value of mass

قوله (أي حكر) المشاهد، أي المصيدة يبقين بواسطة قياس عيني وهو أنه التوقع الحكر
على نهج واحد لا يدل على حجب وإن لم يعلم ماهية ذلك السبب فكيف عدم وجود السبب
عدم وجود الحجب قطعاً

Ahmad al Mallawī, *Hasbi ya al-Mulla Sharh Ishtirāʿi* (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiḡā 2017), 684.

2. Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Qāṣ al-Shāfʿī (d. 335 h) states:

ليس أنكر بنية الحس أنكر بنية ومن أنكر العقل أنكر صانع ومن أنكر عموم
الأمور أنكر حكمه ومن أنكر خبر الآحاد أنكر التبريع ومن أنكر مدح الأمة
أنكر نبوة ومن أنكر النعم مقطب محذور به لأن اللغات بالمسميات محاب ومن أنكر
المبرة أنكر بقاء رأسه

Al-Nhaṣṣ al-Baḡhidādī, *al-Fuṣṣṣa wa al-Mufaṣṣṣa* (Damascus: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1996), 2: 37.

121. Al-Nasafī (d. 537 h) states:

أسباب العلم بخلق الآلة الحوسب نسيئة وخبر الصادق والعقل

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftazānī, *Sharḥ al-Aḡḡal al-Nasafīyya* (Damascus: Muḥammad Adnān Darwish, 2005), 60.

123. This is unlike those philosophical naturalists that claim to uphold natural law yet believe those who have witnessed miracles. On one hand they advocate use of all forms of natural law, while on the other hand preclude the use of observation when it comes to witnessing miracles. A clear contradiction of their own terms.

124. Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī states:

ويعلم أيضاً تفريق الدليل العقلي على الدليل التجريبي حيث يثبت بالاول وجود الله الواجب
الوجود وبالثاني وجود الشيء غير الواجب الوجود

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *al-Qawl al-Faṣl* (Cairo, 1942), 26.

testimonies confirmed to them the actual occurrence of these miracles. The likes of Qatissoumi may be questioned how they have corroborated the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ was in fact a true prophet without being in case of circular reasoning. While it is undeniable that the Qur'an has been mass transmitted to us and therefore yields certainty, yet this certainty only means that we are certain that these words that makeup the Qur'an were recited by the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ who then attributed these words to Allah ﷻ. Mass transmission (*naql*) alone does not yield us certainty that this attribution is indeed true. A miracle would be needed to validate this attribution such that this miracle stands in the place of Allah ﷻ saying "this man is telling the truth in what he has attributed to Me". Upon establishing the truthfulness of a prophet's word, the Qur'an can only then be accepted as an evidentiary source revealed by Allah ﷻ. In fact, there is no other method by which the truthfulness of the claim to prophethood can be ascertained except by way of miracles. Accepting

25. Al-Ghazali states how miracles performed by the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ indicate his truthfulness as a claimant to prophethood:

بما ثبت بكونه محمداً من الأنوار الخارجة عن ذات التي ظهرت عليه كاستفراق البحر وسبق
 الحجة ، وتصريحه بين صوابه وخطيئه الخاص في كنهه وتكثير المعجزات العظمى وغيره من
 حوارق العادة ، فكل ذلك دليل على صدقه

Abu Hamza al-Ghazali, *al-iqtiṣād fī al-ḥujjāt al-ḥaqīqah* Jar al-Minhaj, 2043, 6.

26. Abd al-Hayy al-Laknawi (d. 1004 h) explains how the Qur'an cannot yield certain knowledge until the truthfulness of the claim to prophethood has been established. Otherwise it will lead to circular reasoning. Once his miracles establish the necessary conditions, the mind will rationally conclude his claim to prophethood is true.

وما الذي صار من صدق الأمر بنبينا لا يثبت إلا بكونه مقدمه من مقدماته
 بعيدة عن تعريضه لتكذيبه لا بعد العلم إلا بعد عدم بصدق ترسل صلى الله عليه وسلم
 وهو لا يثبت من الأمر بل من العقل في تدبر الأمور بالعقل لا صرف غير الدور وما
 يستفيد صدقه من العقل لم يبق الدليل نقياً صرفاً

Abu al-Hayy al-Laknawi, *al-Hadiyyat al-Muthharriyya Sharḥ al-Radd al-Aḥdath al-Karāḥiyyah* *Qur'an wa al-Ulūm al-Islamiyya*, 1998, 48.

27. Al-Juwayni explains that if prophethood were verifiable through some ordinary act then this can be potentially done by anyone, pious or impious. Thus, there is a need for an event that is a rupture of the norm compared with common prophethood that will inevitably serve as a validation of its claim.

prophethood sheerly by virtue of someone's claim to it or by their message simply being void of contradictions was only the stance of splinter groups such as the Iḥādiyya, Khawarrī, Karrāmiyya, and the Qadariyya, not that of Ahl al-Sunna.¹²⁸

Actualizing the Supernatural

In sum, the judgment that every human must have a pair of biological parents is a necessary nominal judgment (*ḥaqīqīyātī*), but a rationally possible judgment (*imkānīyātī*) for the reasons detailed above. As per the definition given above for the former, despite it being *nominally* necessary for every human to have a set of biological parents, the occurrence of an anomaly, i.e. a human lacking biological parentage, remains a rational

دس میں ہیں جن کی بقدر صواب دس علی صدق النبی غیر المعجزة؟ فیما ذلک غیر ممکن
 ہیں مہ بقدر دلیل علی الصدق لا یخبر: ہا اُر یحکون معنادر و ما اُر یحکون خدوہ بقاعد
 ہیں کان معنادر یسوی فیہ الیر والعاجر یستحیل کونہ دلیلًا ذوں اُن ینتعلی بہ دعوی
 نبی اذ کل جاری لبعاد یحور بقدر وجودہ استدعاء من فعل اللہ تعالیٰ ہا ہر ہم یحکم ہا ہر
 تعلقہ بالذعوی ہو المعجزة بعینہا

Abd al Mālik b. Yūsuf al-Juwaynī, *Kitāb al-Iḥṣān il-Qawāṭi al-Asāla fi Usūl al-Fiqāh* (Cairo: Maktaba al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, 2009), 262.

128. Abū Maṣṣūr Abd al-Qahūr al-Baḡhdādī, d. 419 h states:

وعلمت لا بأصية وكثير من الخوارج أن نفس قول النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم أنا نبي ودعوي
 أنا ما يدعوا إليه حجة ولا يحتاج عليها إلى بينة وبرهان وعلى قوله قبول قوله وإن لم يأت
 برهان، حتى لم يبينه كغير واحد سرفته الكثرانية هذه البدعة من الأصالة فوعلمت أن
 كل من سمع قول الرسول أو سمع الخبر عن ظهوره وعن دعواه برهانه، الإقرار والتصديق به
 سواء علم برهانه وحجته أو لم يعلمه. وقال ثمانية وأربعون من القدرية لا يحتاج النبي في
 الحاجة على بيئته إلى كبر من سلامة شرعه وما يأتي به من التفاضل فيه. وقال أصحاب
 سلامة معجزته عن معارضة دس على صحته. وما سلامة شرعه عن التحيط والتقص
 ما خلا بدس على صحته لأن تكذيبه يوجب شرعاً واحداً فيه قياضه لم يجب به تصديقه ولا
 بد من مخالفة دس على صدقه فيجب بها أتباعه ولو جار تصديقه في دعواه من غير برهان لم
 يمكن ما دلالة على كذب الكاذب في دعوى النير. قد لم يستثنى معه برهان صحته وهذا
 باطل لما يؤدي إليه مثله

Abū Maṣṣūr Abd al-Qahūr al-Baḡhdādī, *Kitāb Usūl al-Dīn* (Istanbul: Dār Ṣādir, 1948), 175-176.

possibility.¹²⁹ There is no contradiction in describing a phenomenon as both “necessary” and “possible” because the “necessary” judgment is with respect to what we continuously observe and have never witnessed a negation thereof,¹³⁰ while the “possible” judgment is solely with respect to the rational question as to whether there is anything within the quality of that thing that precludes its norm from being breached based on PNC. Since each of these judgments perspective (*idāfa*) differs, there is no contradiction.

129. Ibn Amir Hājj al-Hanbalī al-Hanafī states:

معنى حتمًا لعديبات محوّر العيّن به هو فرض وقوع ذلك التغيّض بداهة ثم نعلم من ذلك محالاً له لأنّ الأمور العادية يمكنه في حد ذاتها أن يحصل لا بداهة ثم هي من طريقه محالاً بداهة ولا يخفى أنّ هذا جارٍ في جميع الممكنات الواقعة

Ibn Amir Hājj al-Hanbalī al-Hanafī, *al-Taqrir wa al-Taḥḍir* (Beirut: Dar al-Kitāb al-Hadīth, 1983), 1:40–41.

130. A. Sanūsī clarifies that the definition given previously of the rational judgment to include anomalies as being “rationally possible” was due in part to the prevalent notion of ignorance regarding nomic judgments being conceived as absolutely immutable.

سبب في حقن عدم وضع مسألة البقاء الأكثر في الأحكام العادية حتى يومنا هذا، لا معنى لمرشد الذي حصل في حكمه العادي لا ربط الروم الذي لا يمكن معه بذلك كسرهم بقلي روم استأجر من حده في الآخر منها بعد الجدة على أن الربيع الذي حصل في حكمه العادي إنما هو ربط افران ودلّاه جميعه لا ربط روم الروم الذي يسهل الروم (بقلي) يقول مع صحة التخلف!

Mohammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt* (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Maʾārif, 2009), 69.

131. *Al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya* mentions that, among the conditions needed for a true contradiction to exist between two propositions is the unity of ascription (*idāfa*), *idāfa*, *idāfa*,

ولا يصدق التناقض في خصوصيتين إلا على وجه واحد أو صرح به وجه واحد بمرشد
 ١. جزء واحد وكذا وجه واحد محمول بمرشد به وجه واحد الرباع والرباع والإضافة والافادة
 والافادة

Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Taḥṣīl al-Qawā'id al-Manṭiqiyya fi Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya*, (Lebanon: DKI, 2014), 238.

Al-Chazālī likewise clarifies this crucial difference between things that are intrinsically possible yet extrinsically impossible, but never both intrinsically possible and intrinsically impossible.

All that remains after proving the possibility of the supernatural, to occur is to prove its actual occurrence.¹³² Attaining certainty of a supernatural occurrence can be ascertained by one of a variety of ways. One such way is via mass-transmitted testimonials.¹³³ Those who argue that miracles are within the realm of rational possibilities but do not occur in the extramental world – because that would impinge on the teleological arguments for the existence of God – run into the problem of denying mass-transmitted evidence of miracles such as the splitting of the moon¹³⁴ and many others.

يُحْجَرُ أَنْ يَكُونَ الشَّيْءُ الْوَاحِدُ مُحْتَمَلًا وَيَكُنْ مُحْتَمَلًا بِاعْتِبَارِ دَلَالَةِ مُحَالَا بَاعْتِبَارِهَا كَيْفًا.
وَلَا يَحْجَرُ أَنْ يَكُونَ مُحْتَمَلًا لِدَلَالَةِ مُحَالَا لِدَلَالَةِ هُمَا مُتَمَيِّضَانِ.

Abu Hāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtisād fī al-ʿIrqād* (Iddah: Dār al-Minhār, 2019), 209.
132 In this regard, the model of the dialecticians (*mutakallimūn*) was followed whereby the mere rational possibility of something is initially proven followed by proving its actual occurrence. Al-Ashʿarī explains this method:

مَا يَجِبُ فِي حَقِّ النَّظَرِ أَنْ يَبْدَأَ بِالنَّظَرِ بِالنَّظَرِ فِي امْتِنَانِهِ لِأَنَّهُ الْأَمْرُ وَالسَّعْيُ عَرَضٌ
وَالْأَمْرُ أَوَّلُ وَالْعَرَضُ بَارٍ وَأَنْ يَجِبَ حُكْمُ الْأَوَّلِ قَبْلَ الثَّانِي فَإِنَّ عَرَضًا لَا يُوْجِدُهُ الْعَقْلُ عَرَضٌ
لَمْ يَحْمِلْهُ عَلَى السَّعْيِ

Muhammad b. al-Hasan b. Fūrak, *Muḥarrar Maqālāt al-Shaykh Abī al-Hasan al-Ashʿarī* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1987), 319.

In this vein, al-Rāzī reminds us that although the mere rational possibility of something occurring can be proven through rational proofs, the actual occurrence of it can only be proven by way of transmitted evidence:

وَعَدَهُ أَنَّ الْحَقَّ الْعَقْلِيَّ يُمْكِنُ اثْبَاتُهُ بِدَلَالَتِ الْعَقْلِ لَا وَقَوْلِ الْحَاوِلِ وَلَا سَبِيلَ إِلَى ثَبَاتِهِ
لَا بِالسَّمْعِ

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-ʿIrqād fī ʿUlūm al-Dīn* (Cairo: Maktaba al-Kalāya al-Azhariyya, 1986), 230.

133 al-Taftāzānī states:

مَوَاقِفُ مُوجِبٍ لِمَعْنَى ذَلِكَ بِالنَّهْزِ فَإِنَّهُ يُجَدُّ فِي أَمْرٍ أَعْلَمُ بِمَوْجُودِ مُحْتَمَلٍ وَبَعْدَ دَلَالَةِ
حَقِّهِ لَا بِالْإِحْدَارِ أَنْ يَفْقَدَ حَاصِلُ بِهِ ضَرْوَرِيٌّ وَذَلِكَ لِأَنَّهُ يَحْتَمِلُ لِلْمُسْتَعْدِلِ وَخَيْرُهُ حَقٌّ
صَحِيحٌ لَمْ يَرِ إِلَّا هَتَمًا هَمٌّ فِي أَعْلَمَ بِطَرِيقِ الْأَكْسَابِ وَتَرْسِيْمِ الْمُقَدِّمَاتِ.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Aḥqād al-Nasafiyya* (Damascus: Muḥammad Adnān Darwish, 2005), 64.

134 Ibn Kathīr (d. 774 h) states:

which are vouchsafed by the Qur'an according to the consensus of Muslim scholars.³⁵ Moreover, such an argument undermines Allah as being omnipotent, omniscient, and freely willing agent.

Interpreting the Empirical Data

In the pre-modern era, the empirical evidence used to affirm that every human, be it Adam ﷺ or other, must have had parents was largely based on inductive reasoning.³⁶ Our repeated experiences and observations give

و قد بلغوا العتيد مع بديه الأئمة ع أن الله في أفعاله كان في عهد رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم وقد رويت الأحاديث بذلك من طريق عميد القمحة عند الأئمة

Isma'il b. Umar Ibn Kathir, *Muḥall al-Nabī al-Mustabā al-Tawfīqīyya*, 2000, 1.

A. Subkī (d. 746 h) states:

والصحيح عندني أن يسبق بعمر مائة من مائة من عتيد في القرآن في الصحيحين وغيرهما من طريق شقي

Abmad b. Muhammad b. Hajara, *Hayat al-Ummā fi Sharḥ al-Riḥla*, Amman: Dār al-Fath, 368.

35. Al-Munāwī (d. 1031 h) states:

وهذا أمر بالإجماع لا يرد فيه شبهة بعض القرآن والسنة ومع هذا تتواتر وحشوا به العلم اليقيني السماعي أي بالسماخ من الجهم الغمر

Abd al-Ra'ūf al-Munāwī, *al-Liḥā al-Sanīyya ala Aḥyā al-Sīra al-Nabawīya*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 2004), 65.

36. A. Khabīsī (d. 1050 h) states that non-exhaustive inductive reasoning alone does not yield certainty due to the permissibility of something that was not accounted for to be counter to the conclusions of what has been tested and universalized therewith:

(أستمر) فهو (تصحيح) لخرجات (أشياء) حكم (ك). وهو لا يعيد اليقود حرر وجوده جوتي لم يستقر

Ubayy Adah b. Faq, Adah al-Khabīsī, *al-Fidh al-Sīra al-Tawfīqīyya al-Munāwī wa al-Kalām*, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Babī al-Ḥalabī, 1936), 413.

Abd al-Rahmān Habannaka states:

وهذا أمر أن لا يرد في الأمر التصحيح قد يعيد النظر الحكم اليقيني وذلك في عهد النبي محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم من يكون ما لم يدرس كل خلاف ما درس وخبره أن يظهر في استغنى عنه

is a sense of certainty whereby we confidently generalize those experiences. After encountering countless people all of whom were born of two parents, we conclude that every human is undoubtedly the product of two parents. Nevertheless, Muslim scholars expressed caution when relying on empirical methods alone to construct universal judgments. Abū al-ʿAlāʾ al-ʿIṣṣārī al-ʿIṣṣārī (d. 1225 H) explains that it is very important to pay heed to any provisos or clauses attached to particulars (*al-turayyāt*) that are observed during scientific experimentation. He gives the example that if someone who only ever witnessed Africans being black-skinned, can legitimately construct a universal judgment stating, "every African man is black-skinned," but not, "every man is black-skinned." Al-ʿIṣṣārī then offers a reflection by stating that the mind has a penchant for constructing universals from causes or correlations that were only found during experimentation, as opposed to stepping back, contemplating, and concluding that the causes and correlations may very well be broader and more general.¹³⁷ Al-ʿIṣṣārī's words here are a keen reminder that is oftentimes overlooked when drawing conclusions based on empirical methods.

Furthermore, in addition to simply using empirical methods in drawing conclusions through inductive reasoning, modern evolutionary science today states that there are multiple lines of evidence that suggest exactly

الحكم لكل المستند إلى القياس الخاص

Abū al-Rahmān Ḥabannaka. *Dawabit al-Maʿrifah* (Damascus: Dar al-Qalam, 2015), 195.

137 Al-ʿIṣṣārī states that the repeated sense-perception of many particulars over time prompts the rational soul to eventually accept the universality of what it perceives.

الأحكام بحكميات كثيرة يصير النفس فانية بحكم الكل؛ لأن المعبر به يدرك ذلك
وراء الكلب

Ibrāhīm al-Dusūqī, *Hāshiyat al-Dusūqī ʿalā al-Risāla al-Shumayyīyya* (Egypt: Maʿhad al-Kurdīstan al-ʿIlmiyya, 1909), 2243.

138 Al-ʿIṣṣārī states:

في التجربة به فيه من أن يرى في فرد شوهة خرباب معاً من شاهد أربعين
بحكم أن كل واحد ربي أسود لا أن كل (شاهد) سود فإن الدهن به يقتل في غيره
ما وجد به الحكم أو ملازمته إليها دون ما هو أعم.

Abū al-ʿAlāʾ al-ʿIṣṣārī. *Sharḥ Riḥat al-Uḥm* (Kuwait: Dar al-Diʿa, 2007), 724.

way we do not observe humans being created without a pair of parents in year. Muslim logicians made a distinction between the conclusions rationally drawn solely via empirical methods (*isaghrāʾ*) and the conclusions which have empirical evidence (*qiyās khabrī*) underpinning the conclusion. The latter was consistently detected through a valid rationale indicating that repeated occurrence is not merely due to chance or at random (*ʿādhā*). They usually assert the first type (*isaghrāʾ*) will not yield certain knowledge explained above, while the latter type (*qiyās khabrī*) would in fact yield knowledge is nominally certain.¹³⁹ Given the sheer amount of evidence presented by evolutionary scientists in discovering and presenting these implications and inferences¹⁴⁰, it will further bolster the conclusion that every human needs a pair of biological parents is nominally certain.

Al Taftāzānī expounds that what is obtained even through empirical methods will stand as evidence (*dalīl*) and a proof (*ḥujja*)¹⁴¹ absent at any

139 Ahmad al-Mallawī writes in his gloss on Zakariyya al-Anṣārī's commentary on the *Isaghrāʾ*:

فإنه لا يحرر من شك في شيء، ليعين به نفسه في شيء، وهو أن يكون خبر
عن شيء واحد لا يدل له من حيث هو، وإن لم يعرف ما فيه، فذلك الشيء وكلف عدم وجود الشيء
عدم وجود الشيء قطعي

Ahmad al-Mallawī, *Hashiyat al-Malla Sharh Isaghrāʾ* (Kutub Dār al-ʿIlm 2017), 884

140 A. Razi explains that this type of evidence – despite it not being rational – necessary, will in fact still yield knowledge:

وعرفت ذلك الشيء كآلة هذا الأمر على مدلولاتها دلالات عرفية أعني أنها غير
رجحية عقلا وهي مع ذلك تفيد العلم بمدلولاتها

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Amayyat al-ʿuqūl fi Sharḥ al-ʿuṣūl* (Beirut: Dār al-Dhikr 2015), 3510

141 Although inductive conclusions are not rational necessities, they are still cogent in that the evidence seems to be generally convincing. As such, it can be universally applied and stand as a proof. Al Taftāzānī states:

لا يتم وهو خارج عن سبب، فليس من حكمه تجريبات في حكمه كغيره

Abd Al-ʿAlī al-Yazdī, *Sharḥ Taftāzāt al-Maṭṭāʾ* (Amman: Dār al-Naṣr 2018), 114. Likewise, Saʿīd Fūda states that the nominally certain judgment will still yield knowledge and will be considered decisive despite it not barring the rational possibility of its opposite.

is found, then it becomes necessary way b) to apply it and then towards metaphorical interpretations (a wif) of scripture can then adopted and applied.⁴⁶ Although this does beg the question that when a universalistic judgment has been applied, what knowledge

عن حصار العصبية والاعراض غير المدعمة بدليل يقين لا ساي ولا تعرض
في علوم في النفس من العلوم العادية

Said Fuda, *al Sharh al-Kabir* (Beirut: Dār al-Ḥaḡha, 1994), 457.

Al-Dusūqi similarly states:

و بصر مدرك تحجب لغادي لا يرد ذلك لتكذيب بعينه قاعدة من يقرب
ملاو ذهب مع إمكان تحجب الحاد عملاً وكره ذهباً لا يورث من الله جمعة من أول
مراد به عدم عيه محار و الحاصل أن القطع بجامع الأمر نكدي

Abrahim al-Dusūq, *Hasim al-Dusūqi and Umar al-Dar Dunat as-rat* (Kl 2012), 129.

Al-Razi says likewise:

و علم ان اخبار العقل يحكى ثباته بدلائل العقل أما وقوع اخبار فلا سمين إلى إثباته
إلا بالسمع

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al Arbaʿun fi Usūl al-Dīn* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Badāʾi, al-Ashariyya, 1986), 250.

This should not be taken as an admission that everything the theory of evolution asserts is true. The proposition being made here simply revolves around the validity of the default assumption of every human having parents.

46. Asbraf ‘Alī al-Thānī states:

في الاستفهام ما يشاهد الرحمن بعض الخريبات، يرى فيها قدر مبركاً، فيحكم بذلك
حدراً مشرئ على ماثر خريبات التي به يشاهده، فيه حكم غير مقطوع به، مع أنه
يست به الحكم في خريبات لا يرى بمرئيه حتى، ونظراً ما يمكن، لئلا حاجة فيه
لا يعارضه دليل أقوى منه به، الحكم بغير الذي يكاد بالأسكره لا يمكن لا
بالدوام، وبندوم لا سبب بضرورة أي شيء لا يمكن عن حجاب لمعانين بل يحتاج في
دليل مستغن على أي الامكان، رتق لا أثر له فيه، عارضه تدبر لاقرى ما حتى
توجب حجب بعض بالدوام، فحيث لا يوجد دليل على أي الامكان، ولا دليل الأقول، فاسم
على خلاف حكم الظني، أي لا يدعوهم إلى لا يحكموا بالأقوى وببطلان التوحيين
جده مع أن لا يرى صرف عن الظاهر فلا يحصر إليه، لا عدم الحاجة، ولا حاجة ما

ge evidence would be required to serve as an exception to this normic judgment's universality? In response to this pertinent question, what ought to be noted is that science does not concern itself with individuals, be it Adam ʿĀd, Genghis Khan, John Smith, Zayd, etc. Once science reaches methodological certainty that the sample set studied can be broadly applied to any absent/unobservable target by virtue of its assumed equivalence⁴⁷ what regard to said sample set does it will be applied universally and indiscriminately. As such, science will neither care nor concern itself with any alleged exclusivity surrounding the case of Adam ʿĀd, on grounds that it is still admittedly a "human" biologically and anatomically akin to any other human that has ever been observed. Although analogies can at times be a deductively valid proof, it would first need to be established that there is an equivalence between the two in what they are being compared.⁴⁸ But in the alleged case of an anomaly that happens to be unobservable and absent from being empirically detected, science itself would not possess the authority to distinguish this anomaly from the norm⁴⁹. As Shams al-

مسند يصدر إلى التورين؟ ولو مسح المجلد لثبث هذه التأويلات في بقي شيء من اعتبار
و شهادات حجة التصويب، لكونها عروضة بتأويلات والأحكام الناشئة من غير دليل

Asḥraf Alī al-Taḥāwī, *al-Intihāḥāt al-Mufīda fī Ḥall al-Iṣṭibāḥāt al-Jadida* (Karāchi: Maṭabat Dar al-ʿUlūm Karāchi, 2018), 96-97.

Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī further elaborates that metaphorical interpretations cannot be resorted to when they go against the dictates of what is rationally necessary and/or the dictates of Islam:

كل قول خرج بياناً له بحسبه ظاهر الكلام فيه ولا يردّ العمل والشرع فهو مقبول وما
لا خلاف تأويلات الباطنية

Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī, *Sharḥ al-Taʾwīl* (Diyarbakir: Dicle University, 2017), 36-37. i.e., *mithūyyah* in Arabic.

148 Buhārī al-Dīn b. Maḥmūd al-Bukhārī (d. 256) states that if there is no proof for establishing equivalence between two things, then analogizing between them would be invalid.

عنبار الغائب بالساهد من غير إثبات دليل التصويب بينهما مسند

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Dīn b. Maḥmūd al-Bukhārī, *Sharḥ al-Taʾwīl fī Qawāʿid al-Taʾwīl* (Amman: Maktabat al-Ghanam, 2021), 176.

49 Al-ḥāqim emphatically replies to those who reject the rational possibility of a fully erect, living, and rational man without any parentage that their reliance

Shams al-Dīn al-Afghānī al-Shawātī (d. 1986) explained, when empirical methods cannot even provide such a distinction, our concepts are very invalid data. If we instead continue to merely refer back to their previously obtained conclusions, judgment then as a result, objecting to what the Qur'an defines as "conveys the occurrence of a past supernatural event will be meaningless." If every Muslim must believe that Allah is omniscient of all things, past and bygone.¹⁵⁰ Thus, whenever the Qur'an relates a specific supernatural or past existence or empirical observation does not by itself constitute a strong proof for the necessary judgment that every an observer's man must be the same as what they have observed.

و قد نرى هذا محالاً وثابت به عند إيمان خلق حيا عالم كاملاً لا يندفع من غير دليل راسخ
 بعده ويستقر من حيث حال يقال لهم ما يعقله به من بحر الساهد والوجود لا يجوز
 أن يكون دليلاً على وجوب القضاء بمثلها على الملائكة

Abū Bakr Muhammad al-Baqqalānī, *Kashf Asrār al-Bahayya* (Shams al-Dīn al-Afghānī al-Ishād, 2021), 343.

150 Al-Shawātī states:

من بعد يعلم من الأحوال أنه وحده أو بإختيار لأجل أن الله سبحانه ومن مقرر أن
 حده لا ينصرف نه على أمرين بين اثنين ولا التميز بين شيئين... ليس مدركاً بالخص و...
 لا يمكن مدركاً بالخص حاراً أن يخرق الله سبحانه العادة... وإن جاز عقل من مد مع
 خبر لا مدخر به في ذلك في إختيار أمران التكرير... بعد عمر كما مع صر موبد بعض
 حجة وسقط السؤال بالكلية

Shams al-Dīn al-Afghānī al-Shawātī, *al-Jawābir al-Bahayya* atā Sharh al-Aqā'id al-Nasayya (Gawar al-Jūm al-Husayniyya, 2016), 104.

151 According to al-Bāzī, had it been possible for Allah to be ignorant of something, then His own science of that which He does know would be the product of some agent specifying that knowledge for Him. Ergo, His own science would be dependent on the specifier—and that is unbefitting for the One attributed with self-sufficiency.

به سبحانه وبذلك عالم بعض المعومات من تكليم وخرقته ووجودات و...
 بعد... و...
 بعض نكال...
 الله يدرك الله تعالى في صفة كماله مستقر في غير وهو محال

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Ilāzī, *Hashtayn alī al-Khamsa fi Usul al-Dīn* (Amman: KRA, 2017), 147-148.

event in unequivocal terms (*qat'at dalīla*). This would then qualify as a "stronger evidence" than a universal, nomic judgment provided by science and would further be counted as a departure from 1.

As such, the remainder of this work will focus on bringing forth and establishing this type of "stronger evidence."

151. This would be a case of giving preponderance to something the Qur'an mentions specifically about a particular *shay' ma'diyyat* (112:1), namely Adam عليه السلام , above what science has only judged broadly in universal terms (*umūdiyya*) with "all humans possess a pair of biological parents."

Common Dissent

As mentioned in the introduction, Guessouri takes issue with Jalal's stance of Adamic exceptionalism:

And there lies the main issue I have with this work, namely the fact that the author admits the possible position of an evolution on the basis of what the mainstream is, while noting that these 'orthodox' Islamic theologies were formulated many centuries ago. Even on the various aspects of evolution (including biological) he sees no paradox in relying on the views of scholars of a thousand years ago when discussing issues that have only become understood (at earliest, the past century), thus completely disregarding the intellectual, scientific, philosophical, and theological developments that humanity has witnessed in recent times.¹⁰

The assumption embedded within Guessouri's words pertains to how anyone can rely on thousand year old hermeneutics when the science behind evolution has only been developed recently. This assumption is being used to reject any past exegesis of verses regarding human creation and Adam ﷺ prior to the prevalence of Darwinian evolution. However, a distinction must be made here between considering the very idea of Adam ﷺ descending from a pair of parents vis-à-vis the consideration of a specific argument or evidence in favor of him descending. In Guessouri's words, "conflate the two and assume that 'scholars of a thousand years ago' never even contemplated the very idea of Adam ﷺ descending from parents?"

The Early Evolutionists, *Dahrīyya*

Indeed it would be baseless to argue that scholars of the past did not contemplate that. We saw in the previous chapter where nearly 1200 years ago,

¹⁰ Nadia Guessouri, "Book Review of Islam and Biological Evolution: Exploring Classical Sources and Methodologies" (2017), 476-477.

al Ash'ari considered the "descent" as a being created without sex.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, Muslim exegetes and Hadith experts of the past considered a group that bore an eerie resemblance to the Neo-Nazis of today, the evolution as a tool to deny the original creation of Adam.¹⁵⁵ Al-Khatibi (ed. 188) states that this group was known as the Dahriyya, "they held that time was pre-eternal with no beginning."¹⁵⁶ Al-Shahrastani (ed. 188) further elaborates and describes them as Arabs that "survived in a great resurrection and restoration in an afterlife."¹⁵⁷ Al-Baqillani states that Dahriyya believed that there could not exist any human, including Adam, unless he was a product of a male and a female and that no one had ever witnessed other than this.¹⁵⁸ The connection between the Dahriyya

154 Al-Khatibi states:

وإن من عادة أهل الدهر دأبهم شدة من الزمان ومكرهم من الأمر أصافه في
 أمر وسوء عاقبه يوم غدور ودم دأبهم من انقوبه وكانوا لا يثبتون الله
 عليه ولا يعرفون سببه حاله ولم يحكي الله ذلك من قولهم حين قالوا وما يهديك إلا
 الدهر ولذلك سمو الدهرية وكانوا يرون الدهر أرباباً قديماً لا أول له

Abū Sulaymān al-Khatibī, *Akam al-Fatāwā* (Mecca: Maktaba al-Buhārā al-Irāqiyya, 1988), 30904.

155 Al-Shahrastānī states:

مخبرو خالق، واليهود والإغادة فصل منهم أنشرو الخلق وتبعوا ولا عاة. وقالوا
 بخلق محيي، والدهر المعني وهم الذين خير عنهم أنفوس حجية وقالوا ما هي إلا حيات
 ذات سموت وأخاء، رارة إلى الطبائع المحسوسة في العالم السفلي، مصر للحياة وموت على
 بركتها ومحييها لا مع هو الصبح، والليل هو الدهر وما يهديك إلا الدهر وما يهديك
 من علم إلا هم إلا يلقون.

Abū al-Fatḥ Muḥammad al-Shahrastānī, *al-Mīṭa wa al-Nihāl* (Cairo: al-Maṣraʿ al-Halabī), 377.

156 Al-Bāqillānī states:

يقولون هم ما هي شيء، بل هو بحد إلى هذه الأهور مستحبة كسعة عظيم يدرك الله
 مستحبة في العادة، وفي قدره الصانع بعدى من قتلوا في قدره الصانع أنحدو ويركو ديسهم
 وبينهم ما يسيب على حاله ذنب وإن قالوا لأنهم يجد أحد صعب ولا يقدر عنه ولا
 ريب ذلك قط، ولا حزن مثل ما قد يكون فيهم فيجب أن يحسنوا أيضاً أن يحسن الله تعالى
 أجسامهم ولا يوجد آدم إلا من ذكر وأنثى ولا يحسن دجاجة إلا من بيض وبيضة إلا من
 دجاجة أو بيضة أو من بيض أو دجاجة لا من بطنه لأن ذلك جمع لم يوجد قط ولم يركب

and Adam ﷺ can be primarily found under the commentary of the famous hadith of the Prophet ﷺ "Allah created Adam in his image". Although there is much discussion about the exact meaning of this hadith and the referent of the pronoun "his," it will suffice to restrict the discussion here to what is of relevance to our topic at hand. Ibn Fûrak states that if the pronoun "his" refers back to Adam ﷺ, then one plausible interpretation would be that the Prophet ﷺ himself was refuting the Dahrîyya of his time regarding their belief that no man exists except that he was created from semen, and nor does semen exist except that it was emitted from another man *ad infinitum*, and that people transition from one development stage to another in the customary manner that is commonly known. Ibn Fûrak suggests that the Prophet ﷺ was explaining that Adam ﷺ was in fact the first man and was originally created in "his" very own image without ever being previously produced from semen or descending and transitioning through developmental stages as normally witnessed in humans. Furthermore, he states that the Prophet ﷺ is informing us of something that could not have ever been known except through revelation, that we descend from Adam ﷺ who was not created through the loins and womb of any previous descendant nor through stages of physical development. Rather, he was created as an original creation in the form of a fully erect man infused with a soul.¹⁵⁷ In addition to Ibn Fûrak, other early scholars such as Abû

فإن مروا على ذلك حقروا أهل الدهر

Abû Bakr al-Baqillânî, *Tamkîd al-Awâ'il wa Talkhîs al-Dalâ'il* (Beirut: Mu'assasa al-Kutub al-Thaqafiyya, 1987), 1135-1136.

157. The Prophet ﷺ said:

فإن الله خلق آدم على صورته

Muhammad al-Hafîf, *Sahîh al-Jam' al-Muslim* (Istanbul: Dâr al-Minhaj, 2015), 8:32.

158. Ibn Fûrak states:

أما النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم، فأما حديثه بطل قول أهل الدهر (أنه لم يخلق من طينة، ولا طينة إلا من إنسان فيما مضى، ويأتي وينسب لذلك أول ولا آخر رزق الناس من بعض من مضى، بل نشأ على ترتيب محدد، فمقررت تسلسلهم، وأن آدم خلق على صورته نقي شوهه عبيد من غير أن كان عن طينة قبته وعن نسل، أو نقل من صعر، أو كبر كاعوج من آخر، بل الله ما كان ذلك عليه دلائل المعقولات من كون هذا العالم قد بدأ به، وأنه ما لا يوصل إليه إلا بالسمع، بل الأصل الذي منه يواتد لم يخلق من طينة، بل خلقه من جنس آدم عليه السلام خلق الله تعالى من صلبه، كالمخلوق من

Manṣūr Abū al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 440 h / 1048) and al-Qāḍī Iyāq (d. 544 h),¹⁵⁹ he noted that the Propaganda was refuting the position of the Daʿwīyya in basic theological issues.

Moreover al-Baghdādī describes how the Daʿwīyya would promote a denial of the original creation of Adam ﷺ by suggesting that there were men before him. They used this idea to support their belief in the beginningless nature of the universe.¹⁶⁰ In short, we know that thousands of scholars of Islam became accustomed to hearing the idea that Adam was created from a set of biological parents and rejected this as twisted, what they believed was “no longer evidence” to the community.

خبر الله الرزق * سمع بكى قط في صلب ولا رحم ولا كان عنده ولا مضى ولا فعلا ولا
مراهقا بل خلق ابتداء بشرا سويا كما شئهم وعهد

Abū Bakr b. Fūrak *Mushawwaf al-Hadith* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Fassan, 1979), 117.

159. Abū Manṣūr Abū al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī *al-Asma wa al-Sifa* (Damascus: Dār al-Taqwā, 2010), 3:150-151.

160. Badr al-Dīn al-Aynī, *Umdat al-Qārī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 2001), 22:158.

161. Abū al-Walīd b. Rushd, *al-Bayān wa al-Tahsil* (Beirut: Dār al-Charb al-Islāmī, 1984), 18:408.

162. al-Qāḍī Iyāq *Ikhtār al-Maʿlūm bi-Farq al-Maʿlūm* (Cairo: Dār al-Waḍḍ, 1994), 4:89.

163. Al-Baghdādī states:

وله من الغفوري في رسائله إلى سليمان بن الحسن وفي أوحيه يسكت الناس في أمر
والسورة والمبور. ألا يحسن وقد عوهم في بطل الشرائع وبطل معاد والشور من نفور
بحسن ملائكة في السماء من بعد الحسن في الأرض وأوصيك أن تدعوهم إلى القود بأنه قد
كان قبل آدم بشر كثير من ذلك خلق على عيون بعدم العالم وفي هذا تحقيق دعوتهم على
الباطنية أنهم دهرية يقولون يقدم العالم

Abū Manṣūr Abū al-Qāhir b. al-Baghdādī *al-Farq Bayn al-Farq* (Beirut: Dār Ibn Hāzim, 2005), 76.

Consensus

It was mentioned in the introduction that despite Guessouly's call for applying the exegetical approach of Ibn Rushd, he fails to recognize that he later stated that if consensus (*ijmāʿ*) had been reached through a means which is certain (*yaqīn*) concerning the outward import (*ẓāhir*) of a verse then it would not be correct to adopt an allegorical understanding.¹⁶⁴

Consensus on the Ādamic Creation

Abu Mansūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī asserted that Muslims, Christians, and Jews agree on the belief that al-humans descend from Ādam ﷺ and that he was created from dust.¹⁶⁵ Ibn ʿAṭīyya (d. 542 h.) states in his *tafsīr* that all people are in consensus that Allāh ﷻ created Ādam ﷺ from dust and that he was not born from sexual reproduction.¹⁶⁶ Also, al-Qurtubī (d. 671 h.) states that no one from the Christians or Muslims differed regarding

164. Ibn Rushd, *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1968, 37.

165. Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī states:

وَتَكْرِبُ الْحَوَارِ كَمَا هُوَ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ وَفِي كِتَابِي فِي الْأَسْمَاءِ النَّاسُ فِي أَدَمَ وَحَوَاءَ
وَمَا ذَكَرُوهُ مِنْ حَقِّ أَدَمَ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ مِنَ الْتَرَابِ وَخَلْقِ حَوَاءَ مِنْ ضَعْفِ أَدَمَ وَالتَّمَثُّلِ بِسَلِ
مِنْهَا بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ

Abu Manṣur ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. ʿĀhir al-Baghdādī, *al-Asmāʾ wa al-Sifāt* (Damascus: Dār al-ʿIḡwā, 2020), 3282.

166. Ibn ʿAṭīyya states:

النَّاسُ كُلُّهُمْ عَاجِمُونَ عَلَى أَنَّ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى خَلَقَهُ مِنْ تَرَابٍ مِنْ غَيْرِ فَحَصٍ

Abu Maḥammad b. ʿAṭīyya al-Andalusī, *al-Mubharar al-Wajīʿ* (Beirut: Dār al-Kuṭub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001), 1:446. Abu Fayyān al-Andalusī (d. 745 h.) and al-Samirī al-Halabī (d. 750 h.) also cite Ibn ʿAṭīyya's words in their respective *tafsīrs* under verse 3:49.

Adam ﷺ being created and formed without biological parents. Al-Qurtubī al-Fāsī (d. 628 h) reports in his *taʿlīq* on *al-Mawṣūʿat* by agreed matters that Muslims reached a consensus that *ʿĀdamu ʿalā ʿadā* "Adam ﷺ the father of mankind." Finally, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751 h) adds that from the matters that are known *al-maʿrūf* and *al-maʿmūr* dispenses is that Allah ﷻ created Adam ﷺ from the dust of the ground. In sum, Muslim scholars from nearly a thousand years ago explicitly consensuses on Adam ﷺ being an original creation.

Guesseau¹⁶⁷ and others attempt to combat such alleged consensus by propagating opinions of individuals such as Ibn al-Dīn al-Raʿī (d. 635 h) Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808 h), Ibn al-Miskawayh (d. 421 h), and the Brethren of Purity (*Ikhwān al-Ṣafā*) that allegedly speak about the stages of biological evolution and common descent of humans. However, these have been proven to be erroneous attempts at shoehorning evolution into the words of these classical scholars by taking them out of context. Moreover, it must be asked why Guesseau does not see his own "paradox in relying on the views of scholars of a thousand years ago when discussing issues that

167 Al-Qurtubī states:

ولم يختلف في ذلك أحد أعني في أن آدم مكنون مخلوق من غير برية

Abū Abū Allah al-Qurtubī, *al-ʿIlām bi-mā fi Dīn al-Nasara* (Cairo: Dar al-Turath al-ʿArabi, 1986), 137.

168 Ibn al-Qatṭān al-Fāsī states:

وَجَمَعَ بَيْنَهُمَا عَلَى أَنَّ اللَّهَ بَعَثَ خَصِيَّ آدَمَ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ بِرَحْمَةٍ وَاسْمِهِ
مَلَأْنَحْتَهُ وَجَعَلَهُ آدَمَ

Abū al-Hasan al-Qatṭān al-Fāsī, *al-Iqṣāʾ fi Maṣāʾil al-ʿArab* (Cairo: al-Faṣṣa al-Hadītha, 2004), 147.

169 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya states:

ليس معلوم من ديني ولا من دين غيره عند الله سبحانه خلق آدم عليه السلام من برية
لأرض

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Ḥadī al-Arwāḥ ilā Bilād al-Abrāḥ* (Cairo: Maktabat Thaqat al-Rahmān, 2005), 51.

¹⁶⁷ N. J. Guesseau, *Islamic Quantum Question* (London: Iqbal Press, 2019), 305-308 and 320.

¹⁶⁸ Shuaib Ahmed Malik, "Old Texts, New Masks: A Critical Review of Misreading Evolution onto Historical Islamic Texts" *Zigzag*, 54 (2019), 50-1, 21.

have only become understood in “recent times”¹⁷² yet denying this same reliance when it opposes evolution. In the preceding chapter it was shown that the call for dismissing consensus on account of Muslims never considered the notion that Adam عليه السلام may have evolved is patently false. The fact that consensus was enacted despite the Dahriyyas claims and propaganda indicates that this is a *hic et nunc* consensus. Therefore, to arbitrarily reject what the scholars came to agree upon is unfounded and illegitimate.

172. Nidhal Qaessoum, Book Review of Islam and Biological Evolution: Exploring Classical Sources and Methodologies, (2017), 476-477.

173. Al-Ghazali states:

لَا مَعْنَى لِلتَّحْقِيقِ بِإِسْتِكْرَارِ مَا فِيهِ أَهْلُ الْإِجْمَاعِ مِنَ الْقُرْآنِ.

Aouf al-Jarrah, *Chahat al-Ijtihad fi al-Ijtihad* (eddah, Dar al-Minhaj, 2019), 241.

Reason for the Revelation of Verse 3:59

The next two chapters will focus solely on the following verse which I believe is the single most important verse in decisively proving the original creation of Ādam ﷺ:

يَسَّ مِثْلَ عِيسَى عِندَ اللَّهِ كَمِثْلِ آدَمَ ۖ خَلَقَهُ مِنْ تُرَابٍ ثُمَّ قَالَ لَهُ
كُنْ فَيَكُونُ

"Indeed, the similitude of Īsā, according to Allah, is just like the similitude of Ādam. He created him from dust, then He said unto him, 'Be!' and he became." - *Al-Imrān:59*

Erroneous Interpretations

Al-Suyūṭī (d. 911 h) describes two types of groups that err when interpreting the Qur'ān. The first group looks to interpret the Qur'ān in alignment with their preconceived beliefs without due attention to the context (context of the verse *ṣayāq*, and what its words denote (*darāṭa*) and convey (*ḥayān*)) while the second group interprets the Qur'ān purely based on whatever would permit an Arabic speaker to intend by the given phraseology without any consideration to the (1) actual speaker (i.e. Allah ﷻ) of the verse, (2) the one to whom it was revealed (i.e. the Prophet ﷺ) and (3) its immediate audience. ¹⁷⁴ Bearing al-Suyūṭī's description in mind, I will begin by explaining the reason for the revelation (*sabab al-nuzūl*) of verse 3:59

174 Al-Suyūṭī states:

أُحْدَهُمْ مَنُ اعْتَقَدَ مَعْنَى ثُمَّ أَرَادُوا مِنَ الْفَصْلِ الْفَرَأْنِ عِنْدِي وَالْثَانِي أَنَّهُمْ قَسَرُوا الْقُرْآنَ
لِحُرُوفِهِمْ بِإِسْرَافٍ يَرِيدُونَ كَلَامًا مِنْ تَحْتِهَا بَعْدَ حُرُوفٍ غَيْرِ مَطْرُوقٍ مِنْكُمْ بِالْقُرْآنِ
وَالْأَمْرُ عَلَيْهِ وَحَاطَبٌ بِهِ فَلَا يُؤْبَهُ لِرُغْوِ مَعْنَى لَدَى رَأْيِهِ مِنْ غَيْرِ تَنْظُرٍ إِلَى مَا تَسْتَحْتَمِلُهُ

followed by an analysis of the context of this verse within Surah Al-Jinn and what its words convey in the subsequent chapter.

Reason for Revelation

al-Shāṭibī states that it is mandatory to know the reason for revelation whenever wants to understand what the Qur'ān intends to convey.¹⁷⁵ Otherwise, one falls into ignorance, doubts, and problems. One such problem, for example, is making that which is obvious to seem ambiguous, resulting in chaotic differences and disputes.

Ibn 'Ashūr (d. 1193) states that the reason for revelation can itself serve as a "latīf" for the exegete in clarifying ambiguities and explaining that which may be unobvious and terse, such that he cannot depend on his knowledge of it.¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, he states that precisely understanding a verse rests upon knowing the reason for its revelation. The effect, knowledge of it, is a "must" in order to explain the ambiguities of the verse.

من غير معرفة سبب دلالة والبيان والآخرين رغب محمد السبط وما يجوز ان يرميه به يدعي
من غير نظر بل من يصلح للتكلم وسياق الكلام

Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *al-Iḥqāfī fī Ḥam al-Qur'ān* Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb, Ashī (2005), 858-859.

175. Al-Shāṭibī states:

معرفة سبب التوقيف لألف لم تُراد عنه العرب من جهة سبب التفسير موقع في
سببه ولا إشكال في مورد المتخصص نفاذهم مورد الإجمال حتى يقع الاجتهاد وذلك مطلق
وقوع السراج

Abu Ishāq al-Shāṭibī, *al-Muwāfaqāt* (Riyadh: Dār bn Attān, 1997), 4, 46.

176. Ibn 'Ashūr states:

من سبب مرور من ليس بمفسر يعني عن علمه لأن فيه بيان بحسن أو بفساد خفي
وموجز ومنها ما يتكون وحده تفسيراً

Muḥammad al-Tāhir b. 'Ashūr, *al-Tahrir wa al-Tanwir* (Tunis: al-Dār al-Tunisiyya, 1984), 147.

177. Ibn 'Ashūr states:

الأول هو المقصود من الآية يتوقف فهم المراد منها على علمه فلا بد من البحث عنه بالمفسر
وهذا منه تفسير مبهات السراج

Muḥammad al-Tāhir b. 'Ashūr, *al-Tahrir wa al-Tanwir* (Tunis: al-Dār al-Tunisiyya, 1984), 147-48.

accounts narrated by both the Companions *ṣaḥābiyyūn* and the Successors *ṭābiʿūn*.¹⁸³ Moreover, al-Raḥī,¹⁸⁴ al-Khāzin (d. 741 h),¹⁸⁵ and Shaykhizādah (d. 951 h)¹⁸⁶ all claim consensus of the exegetes on verse 3:59 being revealed due to the debate that occurred when the Christian delegation of Najran came to al-Madīna. Although the debate includes a variety of points, I will restrict myself to those that are pertinent to verse 3:59.

Ibn Kathīr in his famous tafsīr under verse 3:59, states that Ibn Ishāq (d. 151 h) as well as others narrate that amongst the things that were said by Abu Hāritha, Abd al-Masīḥ, and Ayham to the Prophet ﷺ was that *ʿIsā* عليه السلام is the son of Allah ﷻ because he did not have a known biological father. The Prophet ﷺ repudiated that his very claim of attributing a son to Allah ﷻ is amongst the things which have prevented them from being true believers. They, in turn, asked: "So who, then, is his father, O Muhammad?" The Prophet ﷺ remained silent and did not reply until verse 3:59 was

183 Hasan al-Qinawī states:

روى رويت هذه الآية على وجهين عن جماعة من الصحابة والتابعين وأصلها عند البخاري
ومسلم

Hasan b. ʿIddīq al-Qinawī, *Faṭḥ al-Bayān fī Maqāṣid al-Qurʾān* (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAsriyya, 1992), 2:254.

184 Al-Raḥī states:

جمع المنسوبة على أن هذه الآية نزلت عند حضور وفد نجران على الرسول صلى الله عليه
وسلم

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Raḥī, *Mafāṭih al-Ghayb* (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1999), 8:242.

185 Al-Khāzin states:

أجمع أهل التفسير أن هذه الآية نزلت في محاجة نصارى وفد نجران.

Abū al-Ḥasan Alā al-Dīn al-Khāzin, *Lubāb al-Taʾwīl fī Maʾān al-Tanzīl* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1994), 1:253.

186 Shaykhizādah states:

جمع المنسوبة على أن قوله تعالى: (إن مثل عيسى عند الله كمثل آدم) نزل عند حضور وفد
نجران عند رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم

Muḥammad b. Maṣṭūh al-Dīn al-Hanafī, *Ḥastayāt Muḥyī al-Dīn Shaykhizādah ʿalā Tafsīr al-Qūḍī al-Bayḍawī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1999), 1:8.

Investigating Hadith Methodologies

al-Sayūṭī¹⁹¹ and al-Zarqānī (d. 1367 h)¹⁹² both mention that if a reason for revelation is found in a successor reported narration, it will not be accepted unless it is supported by an auxiliary successor reported narration narrated by one of the early exegetes who were known to have taken directly from the Companions (ṣaḥāb), such as Mujāhid (d. 104 h), Ikrima (d. 104 h), Saʿīd b. Jubayr (d. 95 h), and others of their rank. Kamāl b. al-Humām (d. 86 h) also includes the successor reports of Saʿīd b. ʿa, Musayyib (d. 94 h), Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (d. 96 h), al-Shaʿbī (d. 100 h), and al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110 h) to be reliable in this regard.¹⁹³ Given this requirement, in order to support the contents of the above successor reported narration of al-Aʿraq b. Qays to be accepted as a reason for the revelation of verse 3:59, the following additional successor reported narration of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī can be used wherein he states that two monks from Najrān came forward to the Prophet ﷺ and one of them said to him, "Who is the father of ʿĪsā?"

Ibn ʿAqīl al-Asqalānī al-ʿUjūbī Bayān al-Arbāb al-Jamʿiyya (Jāz b. al-Jawzi, 1997), 13679.

The editor of this edition, Abd al-Ḥakīm Muḥammad al-Aḥī, states that all the narrators of this narration are trustworthy.

Al-Sayūṭī (d. 911 h) also narrates this report and attributes it to Ibn Saʿd (d. 230 h) in the latter's *al-Ṭabaqāt*. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *Liṣṣaḥāb al-Muqarraf al-Arbāb al-Nuzul* (Beirut: Maʼassasa al-Kutub al-Thaqafiyya, 2002), 52.

190 Al-Suyūṭī states:

روى عن النبي ﷺ يوم فرغ من نزول سورة الفرقان قوله تعالى: "وَاللَّهُ يَخْتَارُ" قالوا: "يا رسول الله، من يختار؟" قال: "يختار الله".

Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān fī Ulūm al-Qurʾān* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Arabiyya, 2005), 90.

191 Al-Zarqānī states:

روى عن النبي ﷺ يوم فرغ من نزول سورة الفرقان قوله تعالى: "وَاللَّهُ يَخْتَارُ" قالوا: "يا رسول الله، من يختار؟" قال: "يختار الله".

Muhammad Aḥmad al-Aḥmī al-Zarqānī, *Manāhij al-Itqān* (Beirut: Dar al-Maʼrifa, 2005), 98.

192 Kamāl b. al-Humām, *al-Tahrir fī Usul al-Fiqh* (Cairo: Muṣṣaṭṭa al-Baḥī, 1932), 144.

The Prophet did not hasten to reply until he had recited the following verses were revealed unto him:

"We receive thee to you as one of the sages and a wise counsellor. Indeed! the similitude of Isha, according to Adh. . . possible the similarity of Adam. He created and conducted the first human. Be and he became, his & he and I am you. . . not be one of those who doubt." 3.58 - 3.60 "

The reason for asking about the paternity of Jesus was to establish that the Nazir believed he was divine by virtue of not having a normal biological father and thus the son of God.

It is also important to note here that not all narratives which speak to the reasons and incidents that lead to the revelation of a specific verse are the *actual* reason for its revelation. Rather, at times, the narrative may only be explaining what that specific verse indicates or entails in terms of its content or meaning.⁴ Therefore, the scholars of hermeneutics explained that when

93 Ibn Abi Hatim al-Harisi (3) (b) narrates this report in his *Libra*.

جاء في نسخة من كتاب في تاريخ من تحت عيسى بن ميمون أنه حصل له عنبه
 واحد من هو كثر القدر حطها لهم في عيمه^٩ وكان ميمون له فضل الله عليه
 رحمه الله تعالى حتى يامر به فحرق عليه فمات ميتاً عذيباً من شدة حره ثم حكيم^{١٠}
 في قوله (فمات المستقرين)

Abd al-Rahmān b. Abī Ḥajjāj Rāzi, *Taḥṣīl al-Jarīd*, *Awamī* (Mumammi), 2018, 422–224. The editor of this edition, Muḥammad b. Baḥr b. Yaṣīn, states that the narrators of this chain are all trustworthy except for Muḥarik al-Ḥaḥī, who is “*ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīthī*.” However, as is evident from the chain of the narrator itself, Muḥarik clarifies by saying that he directly “heard” *ṣamīʿ* from al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. In this vein, the contemporary Saudi specialist Muḥammad al-Shurayḥ al-Hafīz al-Awamī, states that according to Yahyā b. Saʿyid al-Qaṣṣāb al-ḡhāṣī, Abū al-Rahmān al-Bīrūnī (d. 988) and al-Nadīm (d. 1028) and al-Mubārakbānī (d. 1166) all agreed that *ṣamīʿ* from al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, the two narrations are accepted. See al-Awamī, *al-Maṣāḥif al-Awamī* (Riḍā al-Ḥaḥī al-Haḥī, 1997), 345–349. After quoting numerous early *ḥadīth* authorities regarding the narrations of Muḥārak from al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, al-Awamī concludes by stating that when Muḥārak clarifies that he directly heard *ṣamīʿ* from al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, then his narration will be authentic (*ṣaḥīḥ*). *ibid.*, 365.

194 A. Zargani et al.

فرد حرد لا يقدح في حفظ سبب ولا يروي سفنك بقاء لا يندب خرب سي كلى
سبب . ان يفسد حرد هذه لانه في شد ملة وهذه بغير نسبت بعد في البيعة بل

the narration either explicitly mentions that such and such was the "reason" (*‘illah*) for the revelation to descend, or when the adverbial, conjunctive particle "fī" conveying consequence comes immediately after narrating the incident¹⁹⁵ then this narration will be regarded as truly speaking about the incident that actually led to the revelation of that specific verse¹⁹⁶. As such, the narration above of al-Hasan al-Baṣrī, would in fact be treated as narrating the *actual* reason for the revelation of verse 3:59 since it uses the adverbial conjunctive particle conveying consequence immediately after narrating the incident¹⁹⁷, thereby suggesting that the verse was revealed due to this specific incident. In sum, according to the rules of determining the reasons of revelation, the narration of al-Hasan al-Baṣrī can serve as an auxiliary report to corroborate the meaning of the narration of al-Azraq b. Qays. In addition to these narrations, here are other narrations of relatively lesser degree of authenticity that also link the reason for the revelation of

يُحْسِنُ وَتَحْسُنْ أَمْرٌ آخَرٌ هُوَ بَيَانُ مَا تَقْصِيصُهُ الْآيَةُ مِنَ الْأَحْكَامِ وَالْعَرَائِشِ وَحَدَّثَ هُوَ أَيْ
تَعَيَّنَ أَحَدُهَا هَدْيَ الْإِحْتِمَالَيْنِ أَوْ تَرْجِيحَهُ

Muhammad ‘Audaī, Aḥmad Zarfānī, *Mundhū al-Infān* Beirut Dār al-Ma‘rifā, 2005), 109.

195 For example:

عَنْ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ مَرْثَدَةَ عَنْ عَمْرِو بْنِ حَنْبَلٍ قَالَ كَانَتْ الْيَهُودُ يَتَّبِعُونَ مِنْ أُنْثَى امْرَأَةٍ مِنْ دِيَارِ يَمَنَ
فِيهَا حَدِيدٌ حَتَّى قَامَ مِنَ اللَّهِ «فَسَاؤُكُمْ حَرْبٌ بِكُمْ فَأَنُوتُوا حَرْثَكُمْ أَيْ شَسِمُوا وَهَدَمُوا
لَا مَسَاحَةَ وَهَدَمُوا بَنِي وَهَدَمُوا حَتْمَ مَلَائِكَةٍ وَبَشَرِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ» ٢٩٣ هـ مِنْ سُرَّةِ الْبَعْرَةِ

Ibid.

196 al-Zarfānī states,

وَلَا تَلَا لَا يَصْرَحُ بِلَفْظِ السَّبَبِ وَلَكِنْ يَتَوَقَّى بِهَذَا فَخُذْهُ عَلَى مَاذَا نَزَلَ الْآيَةُ عَقِبَ سَرْدِ
حَدِيثٍ وَهَذَا الْعَبْرَةُ مِثْلَ تِلْكَ فِي الدَّلَالَةِ عَلَى السَّبَبِيَّةِ أَيْضًا.

Ibid.

197 Moreover al-Zarfānī explains that if one narration explicitly mentions the "cause" or uses the Arabic letter *fī* (adverbial conjunctive particle conveying consequence), while another narration may not, then the former narration will be given precedence.

وَمِنْ هَذَا نَعْلَمُ أَنَّهُ إِذَا رُفِعَ عَنِ رِوَايَةٍ فِي مَوْضُوعٍ وَاحِدٍ أَحَدَاهَا عَنِ فِي سَبَبِيَّةِ نَزُولِ آيَةٍ أَوْ
يَاؤٍ وَالثَّانِيَةِ يَسْتَعَدُّ فِي سَبَبِيَّةِ نَزُولِ لَفْظٍ ذَايَةٍ أَوْ الْآيَاتِ هَذَاكَ لِأَنَّ السَّبَبِيَّةَ بِهَا
هُوَ عَنِ وَحْدٍ الْآخَرَى عَنْ مِثْلِهَا سَائِرِ نَزُولِ آيَةٍ لِأَنَّ النَّصَّ أَقْرَى فِي الدَّلَالَةِ مِنَ الْمَحْسَنِ

Ibid.

this verse with the question of who was the father of Isā – a question posed by the Christians of Najrān

Wakī' (d. 197 h) narrates from Muḥbarak with a parallel from Ḥasan with the wording, "Who is the father of Isā?"¹⁹⁸

n. Qatāda b. Di'āma (d. 18 h) narrates with the wording, "If a man has a father, so what is the matter with Isā for whom there is no father?"¹⁹⁹

m. Aḥmad al-Raḥmān b. Zayd b. Asad (d. 182 h) narrates with the wording, "Do you know of anyone who was born without a father like Isā?"²⁰⁰

198 Al Wāḥidī (d. 468 h) narrates:

حدثنا يحيى بن عبد الله عن جرير بن عبد الله عن أبيه عن ابن مسعود عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم أنه قال: "إنا أنعمنا قبيلنا فقالوا: كذبتم، به يستنكم من الإسلام ثلاثة: عبادكم الصالحين، وأكلكم الحرام، وبولكم الله وآله" قالوا: من أنعم عيسى؟ فأئزر الله عز وجل: "إن مثل عيسى".

Ali b. Ahmad al-Wāḥidī, *al-Ḥasib fi Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-Karīm* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Jamīyya, 1994), 1:443.

199 Al-Ṭabarī narrates:

حدثنا بشر بن عمار عن أبيه عن جرير بن عبد الله عن أبيه عن ابن مسعود عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم أنه قال: "إنا أنعمنا قبيلنا فقالوا: كذبتم، به يستنكم من الإسلام ثلاثة: عبادكم الصالحين، وأكلكم الحرام، وبولكم الله وآله" قالوا: من أنعم عيسى؟ فأئزر الله عز وجل: "إن مثل عيسى".

Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarī, *al-Bayān fi Tawḥīd al-Qur'ān* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Jamīyya, 2009), 3:293.

200 Al-Ṭabarī narrates:

حدثني يونس بن عيسى عن أحمد بن محمد قال قال أبي ربيعة في نور الله عز وجل (إن مثل عيسى عند الله كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب) قال: أتى مجرمان أبي رسول الله (ص) فقالا له: هل عيسى بن أحد؟ من أين؟ ذكره فيكون عيسى كآدم؟ قال: فأئزر الله عز وجل: "إن مثل عيسى عند الله كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب" ثم قال له: حتى يكون كآدم أم لا؟ أو كآدم حقيقاً أم لا؟ فقال: "إن مثل عيسى".

19. Saḥīḥ al-Biḥār (127/10) narrates with the wording: "Have you ever seen a human created without a father?"²⁰¹

Figure 2 depicts seven (70) chains of narrations of varying grades of authenticity which explicitly mention that verse 3:59 was revealed due to the inquiries of Nairān asking the Prophet ﷺ about the paternity of ʿĪsā عليه السلام . It is important to bear in mind that all the chains in Figure 2 qualify as a "reason for revelation" on account of containing words that indicate the verse being revealed due to this specific reason, as opposed to those narrations that are merely indicating the verse's general meaning as was explained above.

Although the wording of these narrations may differ slightly, the exegetes did not see them as grossly conflicting each other. Rather, as can be seen from the consensus cited above, they saw the narrations as harmonizable.²⁰² Additionally, there are many other reports attributed to the Followers

Ibid, 3:294

201. Al-Tabarī narrates:

حدثنا محمد بن حسين، قال: قال محمد بن الفضل، قال: قال أسباط، عن السدي (١) عن عيسى عليه السلام: كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب (٢) بعد رجولته (٣) الله (ص)، وسمع به أهل العراق، وأنه منهم أربعة عشر من خيارهم، منهم العاقب، والسيد، وماسرجس، وماسرجس، فسأوه ما يقول في عيسى؟ فقال: هو عبد الله وروحه وكلمته، قالوا: هم لآء، ولكنك هل لله من من مكنه فذكر في جوف مريم، ثم حرم منها فأرسل قدره وأمره فهل رأيك قط؟ فسأه من غيرك؟ قال: قال الله عز وجل (٤) مثل عيسى عبد الله كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب، ثم قال: له من يكره!

Ibid, 4:293-294

202. Al-Zarqānī mentions how narrations regarding *sahab al-nuzul* can be reconciled:

في حديث روينا في باب: أحد من المرسلين وذكر كل من الروايتين سبب صريح غير ما ذكرناه، لأن فيهما من يصفون إحداهما صحيحة والآخرى غير صحيحة، وما أن يكون كلاهما صحيحة، ولكن لإحداهما مرجح دون الآخر، وما أن يكون كلاهما صحيحة، لا مرجح لأحد من الآخر، ويمكن يستحسن لأحد بهما، وما أن يكون كلاهما صحيحة ولا مرجح، ولا يمكن يستحسن لأحد بهما، فقد شككنا في ذلك، فما حكمه؟

Muhammad Abd al-Azīm al-Zarqānī, *Maṭn al-Ḥadīth al-Nawāzil* Dar al-Maṭn al-Ḥadīth, 1405




Figure 2: Chains of Narrations that explicitly indicate the reason for Verse 59 being revealed was due to the Christians of Najran asking the Prophet ﷺ concerning the paternity of Isa ʿ.

ca. 100) and those after them that simply commented on verse 3:59 by narrating this same question leveled by the Christian delegates of Najran regarding the paternity of Isā ܝܫܐ ܝܫܝܐ.²⁰⁰

In dealing with the causes of revelation, exegetes are not at liberty to concoct what they believe may have led to the revelation or to exercise personal opinion (*jtihād*) in formulating a judgment as to what possibly occurred. Rather, the discipline of causes of revelation is strictly known through what has been historically narrated by those that were either eyewitnesses to the event itself or were familiar with what had occurred. Therefore, when we find a given exegete mentioning that event X led to the revelation of verse Y, we can rest assured, that this was not arrived at through mere speculation, table-telling, or independent reasoning.²⁰¹ With regards to verse 3:59, the following exegetes narrated the question of paternity being raised by the Christians of Najran leading to the revelation of verse 3:59 without any objection to it: al-Tabari,²⁰² Ibn Abi Hātim al-Rāzi,²⁰³ al-Nahhas (d. 38 h),²⁰⁴ al-Samarqandī (d. 375 h),²⁰⁵ al-Wahidī,²⁰⁶ al-Baghawi (d. 516 h),²⁰⁷ Ibn Aṭīyya,²⁰⁸ al-Rāzi,²⁰⁹ al-Qurṭubī,²¹⁰ al-Nasafī (d. 710 h),²¹¹ al-Khāzin,²¹²

200. Muṣā'id b. Sulaymān al-Tayyār, *Mawsū'at al-Tafsīr al-Ma'thur* (Jeddah: Dar Ibn Hazm, 2017), 5: 205-207.

201. Nūr al-Dīn Iṭr (d. 1441 h) states:

ما كان يجب ان يكون أمر واقع بربط الآية بشأنه كان من السديهي ألا يدعى ان العلم بهذا
السبب في ذاته، برأي ولا اجتهد عند حال الإمام الواحد في ديدحة كتابه أسباب الروي
ولا يحل القول في سبب نزول الكتاب إلا بالروية ونسبها عن شاهدها التبرين ورواه
عن الأسباب ويكتفوا عن علمها وجنوا في الطلاب

Nūr al-Dīn Iṭr, *Uṣūl al-Qur'ān al-Karīm* (Cairo: Dār al-Bayṣ, 2014), 48.

202. See his *Jāmi' al-Bayān* under verse 3:59.

203. See his *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Azīm* under verse 3:59.

204. See his *Ma'ānī al-Qur'ān* under verse 3:59.

205. See his *Naḥr al-Uṣūl* under verse 3:59.

206. See his *Aḥkām al-Nuzul*, at *Waṣṭ* and at *Waqf* under verse 3:59.

207. See his *Ma'ālim al-Tanzīl* under verse 3:59.

208. See his *al-Maḥarrat al-Waṣṭ* under verse 3:59.

209. See his *Maḥāṭib al-Ghayb* under verse 3:59.

210. See his *al-Jāmi' li-Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* under verse 3:59.

211. See his *Madārīk al-Tanzīl* under verse 3:59.

212. See his *Ṣubḥ al-Tawḥīd* under *Tanzīl* under verse 3:59.

Abū Ḥayyān al-Anṣarī (c. 745 h) "Ibn Kaldūn al-Ḥalabī (d. 802 h)" al-Suyūtī (982 h) – al-Aḥmadī (1160 A.H. 1797 h).¹⁴ Moreover, in my perusal of well over a hundred commentaries on verse 3:59, I was unable to locate a single scholar voicing opposition or authenticity concerning the Christians of Nairan possessing the Book of about the paternity of Isāʿ. In this vein, the contemporary Saudi nationalist in *al-Umm al-Qurʾān*, Muṣaddid al-Laylān quotes Ibn Taymiyyah (728 h) stipulation that when citing successful narrated reports in false reports should be of the kind that are accepted by the scholars (*imam*, or *qibāl*) which would then lead to an order of certainty. Al-Laylān further states that what could possibly indicate this scholarly acceptance was the verifying specialists (*muhaddithun*) among the exegetes (*mufasssin*) continually mention throughout the ages generation after generation the same incident as the reason for revelation in their respective Qurʾānic exegeses for the very same verse without any objection or at least criticism or textual criticism.¹⁵ Thus, the incident – the Christians of Na-

216 See *his al-Bahr al-Muhit* under term 459.

217 See his *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-Azim* under verse 359.

218 See his *al-Jawāhir al-Husnā* under verse 350.

219 See also al-Durr al-Minhaj under verse 359.

220 See his *Ishtād al-Aḥqāq* (Salīm nā Mawḥūq al-Aḥqāq) under ref. c 13.

211 See his *Rūḥ al-Ma'ādī* under verse 1:59.

222 See his *al-Tahrir wa al-Tidwir* under verse 3:59.

223 Must identify Taylor styles:

رقہ ذکر (ابن یسید) ضوابط قبول ہندہ المراسل وہی

ہاں لا یسکوں معذرتہا مفردا ہوں یسکوں منعیدہ

لَمْ يَخْلُ مِنْهُ الْجَمْعُ:

١١٠٠

قد عبد الله معتبر وهو قد ذكره عند ذكره حديث الأحاد حيث قال: «من تبعني»
«وعدني» فهو من جميع الطوائف على أن خير الوحد أن يتبعه الأمة بالقبول
تصديقه له أو عكساً به أنه يوجب العلم»

١٠٠ بعض الحواريين قد اتفقدوا معهم في قبورهم جراحيل بني نوري في التفسير نكس
١٠١ بعض الحواريين قد اتفقدوا معهم في قبورهم جراحيل بني نوري في التفسير نكس
١٠٢ بعض الحواريين قد اتفقدوا معهم في قبورهم جراحيل بني نوري في التفسير نكس

The Context (*ṣiṭāq*) of verse 3:59

in the preceding chapter. The reasons that led to the revelation of the first eighty verses²²⁶ of Surat Al-Imran (including verse 59) were discussed at great length, as well as what role the reason for revelation can play in aiding us to understand the intended meaning (the illocutionary force) of this verse. Scholars of Qur'anic hermeneutics usually categorize *reasons for the revelation* into one group of para-linguistic indicative devices that are independent of the text itself (*qarīnāt al-furqān*) but can shed light on the intended meaning (*al-mānā*) of the verse. Another group of indicative devices comprises those that are not independent of the text (*qarīnāt al-tafāṣṣil*);²²⁷ included within this group is what is referred to as the textual context (*ṣiṭāq*) of the verse, that which comes before and after the verse in the actual text itself.²²⁸ Finally, there is another type of para-linguistic indicative device known as the rational indicative device (*qarīnat al-ʿaql*) that is also inde-

226. Abū Bayhaqī (d. 458) narrates that the first eighty verses (80) were revealed all at once regarding the delegation from Najrān.

قَالَ مِنْ سَمْعَانِ حَدَّثَنِی مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ سَلَمَةَ بْنِ أَبِي أُمَامَةَ قَالَ مَا لَمْ يَهْلُ بَحْرَارٌ عَلَى رَسُولِ
 اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ إِلَّا لَوْنَهُ عَلَى عِيْسَى بْنِ مَرْيَمَ ثُمَّ تَرَكْتُ فِيهِمْ وَتَحَهُ عَمْرَأَةً
 رَأْسُ الثَّانِيَيْنِ مِنْهَا

Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, *Daʾir al-Nabawīyya* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1988), 385.

227. al-Juwāyri states:

القرآن ينقسم إلى قرآن حالية وإلى قرآن نظرية.

ʿAbd al-Malik al-Yūsuf al-Juwāyri, *al-Baṣīṭa fī Uṣūl al-Faḥḥ* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1997), 133.

228. The contemporary Syrian specialist in *uṣūl al-faḥḥ*, Muḥammad Muḥammad as-Sayid, defines this type of linguistic, textual signifier (*qarīnat al-ṣiṭāq*).

pendent of the text itself but is based on rational or empirical evidence regarding the speaker of the text.²²⁹ In other words, although the evidence does not indicate a precise intended meaning of an utterance can be determined with certainty by eliminating potential meanings contrary to what they are signifying.

I will begin by discussing the textual direct literary force and case device (IFID) *qarinat al-sayyiq* relating to verse 230 + the text verse followed by a discussion of the implications of the rational IFID (*qarinat al-aql*) in relation to it.

Linguistic, Textual IFID (*Qarinat al-Sayyiq*)

Al-Zarkashi explains that the *qarinat al-sayyiq* is one of the most powerful IFIDs which indicate the speaker's intended meaning (the direct literary force of the utterance). Although the benefit it can provide is explaining what may be ambiguous definitively delimiting the intended meaning by eliminating other possible meanings, further specifying that which

من سبق الخلام المراد تفسيره وما يدحضه من المعاني والألفاظ الواردة في مقطع واحد منقول
بمصرعه مع الغرض من إيراده

Muhammad Muhammad Yasin, *Dawabir al-Qur'an wa Tafsil al-Qur'an* (Kuala Lumpur: Government of Dubai, 2015), 2:275.

229. Muhammad Muhammad Yasin particularly highlights these same case signifiers (*qarīnāt*) as those that can explicate the text of the Qur'an in a definitive (*qat'i*) manner.

عن ابن تيمية على تفسير النص القرآني تفسير قطعي هي أ - قربة سبب الترويض
ب - قربة السياق القضائي - ج - قربة العقل القضائي

[ibid, 2:157-158.

It is noteworthy to mention here that although sense perception (*ḥaṣṣ*) is definitive (*al-ḥaṣṣ al-ṣaḥiḥ*) can also fall under the broader heading of the rational signifier (*qarinat al-aql*). It is applicable in this case for the reasons stated previously in that there is no definitive empirical evidence that directly backs up how Adam عليه السلام , in particular, was created.

230. Al-Taftāzī states that locutionary force indicates precisely IFID (*qarīnāt*) can aid to negate other possible meanings and objections until that which is certain and certainty is obtained.

عن ابن تيمية إليه من سبب الأحكام، فبعد القطع بالمعنى وبسبب التعرض في العبادات
والعلم بالإيراد يحصل بمعونة القرائن بحيث لا يبقى شبهة

Sa'ad al-Din al-Taftāzān, *Sharḥ al-Maqṣad fī ḥukm al-Sūrah al-Rūḥ*, (Riyadh: Dar al-ʿArafah, 2004), 2:24.

correct, and finally restricting that which is possible. He further states that whenever is remiss in having a proper understanding of it will err in his understanding and deliberation of the text. " We shall now proceed to establish the textual IFID for verse 3:59

Verses Preceding and Following Verse 3:59

In the very name of the chapter which contains verse 59, "*Al-Imran*" is a subtle indication pointing to the lineage of *Isa* عليه السلام being human, and not divine.¹² Moving along to the second verse of this chapter – Allah ﷻ declares that there is no divine being except Himself, the Living and All Sustaining. In this verse lies a rational proof against those that attribute divinity to *Isa* عليه السلام since he is evidently not the "All Sustaining." Then in the sixth verse Allah ﷻ declares that He is the One who shapes you in the wombs as He likes, followed by a second declaration of Him alone being divine.¹³ This is a clear response to those confused about how a man could be born without a biological father and a further denial of anyone else being divine. Then again, in the eighteenth verse Allah ﷻ bears witness that He alone is

233. Al-Zarkashi states:

دلالة اسميائه عليه برحمته في بيده وحمل والمطعم وعدم حسبان غير امراده وعصبى انعام
وعبيده تطيق سرخ الدلالة وهو من أعظم العرائض بدالة على مراد استكمال من هيبه
غلط في نظره وغالط في منظره.

Hadi al-Din al-Zarkashi, *at-Burhān fī Uḥūm al-Qurʾān* (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2006) 445

12. *Imran* is recognized as the father of Maryam عليها السلام . Thus, it is as if Allah ﷻ is declaring right from the onset of this chapter that the biological lineage of *Isa* عليه السلام cannot be attributed to Himself.

al-Aqrabāwī, *Al-Hānī Maṣṣud Sūrat Al-Imran* (drive.google.com/file/d/1tRH51nq66QTgDeOcUst1GcQzHrkBld/view Page 6

233. Allah ﷻ says:

لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا هُوَ الْحَيُّ الْقَيُّومُ

"Allah: There is no god but He, the Living, and All Sustaining."

234. Allah ﷻ says:

هُوَ الَّذِي يَصْرِفُكُمْ فِي الْأَرْحَامِ كَيْفَ يَشَاءُ، لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا هُوَ الْعَزِيزُ الْحَكِيمُ

"It is He the One who shapes you in the wombs as He likes. There is no god but He, the Mighty, the Wise."

divine. Furthermore, He commands the Prophet ﷺ to read a twenty-sixth verse to state that He is omnipotent over all things. Immediately following this verse, mention is made of how He makes the night enter the day, and makes the day enter the night, and how He brings the living out from the dead and the dead out from the living. These powers are being revealed unto them for the purpose of pointing up to reflecting on whether such feats were performed by Isā ʿ. Also, in the twenty-seventh verse, Maryam ʿ asks how she will have a son when she has never had a consort, yet Allah ʿ responds by saying "so will He create what He wishes, that when He decrees a matter, He simply says, 'Be.' And this is the forty-ninth and fiftieth verses, Isā ʿ states how he performed them:

235 Allah ʿ says:

يَوْمَ يَشْهَدُ لَهُ شَهِيدَاتُهُ كُلُّهُنَّ فَيَمْلِكُنَّ لَهُ فَيَكْفِيَهُمْ هُنَّ أَعْلَمُ بِمَا يَكْفِيَهُنَّ
حَكِيمٌ

"Allah bears witness that there is no god but He and (so do) the angels and the men of knowledge, being the One who maintains equity, there is no god but He, the Mighty, the Wise."

236 Allah ʿ says:

قُلْ إِنَّمَا أَعِظُكُمْ بِمَا نَسَىٰ عَن قَوْمِهِ وَإِنَّ لَكُمْ فِيهَا لَآيَاتٍ لِّمَن يَعْلَمُ
مِنْ نَّسَبِهِ يُبْدِيهِ لَكُمْ آيَاتِهِ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ مَوْجٍ لِّعَلَّكُمْ تَعْقِلُونَ

"Say [Prophet], 'O Allah, Lord over all, admonish! You give authority to whoever You please and remove it from who You please; You honor whoever You please and disgrace who You please; all good is in Your Hands. Surely, You alone are Most Capable of everything.'"

237 Allah ʿ says:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ
وَأَنزِلُ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مَاءً فَيَكُونُ لَكُمُ الشَّجَرُ أَغْنَىٰ
وَأَنزِلُ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مَاءً فَيَكُونُ لَكُمُ الشَّجَرُ أَغْنَىٰ

"You cause the night to pass into the day and the day into the night; You bring forth the living from the dead and the decrees of the living; And you provide for whoever You will, without limit."

238 Allah ʿ says:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ
يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ

miracles "by the permission of Allah" not by way of a show-off!"²³⁹ This is a direct refutation of those that believed him to be divine because of the miracles he performed.²⁴⁰ In the fifty-first verse, Isāʿ outright exclaims:

Mary wondered, 'My Lord! How can I have a child, when no man has ever touched me?' An angel replied, 'As will Allah create what He wills. When He decrees a matter He simply says, "Be" And it is!'

Abū Abī Hātim al-Rāzī narrates by way of Ibn Ishāq under this verse:

ويحدث ما يشاء من بشر أو غير بشر... ما يشاء وكيف يشاء فيكون كما أراد

Abd al-Rahmān b. Abī Hātim al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-Azim* Riyadh: Maktabat Nizār al-Dāz, 1997, 163.

239. Allah ﷻ says:

رَسُولًا مِّنْ رَبِّكَ إِذْ يَدْعُكَ مِنْ رَبِّكَ إِلَىٰ أَن يَكُونَ لَكَ مِنْ طَيْرٍ كَهَيْئَةِ الطَّيْرِ مِمَّا يُبْدِئُ بِهِ اللَّهُ الْبَشَرِ الْإِنْسَانِ وَأَن يُرَىٰ الْإِنْسَانُ أَنَّهُ نَزَّلَ بِهِ رُسُلَهُ أَن يَأْتِيَهُمْ بِالْحَقِّ وَلَئِنَّ فِي ذَلِكَ لَآيَةً لِّكُلِّ عَبْدٍ مُّحْسِنٍ وَمَن يَعْصِ وَرَأْيَ رَبِّهِ فَالْحَقُّ وَإِن يَرَوْا كِسْفًا مِّنَ النُّجُومِ نَازِلًا أَوْ سَحَابًا مِّنْ غَمَامٍ مُّطِيرًا فَقَدْ كَذَّبَتْ إِلَهُكُم بِمَا كُنتُمْ تَعْمَلُونَ وَإِن يَرَوْا كِسْفًا مِّنَ النُّجُومِ نَازِلًا أَوْ سَحَابًا مِّنْ غَمَامٍ مُّطِيرًا فَقَدْ كَذَّبَتْ إِلَهُكُم بِمَا كُنتُمْ تَعْمَلُونَ وَإِن يَرَوْا كِسْفًا مِّنَ النُّجُومِ نَازِلًا أَوْ سَحَابًا مِّنْ غَمَامٍ مُّطِيرًا فَقَدْ كَذَّبَتْ إِلَهُكُم بِمَا كُنتُمْ تَعْمَلُونَ وَإِن يَرَوْا كِسْفًا مِّنَ النُّجُومِ نَازِلًا أَوْ سَحَابًا مِّنْ غَمَامٍ مُّطِيرًا فَقَدْ كَذَّبَتْ إِلَهُكُم بِمَا كُنتُمْ تَعْمَلُونَ

"And make him a messenger to the Children of Israel to proclaim: I have come to you with a sign from your Lord; I will make for you a bird from clay, breathe into it and it will become a real bird – by Allah's Will. I will heal the blind and the leper and raise the dead to life – by Allah's Will. And I will prophesize what you eat and store in your houses. Surely in this is a sign for you if you truly believe. And I will confirm the Torah revealed before me and legalize some of what had been forbidden to you. I have come to you with a sign from your Lord, so be mindful of Allah and obey me!"

240. At-Tabari narrates that the Christians of Najrān also believed Isāʿ to be divine due to the miracles he performed:

عن امر حريق قال: "يوسف بن مصرية جرد قدم ردهم على النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم فيهم السيد، والعاقب، وهما يوسف سيد أهل جرد فقالوا: يا محمد فيم قسم صاحبنا؟" قال من صاحبكم؟ قالوا: عيسى ابن مريم تزعم به عبد قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: "جن به عبد الله، وكلته ألقاه بن مريم وروح منه فخصي، وقالوا: إن كذب صدق ما نطق به النبي، ويبري الأكمة، ويحدث من لطيف كهيئة الطير فيدبح فيه، يكره الله فمكنت حتى جاءه جبريل فقال: يا محمد لمد كعمر الذين قالوا: إن الله هو المسيح بن مريم" (الحدث، ٧) [آية قدس: سورة الله صلى الله عليه وسلم بن جبريل، بهم سالوني بن حمزة]

that Allah is his lord and their lord, and they ought to worship Him.

As for those verses that follow 250, then again in these verses 251 and seventy-ninth verses Allah ﷻ accuses the people of distortion of the Book about Himself and that it is not appropriate for a messenger like I who was given a book, wisdom and prophethood, that he beguiles people towards worshipping himself as de from Allah ﷻ. Finally in eightieth verse, Allah ﷻ asks them if it is sensible for him to be devoted towards false belief after they had become true believers. Then the coming

سَمِعَ عِيسَىٰ هَٰذَا حَزَنًا ۖ فَاَتَىٰ عِيسَىٰ عَبْدُ اللَّهِ كَعِيسَىٰ اَدَمَ خَلَقَهُ مِنْ تُرَابٍ هَٰذَا هُوَ الَّذِي
يُكْفَرُونَ فَمَا اصْبَحُوا عَادًا فَعَرَا عَلَيْهِمُ الْآيَاتُ *

Abū Isḥāq al-Ṭabarānī, *muṣṣaḥḥa Bayān al-Fawā'id al-Qur'āniyya* (Maktaba Ibn Taymiyya), 6:470.

241 Allah ﷻ states

إِنَّ اللَّهَ رَبِّي وَرَبُّكُمْ فَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ هَٰذَا صِرَاطٌ مُسْتَقِيمٌ

"Allah is surely my Lord and your Lord. So worship Him. This is the straight path."

242 Allah ﷻ says:

وَمِنْهُمْ مَن يَتُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ بِالْكُفْرِ ۚ إِنَّهُمْ مُّكْذِبُونَ
وَمِنْهُمْ مَن يَتُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَمِنْ بَيْنِ يَدَيْهِمْ وَيَتُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَيَتُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ
وَمِنْهُمْ مَن يَتُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَيَتُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَيَتُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ
وَمِنْهُمْ مَن يَتُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَيَتُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَيَتُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ

"There are some among them who distort the Book with their tongues, to make you think this distortion is from the Book, but it is not what the Book says. They say, "It is from Allah," but it is not from Allah. And so they attribute lies to Allah, knowing it is not appropriate for someone who Allah has blessed with the Scripture, wisdom, and prophethood to say to people, "Worship me instead of Allah." Rather, we would say, "Be devoted to the worship of your Lord alone," in accordance with what these prophets read in the Scripture and what they taught."

243 Allah ﷻ says:

وَمِنْهُمْ مَن يَتُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَيَتُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَيَتُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ

"And he would never ask you to take angels and prophets as ends. Would he ask you to disbelieve after you have submitted?"

أَمْ لِلْإِثْمِ أَجْرٌ **يُؤْتَى** becomes evident from the verses dealing up to and following verse 35. A repeated negation of even a hint of divinity for 'Isa 13

This last verse supports the narrations whereby the Prophet ﷺ informed them that their attribution of divinity to 'Isa عليه السلام is amongst the things that prevent them from being muslim.

Textual Analysis of Verse 3:59:²⁴⁴ Bringing it all together

فَإِذَا مَثَلٌ يُعِيسِي عَبْدَ اللَّهِ كَمَثَلِ آدَمَ خَلَقَهُ مِنْ تُرَابٍ ثُمَّ قَالَ لَهُ
كُنْ فَيَكُونُ ﴿٥٩﴾

"Indeed! the similitude of 'Isa, according to Allah, is just like the similitude of Ādam. He created him from dust. Then He said unto him: Be! and he became," *Āl Imrān*:59

The structure of this verse is one of simile (*tashbīh*), where 'Isa ﷺ is being likened to Ādam ﷺ. Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Mubarrad (d. 286 h.) said that it wouldn't be farfetched to suggest that most of the speech of Arabs is in such similes.²⁴⁵ Given its frequent usage in the Arabic language, the rhet-

244 Textual analysis here will specifically refer to what is known as the "*nazm*" of the verse. This falls into the broader heading of linguistic signifiers (*al-qurʾān al-maʿnawī*) mentioned earlier. Al-Taftāzānī defines "*Nazm al-Qurʾān*" as the composition of the words used, the arrangement of its rhetorical meanings and devices (i.e. the co-text), and its agreement in meeting the requirements of both the context in which it lies and the literary standards of skilled rhetoricians.

نظم القرآن: تأليف كلماته مترتبة المعاني متسقة الدلالات على حسب ما يقتضيه العقل

Said al-Din al-Taftāzānī, *Maḥāsni al-Maʿāni* (Karachi: Maktabat al-Bushra, 2010), 1:18.

245 The respective marginalia of al-ʿUlūʿi and al-Bannān, for further elucidation.

246 al-Mubarrad said in *al-Kāmil*:

المشبه جدر كبير في كلام العرب حتى لو صار قاش هو أكثر كلامهم به بعد

oricians detailed the mechanisms of Arabic eloquence in terms of the use of figures of speech (*maṭal* *al-maṭal*) under the broader category of *balāgha* (eloquence) and the oratorical art (*al-ḥikmah al-balāghiyah*). By virtue of this, the *balāgha* is a noble (*noble*) knowledge of figures of speech in the Arabic language in general and of *ashshuh* in particular – a necessity for anyone seeking to fully understand verse 3:59. If the Qurʾān is in no way eloquent in style, then it must concur with what the master of Arabic rhetoric (*maṭal*) viewed as being eloquent (*qasid*) and effective speech (*maṭal*). Al-Taftāzānī states that by understanding what *balāgha* is, one is able to go back to the ancient Arabic rhetoricians and will understand that eloquence in the Qurʾān is inimitable but why it is the pinnacle of eloquence (even a human cannot do it). Al-Sakkākī (c. 620 h) mentions that at some points, the exegesis of the Qurʾān is ever so in need of having a logical knowledge of the use of figures of speech in classical Arabic, and that this is what always the one negligent therein.⁴⁴⁸

Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Muhaddith al-Kurānī fī al-Lughah wa al-Ḥikmah al-Balāghiyah (Mawṣūʿat al-Ḥabīyya), 96.

246 Consider the *ḥamūdī* verses (2:23, 10:38, 11:1 – 7:88, 28:42 – and 52:14) in the Qurʾān and how it would be a futile attempt to challenge the inimitability of the rhetoricians of the day if the Qurʾān did not even abide by what they considered as eloquent. Rather its inimitability is what led them to accuse the *ḥamūdī* of being a poet, a magician, and a sorcerer, but never as inarticulate.

247 Al-Taftāzānī states:

(وإنما من راحة العجز في نظم القرآن) أي به يعرف أن القرآن معجز
تكملة في علم من راحة العجز في نظم القرآن، أي به يعرف أن القرآن معجز
وسيلة إلى تصديق النبي عليه السلام.

Shāh al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtasar al-Mawṣūʿat al-Balāghiyah* (Mawṣūʿat al-Ḥabīyya, 2010), 1:17.

Moreover al-Marāḥī states that the Qurʾān is *both* inimitable in its form and content:

من غير قصد به بالجهل بحيد صحت حروفه ونظمه ويعرف ما ورد فيه من المعاني
صاحبة بنظمه ولغظمه وبالمعاني المودعة فيه.

Abū Maṣṣūr al-Māturīdī, *Taḥwīṭ al-ʿUlūm* (Beirut: Dār al-ʿUlūm al-ʿArabīyah, 2003), 10:346.

248 al-Sakkākī states:

وإنما من راحة العجز في نظم القرآن، أي به يعرف أن القرآن معجز

Al-Taftāzānī adds that Allah ﷻ is far beyond including even one inelegant word in the Qur'ān such that "it would lead to Him being attributed with ignorance (*ghaflah*) or ineptitude (*qasā*)".²⁴⁹ Al-Khattābī's explanation is that ignorance would result if Allah ﷻ neglected something without knowing that it is inelegant, or if He deemed the inelegant to be better than the eloquent while ineptitude would result if He knew of al-Faṣḥ's yet was unable to bring forth that which is eloquent in place of the inelegant.²⁵⁰ Al-Jusūqī further adds that if it is hypothetically supposed that Allah ﷻ has both the ability and knowledge to bring forth something more eloquent but chose not to on account of the inelegant being easier at conveying His intended meaning, or if it was done due to a wisdom in knowing that the people of that time could not comprehend it, then we would reply to this by asserting that from among the objectives of the Qur'ān is to incapacitate (*ʿajaz*) others from being able to replicate its perfect rhetorical style (*ḥaḍḥah*) and eloquence (*fasḥah*) in order to confirm the messengership of Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ. Whereas the use of something that is inelegant in the Qur'ān would necessitate that this specific purpose is frustrated, rendering it no longer an incapacitating (*ʿajaz*) literary miracle. Moreover, al-Jusūqī further contends that failing to fulfil this primary objective due to some external factor would itself be counted as foolishness (*isāfah*) and further ignorance (*ghaflah*) for not knowing better ergo impossible by One

هدى العيني ك لا ينسأ بالدين كل الوير عو يعاطي بفسر وهو بهد حر

ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Ḥafḍī, *ʿAbd al-Ḥafḍī al-Ḥafḍī*, *ʿAbd al-Ḥafḍī al-Ḥafḍī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1987), 162.

249 Al-Taftāzānī states:

مجرد اشكال العرب على كلام غير فصيح من غير كلف غير فصيح كما بقوله: هدى العيني ك لا ينسأ بالدين كل الوير عو يعاطي بفسر وهو بهد حر

ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Ḥafḍī, *ʿAbd al-Ḥafḍī al-Ḥafḍī*, *ʿAbd al-Ḥafḍī al-Ḥafḍī* (Karachi: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 136-37.

250 Al-Khattābī states:

لا ينسأ بالدين كل الوير عو يعاطي بفسر وهو بهد حر هدى العيني ك لا ينسأ بالدين كل الوير عو يعاطي بفسر وهو بهد حر

ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Ḥafḍī, *ʿAbd al-Ḥafḍī al-Ḥafḍī*, *ʿAbd al-Ḥafḍī al-Ḥafḍī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2010), 114.

attributed with absolute wisdom.²⁵¹ Accordingly, what can be derived from this is a rational IFID (*qanun al-‘aql*) that whenever an interpretation or exegesis is laid forth which necessitates that the Qur’an failed to meet the foundational principles of what constitutes eloquence in the Arabic language, then this meaning will be rejected on grounds of attributing ignorance (*jahl*), impotence (*‘ajz*) and/or fool-shiness (*‘afaliyya*) to Allah. With that said, it is imperative the reader understands how the Arabs defined “eloquence” itself.²⁵²

251. Al-Dusūqī states:

من قد تمكن به ورع غير انصاع مع عدمه بذلك وقدرته على الإتيان بالعصيح بدله،
 ... ورع غير انصاع لكونه أوصح دلالة على لمحي الرد من العصيح أثر حكمة لا
 ينشأ من غموض وحيدة فلا محذور في التماس العراء على غير فصيح، فثبت بمقصود
 من غير ... ما هو الاستحار بكلام بلاغة وفصاحة لأجل صدق النبي صلى الله عليه
 وسلم ووجود قومه غير فصاحة فيه موجب لعدم فصاحته ما تشمل عليه من المقدر معجز
 بالإنعاق وعدم فصاحته ذلك القدر موجب لعدم بلاغته، فلا يكون معجزاً، وبخالفه ذلك
 بمقصود الأمر عارض بغيره وخرجه عن حكمة، وهو لا يبين محال حكيم، وحيدته
 فتكون (إنسان غير انصاع مع لعدمه) القدرة على بيده ما يستلزم ما لا يعلم أنه سعة
 حكيم ما يصح الاتياف في محله، فظهر لك من هذا أن الإتيان بالسعة يبيحه بجهل بأنه
 سعة فتكون نسبة السعة داخله تحت نسبة الجاهل.

Muhammad b. ‘Arafa al-Dusūqī, *Hashtiyat al-Dusūqī alā Mukhtasar al-Ma‘āni* (Cairo: Bulāq Miṣr, 1895), 1:67.

Al-Khattābī explains similarly with al-Yazdī affirming it too in his own respective gloss. See Abd Allah al-Yazdī, *Hashtiyat al-Yazdī alā Hashtiyat al-Khattābī alā Mukhtasar al-Ma‘āni* (Kaysere: Erciyes University, 2022), 180.

252. Those Arabs who’d rectly heard the Qur’an when it was first revealed understood the distinct literary style of the Qur’an purely by their familiarity w/ what constitutes eloquence and what does not. As a result of this, they understood and experienced the inability to replicate something of its nature by way of necessity as first-hand witnesses. Whereas those who came after and fell short of this level of comprehension resorted to understanding the Qur’ān’s inimitability through a variety of deductive and inductive methods. However, both arrived at the same conclusion in that its inimitability is certain (*yaqīn*) and the proof of this lies in the fact that neither of them were able to counter the challenges made by the Qur’ān. Ibn ‘Atīyya explains:

لهذا العرب مخصوصون بهذا في غير كلام وخبر بها ما لا يعلمه غير ولا كل من خاطبه
 حضرة فقهوا المعجز عليه ضرورة ومشاهدة وعينه الناس بعدهم استدلالاً ونظر الكمال

Defining eloquence (*faṣāḥa*)

Al-Taftāzānī defines "eloquence" as [a] speech whose individual words themselves are eloquent, and additionally that it should be devoid of a) weakness in composition (i.e., does not follow the known rules of classical Arabic grammar), b) phonetic incompatibility (i.e. the word-choice used in a sentence impedes proper pronunciation) and c) lexical/semantic incompatibility.²⁵³ Al-Taftāzānī further defines *balāgha* as meeting everything that defines *faṣāḥa* above along with the additional caveat that it conforms with the dictates and requirements of the context (*muṭabbaʿa li-muqaddā al-hāl*).²⁵⁴

In what follows, extensive quotes culled from classical works on Arabic rhetoric will be presented. It is highly crucial that the reader understands throughout the forthcoming discussion that none of these quotes are specific to verse 3:59. Rather, these reference works will be generally defining and highlighting simile (*tashbīh*) as a rhetorical device and what it must consist of, for its usage to not only be proper but to moreover be *fasīḥ* and *baligh* according to the most skilled of classical Arabic rhetoricians.²⁵⁵

محسن علم بطبي لم يكن ليس في مرتبة واحدة

Abū Muḥammad ḥ. Aṭṭar al-Andalusī *al-Muḥarrar al-Waḥīd* Beirut Dār al-Kuṭub al-Ilmiyya, 2001), 3483.

253 Al-Taftāzānī states:

المصاح في الكلام خبره من ضعف التأليف وتسامر الكلمات و التعقيد مع فصاحتها.

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtasar al-Maʿāni* Karāchi Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2006), 1140.

254 Al-Taftāzānī states:

(و البلاغة في الكلام مطابقة لمقتضى الحال مع فصاحه) أي فصاحة الكلام.

Ibid, 1154.

255 The reason for heavy reliance on understanding the nuances of the Arabic language is because Allāh ﷻ highlights the importance of it in understanding the Qurʾān:

"We have not sent a messenger except in the language of his people to clarify the message for them." – 14:4.

وما أرسلنا من رسولٍ إلَّا بلسان قومه، يبين لهم

Al-Qarāfī (d. 684 h.) states that because of the Qurʾān having been revealed in Arabic, it necessitates that whatever is deemed permissible and eloquent in Arabic

Refuting Maxim Misuses

Muslim evolutionists pointedly assert that verse 3:59 is simply a general comparison between Adam ﷺ and 'Isa عليه السلام as per its use of the word "mathal" which is an indefinite word. Moreover, they argue that as per the legal theory maxim of "consideration is given to the generality of the verse, not the specificity of the actual reason for revelation" (*al-ithr al-umūm al-tafzīl bi-khusūṣ al-sībab*) there is no reason to consider the reason for the revelation.

This line of reasoning can be replied to in at least two different ways.

First, it was mentioned earlier that *ilm al-bayan* is the science that deals with the use of figures of speech in the Arabic language and within this broad science lies the use of rhetorical devices such as the simile. Al-Taftāzānī defines the science dealing with figures of speech in the Arabic language as a science that requires a certain ability or an understanding of known rhetorical precepts, whereby an intended meaning can be expressed in varying degrees of clarity that concords with the linguistic requirements of the context (*muqattadā al-hāl*).²⁵⁶ Al-Taftāzānī explains that what is meant by "varying degrees of clarity" excludes the mere lexical difference found in synonyms.²⁵⁷ In other words, the use of figures of speech, such as similes,

must be the standard in the Qur'ān, and whatever is considered inappropriate or ineloquent in Arabic must also hold true for the Qur'ān:

كُلُّ مَا كَانَ حَسَنًا فِي كَلَامِ الْعَرَبِ كَانَ كَسِبَتْ فِي كَلَامِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى وَمَا كَانَ مُعْجَبًا كَانَ مُعْجَبًا
لِذَا اللَّهُ يُعَذِّبُ الْحَبِيرَ بِهِ. وَمَا كَانَ عَرَبِيًّا عَلَى لِسَةِ الْعَرَبِ لَا عَلَى لِسَةِ اللَّهِ وَلَا مَعْنَى لِحْوَةٍ عَلَى
لِسَةِ عَرَبٍ إِلَّا أَنَّهُ مَعْنَى جَرَّ جَرِّهِ وَمَعْنَى اسْتَفْتَحَ فِي كَلَامِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى فَتَأْتِلُ هَذِهِ الْفَاعِلَةُ
فَيُؤْتِي بِخَرَجٍ عَلَيْهَا حِكْمًا كَثِيرًا وَأُسْلُوبًا صَعِبًا فِي كَلَامِ اللَّهِ يُعَذِّبُ

Shihab al-Dīn Ahmad b. Idrīs al-Qarāfī, *al-Istighnā fī al-Istithnā* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1986), 447.

256. Al-Taftāzānī states,

(وهو علم) في مدركة به درجته على درجات جارية وأصول وقواعد معنوية (يعرف
به يراد المعنى الواحد) في عدول عليه بكتلام مطابق لمقتضى الحال (مطوون) ركب
(محمدة في وضوح دلالة عليه) أي على ذلك المعنى إذ يحذف بعض الطرق ويصح الدلالة
عليه بعضها أوضح

Shihab al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Muḥtaṣar al-Ma'ānī* (Karachi: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 23.

257. Al-Taftāzānī states,

n this science is not, for example, expressing that Zayd is a giving person by merely stating, "Zayd is generous" where "giving" is simply substituted with its synonym "generous". Rather, this science not only requires understanding the mere definitions of the non-khul words being used but additionally requires a cognitive effort in the mind of the addressee/reader to mentally transition from the antecedent (*muḥtawī*) in the figure of speech to its consequent (*khāṣṣ*).²⁵⁸ That is to say, one wishes to employ rhetorical devices in a manner that genuinely qualifies himself as being eloquent. Then one's use of simile cannot be mere substitution with synonyms or equivalents between things being compared. The skilled rhetoricians of this field demand that words or phrases be used in a manner that both enables and petitions the addressee/reader to exert mental effort in discerning the actual degree or extent of comparison being made in the simile. Moreover, not do the dictates of figures of speech permit any meaning that can possibly be conjured in the mind to be of consideration in the simile. They are rather explicit in stating that the understood meaning must be one that is being intended by the speaker.²⁵⁹ By this, the folly of those who attempt to understand and interpret verse 3:59 by plainly considering the

وعبد الخلاق بالوضح يحرج معرفة يراد معنى الواحد بطرق مختلفة في اللفظ
والعبرة

Ibid, 2:4.

258 Al-Taftāzānī states:

وهذه الدلالة (يدل على تمام ما وضع اللفظ به) كدلالة الإنسان على الحيوان الباقى أو
على حوته كدلالة الإنسان على عيوبه والناظر (و على خارج منه) كدلالة الإنسان على
الضاحك (وسمى الأول أي دلالة على تمام ما وضع به (وصفيه) لأن الواضع يمد وضع
اللفظ لتمام معناه (بسمي (كل من (أخوتى) أي دلالة على الجزء والخارج (عفيه)
لأن دلالة اللفظ على كل من جزءه والخارج بسمي من جهة حكمة العلف بأن حصول بكل
أو المبروم يستلزم حصول الجزء أو اللام.

Ibid, 2:5-6.

259 Al-Taftāzānī states:

(وهو علم) أي منك يتقدم به على إدراكك حقيقته أو أصول وهو عند معرفة (يعرب به
بأن معنى الباقى (اللام في "معنى" أو حقه للاستغراق العرفي أي كل معنى واحد يدعى
بحد نصيب المتكلم وإرادته

Ibid 3-4.

emphatically state that the reason for the revelation cannot be extracted from the meaning of the text even in the presence of a context specifier (*mukharrij*) and that its consideration was decided¹² remain as per the consensus of the scholars. Moreover, excluding consideration of the reason for the revelation results in grave implications. Al Zarkashī mentions that it could result in the implication that Allah *is* asking around answering what has been revealed to the Prophet ﷺ and being ambiguous in His reply to the interlocutor, all of which is invalid with regards to Allah *swt*.¹³ The rhetoricians would demand considering the reason for the revelation to ascertain conformity with the *muqadda al-hal* as mentioned above while Muslim legal theorists (*ushūliyyin*) would demand considering the reason for the revelation to ensure the judgment being issued is not at odds with it. Thus, it becomes apparent that Muslim evolutionists have to recourse but to consider the reason for the revelation due to the undervalued demands of both the rhetoricians and legal theorists.

Determining the “Muqadda al-Hal”

Concerning the aspect of upholding the rhetorical style of the Qur’an as defined above, it must be asked of Muslim evolutionists, that in addition to connecting all the requirements for eloquence, how exactly does their own interpretation of verse 359 fulfil the additional requirement of “*mutabaqa li-muqadda al-hal*”? “*Mutabaqa li-muqadda al-hal*” is to appropriately consider what the context is calling towards such that it be correctly factored

الإجماع المذكور

Muhammad Abu al-A'war al-Zarkāshī, *Masaḥif al-Uṣūl* Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, 2005), 107.

Al Zarkashī states:

«...فإنه قد يحكى بلفظ عام ويعوم الدين على الشخص بـ «أ» من السبب لا يحكى إخراجاً ولا جهاداً وإنما يجمع كما حكاه اللغامي أبو بكر في مختصر التفسير لابن جحون السبب قطبي

Badr al-Din al Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī Uṣūl al-Qurʾān* Cairo: Dar al-Hadīth, 2006) 29.

262 Al Zarkashī states:

«...فإنه قد يحكى بلفظ عام ويعوم الدين على الشخص بـ «أ» من السبب لا يحكى إخراجاً ولا جهاداً وإنما يجمع كما حكاه اللغامي أبو بكر في مختصر التفسير لابن جحون السبب قطبي

bid.

conveys the intended meaning that the speaker is trying to convey.¹⁵³ Furthermore, al-Shāṭibī explicitly states that the science of figures of speech in classical Arabic, through which the immutability of the Qur'an can be known, revolves around knowing the muqadā al-hāl and more so, knowing the reason for the revelation is akin to knowing the muqadā al-hāl. Likewise, Nur al-Dīn al-Idrīsī states that studying the Qur'an's linguistics and understanding it can prove to be difficult without first studying the reason for the revelation due to the latter providing an insight into how the Qur'an factors in the muqadā al-hāl and then consequently, as previously

153 Al-Taftāzānī states:

وَأَمَّا هُوَ "مَرْدَدٌ" فَيَعْنِي مَعَ كَلَامِ الَّذِي يُرَدُّ بِهِ أَصْلُهُ وَهُوَ خُصُوصِيَّةُ مَا
وَهُوَ مُفْتَضِلٌ إِلَى

Said al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Al-Muḥarrar al-Maṭṭar* (Karacatur Akademi al-Bashra 2010), 154-55.

154 Al-Shāṭibī's discussion concerning the interplay between the *subuh al-bayān* and *muqadā al-hāl*:

مَعْرِفَةُ سَبَبِ الْكَلَامِ مِنْ مَعْرِفَةِ الْمَعْنَى وَتَعْرِفُ ذَلِكَ بِغَيْبِ الْمَعْنَى وَالْبَيَانِ
مَنْ يَعْرِفُ بِهِ عَدْرَ نَظْمٍ يَفْرَأُ فَمُضِلًا عَنْ مَعْرِفَةِ مَقَاصِدِ كَلَامٍ يُعَرِّبُ بِمَا مَدْرَهُ عَلَى
مَعْرِفَةِ مَقْصِدِهِ أَوْ أَحْوَالِ حَالِ الْخَطَابِ مِنْ حَيْثُ يَحْسِي الْخَطَابُ بِهِ الْخَاصُّ وَالْخَاطِبُ أَوْ
جَمِيعُ الْكَلَامِ بِوَاحِدٍ يَخْتَلِفُ فِيهِمْ بِحَسَبِ حَالِهِمْ وَبِحَسَبِ خَاطِبِهِمْ وَبِحَسَبِ غَيْرِ ذَلِكَ
فَالْأَسْمَاءُ بِفَعْلِهِ وَاحِدٌ وَبِحَسَبِ مَعْنَى حَرْفٍ مِنْ تَفْصِيلٍ وَتَوْجِيحٍ وَغَيْرِ ذَلِكَ وَكَالْأَمْرِ بِدَعْوَةٍ
بَعْدَ تَوْجِيحٍ وَتَهْدِيدٍ وَالتَّعْجِيلِ وَتَأْخِيرِهِ وَلَا يَحْدُثُ عَلَى مَعْنَاهُ حَرْفٌ إِلَّا الْأَمْرُ الْخَافِضُ
وَعَمْدَتُهُ مَقْصِدَاتُ الْأَحْوَالِ وَبَيِّنُ كُلِّ حَالٍ يَقُولُ وَلَا كُلِّ قَرِينَةٍ تَقْرُبُ بِحَسَبِ الْكَلَامِ
تَحْزِينٌ وَتَعْدِيدٌ مِنْ حَصْنِ النَّمْرِ مِنَ الدَّالَةِ فَاتَّهَمَ الْكَلَامَ هَلْ أَوْ قَرَّبَهُ شَيْءٌ مِنْهُ وَمَعْرِفَةُ
الْأَسْبَابِ رَافِعَةٌ بِكُلِّ مَشْكَلٍ فِي هَذِهِ السُّبُطِ وَهِيَ مِنْ مَقَامَاتِ فِي هَذِهِ الْكُتُبِ بِلَا نَدٍّ وَمَعْنَى
مَعْرِفَةِ السَّبَبِ هُوَ مَعْنَى مَعْرِفَةِ مُقْتَضَى الْحَالِ

Abu Ishāq al-Shāṭibī, *al-Muwafaqāt* (Riyadh: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1994), 114-6.

In this same respect, al-Sanūsī states that the *muqadā al-hāl* is the reason *subuh* for which that speech is revealed:

السبب الذي ورد الكلام لأجله.

Muhammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *Sharh al-Aqida al-Kubra* (Damascus: Dār al-Iqwa, 2019), 590.

in the "highest form of immutability".²⁶⁵ It was shown in an earlier chapter that the reason for the correlation of verse 3:59 was with the Christian story of Natān as a tempted to make a case for the divinity of Isā' by questioning what his father was, whilst it being known to both Christians and Muslims alike that he did not have a biological father – the obvious implication being that God Himself must have been his father. It was also shown in the preceding chapter that the context of the first rightly-recognized prophet, 'Adām, in the Qur'ān – here coming both before and after verse 3:59, seeking to negate divinity for Isā' 266. As such, if we were to combine both of these devices *qat'ī* and *ḥaqīqī* the reason for *ḥiṭṭ* and *ḥuṭṭ* text, it would be that how exactly verse 3:59 should correspond to the *ḥiṭṭ* and *ḥuṭṭ* text. To cogently prove that the absence of biological paternity in the case of Isā' does not merit a case for his divinity.

One of the examples al-Taḥṣanī gives to illustrate how something would qualify as meeting its contextual requirements (in *ḥuṭṭ* al-ḥaṭṭ) is the case of someone who refuses to believe that Zayd is inside the house. Consequently the individual's adamant denial demands the speaker declare with emphasis that "Indeed Zayd is inside the house!"²⁶⁷ Similarly, he admonishes the individuals of the Christians of Natān to accept the mortal nature of Isā' and their resorting to making a case for his divinity by suggesting that at the absence of his biological father, God Himself, is his father – what drives verse 3:59 to begin with "indeed" *ḥuṭṭ* to underscore what is soon to follow in refuting their fallacious reasoning. If Muslim evolutionists do not accept the contextual criteria, then it must be asked of them, what is the very first word in verse 3:59 emphasizing?

265. Nūr al-Dīn It states:

بِ كَرِّ مَلَاةٍ (بِ كَرِّ هُوَ يَدْعُو تَحْلًا بِمَعْنَى حَالٍ وَمِنْ حَسْبٍ مِنْ لَدُنْكَ مَا
يَكُونُ بِ كَرِّ يَدْعُو حَصُوصِيَّاتٍ مُفَادَةً لِأَسْمَاءٍ بِ مَعْنَى لَدُنْكَ هُوَ كَرِّ وَ حَرِّ حَتَّى يَكُونَ
بِ كَرِّ مِنْ مَعْنَى حَالٍ مُعْجَبٍ عَلَى بِي مَسْنُونٍ مَعْنَى

Nūr al-Dīn al-Qur'ān al-Karīm wa al-Furqān al-'Adl biyya (Tashreeḥ Maṭṭa' al-Jamī'a Dimashq, 2003), 58

266. Al-Taḥṣanī states:

مَلَاةٌ كَوْنٌ مُعْجَبٌ مِنْ كَرِّ مَعْنَى حَالٍ بِ كَرِّ حَصُوصِيَّاتٍ بِ كَرِّ مَعْنَى حَالٍ
وَقَوْلُكَ لَهْ يَزِيدُ فِي الدَّارِ مَوْكِدٌ بِ (بِ) كَلَامٍ مُطَابِقٍ لِمَقْنُونِ الْحَالِ

Nūr al-Dīn al-Taḥṣanī *Muḥṣan al-Muḥṣan* (Karachi: Maktabat al-Bashra, 2010), 1:35

267. Al-Taḥṣanī explains that *ḥuṭṭ* occurs in *ḥuṭṭ* together with emphasis, what

Breaking Down the Arabic Simile Proper (tashbīh)

Arabic rhetoricians describe tashbīh as comprising certain components:

- Tenor (mushābahah):** The subject of the simile which is being likened to something else.
- Vehicle (mushābahah bihi):** The thing used to describe the tenor.
- Comparator (adāt al-tashbīh):** The particle used to connect the simile, usually being struck between the tenor and vehicle.
- Ground (wajh al-shabāh):** The common meaning shared by both the tenor and vehicle.

When applied to verse 3:59 it would look like this:

tenor	comparator
"Indeed, the similitude of Isā, according to Allah, is just like the similitude of Ādam. He created him from dust. Then He said unto him: Be, and he became."	
vehicle	

Instead of outright identifying the ground now, which is at the heart of the contention, I will first proceed to discuss how it ought to be identified.

As Taftazānī mentions that among any two things being compared, such as Zayd and a lion, the two can potentially share in several things, including essential traits such as both possessing a body and being an animal. However, despite these and other commonalities, none of them will be deemed the ground merely by virtue of them being shared. The ground is only that common feature which the speaker is particularly intending.¹⁶ Therefore, to posit the opinion that "mathāl" (similitude) in this verse could virtually

the addressees are seeking to know and are skeptical about:

وأما كلمة "إنه" بيون المعسورة في هذه الواقعة فتعويه الجنبه هي بصيغته المخاطب
ويتردد بين وصال عنها

Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftazānī, *Sharḥ al-Tafwīṭ*, Beirut: al-Maktabah al-Asriyya, 2003, 2: 158.

168. As Taftazānī states:

(ووجهه) أي وجه التشبيه ما يشتركان فيه) أي معنى الذي قصده إشراكه بغيره من
الصفات من جهة والاشد يشتركان في كثير من الصفات رعيه كالحويية والحسية والوجود
وغير ذلك. مع أن شيئاً منها ليس وجه التشبيه

be anything in which both *Ādam* آدم and *Isā* عيسى have in common stands as patently incorrect. This has been mistakenly repeated by many a Muslim evolutionist.

Which type of Objective is used in the Simile of verse 3:54?

One of the ways whereby the intended simile feature (the ground) can be identified is by determining the objective (*gharad*) of the simile being used. This objective of similes relates to some feature concerning the tenor.¹⁶⁶ The objective could be either

- to explain a peculiarity found within the tenor that is being contested or denied (*bayān al-imkān*),
- to explain a particular state or attribute that the tenor possesses (*bayān al-hāl*),
- to explain the magnitude or extent of possessing a certain attribute (*bayān miqdār al-hāl*), or
- to firmly establish a peculiarity or state within the tenor that is being contested or denied with cogency (*taqrīr al-hāl al-imkān*).¹⁶⁷

As is evident, the objective of (d), *taqrīr al-hāl al-imkān* is the same as the objectives found in (a) through (c) except that (d) executes it in a persuasive manner whereby the explanation takes root and becomes strengthened within the mind of the addressee.¹⁶⁸ Recalling that the contextual dictate (*muqtaḍā al-hāl*) requires verse 3:59 to prove that a deficiency in the biological paternity of *Isā* عيسى does not merit a case for his divinity, it would therefore seem that the objective in verse 3:59 would necessarily have to be type (d) that of *taqrīr al-hāl al-imkān*. What further lends support to this is what we find earlier in verse 3:47

Saḍ al-Dīn al-Taḥāzani, *Mukhtasar al-Hidāyah* (Karachi: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 2:26

166 Al-Taḥāzānī states:

(و يفرق بين (أ) أي من السبب (في أغلب موارد) - شبه وهو (ب) أي يفرق بين السبب والشبه

bid. 2:54.

170 Ibid, 2:54-56

171 Al-Taḥāzānī states

تقرير حال الشبه في بعض السبب وتقوية شبه

Ibid, 2:56.

"She said, "My Lord, how will I have a child when no man has touched me?" The angel said, "Such is Allah: He creates what He wills. When He decrees a matter, He only says to it, 'Be,' and it is."

In this earlier verse, Allah ﷻ had already indicated how it is possible for a man to be created without a biological father—however, as seen in the various narrations found in the previous chapter on the relation to the recitation of verse 3:59, the Christians of Najran were not disputing Isa ﷺ having a biological father. Rather, their dispute revolved around using the lack of parentage in Isa ﷺ as a means for establishing his divinity. In contrast, here in verse 3:47 Maryam ﷺ posed the question from the standpoint of how it could be possible (imkān) for conception to take place without a biological father. Her intention was never to engage in a dispute or attempt to argue for the divinity of her unborn son. As such, we see that Allah ﷻ offers her a genuine explanation corresponding to the most factual truth about His omnipotence in that He is fully able to create what He so wills and what has been decreed, without resorting to using words conveying emphasis or intensity. This incident with Maryam ﷺ was recited unto the Christians of Najran to relay the same message about the extent of His omnipotence. However, the mood seemingly shifts, as we saw in an earlier narration where the Christians of Najran claimed they were already "true believers" before the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ himself. The extent of the heated exchange between them can be gauged by the narration of the Companion, Abu Adhāb al-Harith al-Zubaydi d. 80 H, wherein he states that he heard the Prophet ﷺ wish for a barrier to arise between himself and the Najran such that he would not see them, and they would not see him, due to the

272 3:47

وَقَالَتْ رَبِّ انصُرْنِي بِمَا كُنْتُ مَعَهُ ۚ فَنفَخَ فِيهَا مِنْهُ رُوحُ رَبِّهَا فَنَزَلَ فِي فَطْرِهَا فَكَانَ نَذِيرًا
فِي مَا يَفْعَلُ الْمُجْرِمُونَ

273. As Saṣṣusi explains that, according to the rules of *balagh*, if the addressee is unaware of the subject matter at hand, then what is suitable is that they be addressed with words that do not carry strong emphasis:

وَلَا يَلُوحُظُ فِي هَذِهِ الْمَقَامَةِ أَنْ يُلْقَى إِلَيْهِ بِكَلَامٍ مِثْلِهِ

Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Saṣṣusi, *Maṭh al-Aspāṭ al-Kubrā* (Damascus: Dar al-Taqwā, 2019), 590

This is precisely the type of response we see in verse 3:47 unlike in verse 3:59.

sheet intensely by which they were disputing with him.¹⁴ Furthermore, in just two verses after verse 359, a call towards the "imprecation (*imāhātāt*)" is issued for whoever is speaking falsely amongst the disputing parties.¹⁵ Suggesting that verse 359 was the "losing argument" and the final blow to her beliefs. One of the known functions of *tashbīh* is in fact to act as proof (*dalīl*) and evidence (*bayyāt*)¹⁶ that is presented to demonstrate an interlocutor. Therefore, in view of how the discussion escalated, it is only fitting to the situation (*mutābiq li-muqaddāt-hā*) that verse 359's use of *tashbīh* is for the objective (*gharad*) of *taqrīḥ al-hal al-amkār*.

Defining the Tagr al Hal al Imkân

concerning taqrīr al-hâl al-umkân, al-Taftazani states that what is required in this type of tashbīh is that the vehicle is both more renowned (*ashraf*), and is more complete (*akmal*), than the tenor with respect to the ground.¹⁰

14

[illegible]

Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari *Jāmiʿ al-Bayān fī Taʾwīl al-Qurʾān* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Jamʿiyya, 2009), 3:196.

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فَمِنْ حَقِّكَ فِيمَ مِنْ عَذَابٍ جَدِيدٍ مِمَّنْ أَلَيْمُ الْعَذَابِ فَمُلَّا فِيهِمْ فَمِنْ حَقِّكَ فِيمَ مِنْ عَذَابٍ جَدِيدٍ مِمَّنْ أَلَيْمُ الْعَذَابِ فَمُلَّا فِيهِمْ فَمِنْ حَقِّكَ فِيمَ مِنْ عَذَابٍ جَدِيدٍ مِمَّنْ أَلَيْمُ الْعَذَابِ فَمُلَّا فِيهِمْ

"Then whoever argues with you about it after this [knowledge has come to you] say, 'Come, let us call our sons and your sons, our women and your women, ourselves and yourselves, then supplicate earnestly [together] and invoke the curse of Allah upon the liars [among us]'" (3:61)

176 A.J. Dyfugāi et al.

مؤثري بالشبهة على طريق الدليل على إنبائه قوله (اصحح هذه الدعوى) أي أقام الحجة أي الدليل على إنباء هذه الدعوى.

Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Dusūqī, *Ḥaṣṣayāt al-Dusūqī*, and Muḥammad al-Aḥmadī (Cairo: Bulāq Miṣr, 1855), 2202.

477 al-Tafāṣṣuṭi states

هو من تلاميذ جبال بعلبك، الأمير حميد الأسطى، الأمير الأشم، أمير جبال بعلبك

indeed, it would defy logic to draw a comparison with something that is even more vague and unclear as it would only compound the problem. Abu al-Abbās b. Ya'qub al-Wallāh (c. 1128 h) explains the reason for this requirement is that the entire objective of *taqrīr* is to establish and firmly root the ground into the mind of the addressee such that he becomes certain of it, thereby leaving no possibility to oppose it by way of mere conjecture.¹⁷⁷ Al-Wallāh adds that according to the rhetoricians, using a vehicle that is both more renowned and complete than the tenor is mandatory (*waajib* in *taqrīr* lest it amounts to neglect for what the situation requires it) (i.e. *muqtadā al-hāl*) or leaving oneself open to rebuttal even if by erroneous rejoinders.¹⁷⁸ What is worthy of mention here is that the ground relating to Adam عليه السلام must be accounted for with respect to the understanding of the actual addressees of this verse, i.e. the Christians of Naḡrān and the Muslims alive at that time and need not be in accordance with the understanding of anyone else.¹⁷⁹ Continuing in this vein, al-Tafīḡarānī states:

زيادة التقرير والتقوية أجدر وأليق

Ṣaḍ al-Dīn al-Tafīḡarānī *Mukhtasar al-Ma'ānī* (Karachi: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2010), 258.

178 Ibn Ya'qub al-Wallāh states:

وما بتقرير ميمضى أسسه والأظهر مما لا أن المراد يمكن ذلك الوجه في النفس وتقريره
عندك حتى تطمان إليه ولا يمكن ما مداحة فيه بالهم

Abū al-Abbās b. Ya'qub al-Wallāh, *Mawāḍiḥ al-Fattah fi Sharḥ Tadhkirat al-Mafḥūḥ* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2003), 2271.

179 Ibn Ya'qub al-Wallāh states:

وله بعد من جملة أسامي بالأقوى الأظهر مع قصد ذلك التحقق وجب لأنه بالأصح
تبيين أسماهم فيه والتعاضل عن مقتضاه ويدفعه عن النفس وإثبات صده وهم وبالأصح
كذلك.

Abū al-Abbās b. Ya'qub al-Wallāh *Mawāḍiḥ al-Fattah fi Sharḥ Tadhkirat al-Mafḥūḥ* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2003), 2271.

280 Al-Dusūqī states:

ويحتمل أنه به معروف بذلك الحكم الذي هو موب وجه أشبه عند مخاطب لا عند
كل أحد

Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dusūqī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī ala Mukhtasar al-Ma'ānī* (Cairo: Bu. āq Miṣr, 1855), 2233.

that the vehicle should possess a degree of familiarity and intimacy to the addressee" while *Sadr al-Shari'a al-Mahbub* (d. 741) states that it should moreover be the pinnacle of sense perceptibles (*mathal*) in possessing the intended ground (*wajh al-shabih*).²⁸¹ Al-Dusuqī elaborates that what is intended by the vehicle being "more renowned" (*ashraf*) is that it be "extremely well known" (*shiddat al-ma'rifat*), in order for the comparison to even be considered as valid and for the sake of completeness when used as a form of evidence (*thabāt*).²⁸² Moreover, Ibn Ya'qūb al-Walīdī states that the vehicle's prominence in *taqrīr* is not just in comparison to the reader in a relative sense but rather in an absolute sense in its own right.²⁸³ Lastly, Ibn Aṭīyya states that the use of two simile comparisons (*mathal* and "*kāf*" in conjunction ("*kamathali*") occurring immediately before "*Adam*" in verse 159 specifically emphasizes the similarity of Adam to the.

281. Al-Tafāzānī states:

مرط إلى المعنى به

Sa'd al-Dīn al-Tafāzānī, *Mukhtasar al-Ma'āni* (Karachi: Maktabat al-Bushra, 2016), 2:56.

282. Sadr al-Shari'a al-Mahbubī states:

يد كمال العرض حتى يتضح بالكلية كشيء خد بالود و ياءه المبرر يجب كونه
شبهه به أكمل محسوسات منصفة بعينك الوصف

Abayd Allah b. Mas'ud al-Mahbubī, *al-Wishāh* (Istanbul: Dār Dab al-Ilm, 2010), 67.

283. Muḥammad b. Ahmad al-Dusuqī *Hāshiyah al-Dusuqī 'alā Mukhtasar al-Ma'ānī* (Cairo: Bulāq Miṣr, 1855), 2:204.

284. Al-Tafāzānī states:

ليصبح المقاييس ويتم الاحتجاج.

Sa'd al-Dīn al-Tafāzānī, *Mukhtasar al-Ma'āni* (Karachi: Maktabat al-Bushra, 2016) 2:56.

285. Ibn Ya'qūb al-Walīdī states:

لا يعني أن يرد بلا شبهة في منطق معرفة والشبهة ولا فهو يد معنى من بعض
بم أن يكون لها ولا يمكن أن يفهم من مورد في شبهه كمن في شبهه من غير
شبهه

Abu al-Abbās b. Ya'qūb al-Walīdī, *Mawāhib al-Faṣḥāh Sharḥ Taṭkīr al-Awḥān* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 2003), 2:172.

286. Ibn Aṭīyya states:

Determining the Ground (*Wajh al-Shubuh*)

A critical point worthy of consideration is that at times in the Qur'an Allah ﷻ mentions that He reveals unknown information:

"This is one of the stories of the unseen which we reveal to you [Prophet]. Neither you nor your people knew it before." 287

The revelation of such new information can be contrasted in other verses wherein Allah ﷻ instead corroborates information that was already previously known to the addressees:

"There are messengers whose stories We have narrated to you already." 288

"[Has the story of Moses reached you] [Prophet]?" 289

"And when there came to them a Book (the Qur'an) from Allah confirming that which was with them – although before they used

جمع بين أدنى تأكيد على طريقي التأكيد بدعيه

Abu Muhammad al-Ash'ari al-Andalusī, in *Muharrar al-Waqf al-Bayṭī* (Dar al-Fakr, Beirut al-Jam'iyya, 2001), 2502.

287 31:49

سبح من بين عجيب وحيه يدوم كنت تعبدني أنا ولا تومك من قبل هيا

288 4:164

ورملا قد قصصهم عليه من قبل

289 20:9

وهل أتيت حديث شوقي.

Al-Rāzī states that it is possible that the story of Mūsā ﷺ had already reached the Prophet ﷺ from before the revelation such that the meaning of the verse would then be "Has not this reached you already?" Al-Rāzī attributes this opinion to Ibn Abbas. In view of this, Allah's ﷻ mentioning of the "account of Musa" would be a corroboration of what the Prophet ﷺ has already heard about prior to its revelation.

ويجب ان يكون قد سبق في زمان تقدم فكانه قال ليس قد اتاك وهذا قول بعض
و يضحك عن ابن عباس،

I akhr al-Dīn al-Hazn, *Maṣālib al-Ghayb* (Beirut: Dār al-Fakr, 1981) 22:14.

to pray for victory against those who disbelieved – but (then when there came to them that which they recognized, they disbelieved in it – so, the curse of Allah will be upon the disbelievers”¹⁰⁰

We can thus conclude that the ground as expressed in the vehicle in verse 3:59 cannot be from the type of revelation that is conveying “new” information since anything that is relatively new cannot already be “extremely well known” and “intimate & familiar” in the minds of the addressees. Therefore, to opine that Allah ﷻ was revealing something unknown or new about Adam ﷺ in verse 3:59 is undoubtedly incorrect¹⁰¹, that leaves us with the ground found in the vehicle necessarily being from the second type of conveyance wherein Allah ﷻ uses information that is already commonly known and well recognized.

Finally, given that verse 3:59 continues with “He created (*khalaqn* h m f m dust” necessitates that the ground expressed in the vehicle, i.e., Adam ﷺ, must have something to do with how he was created.

Knowing that Allah ﷻ explicitly mentions “Isā” ﷺ as the tenor and “Ādam” ﷺ as the vehicle in the simile structure of verse 3:59, we can now recapitulate the defining elements of tashbih as discussed above and readily apply it accordingly to this verse. Specifically viewing the tashbih from the perspective of Adam ﷺ being the vehicle, we can say that the use of his name in this verse should necessarily fulfill the following eight (8) conditions listed in Table III based on the preceding discussion:

290 289

وَلَا جُنَاحَ عَلَيْهِمْ كَيْفَ كُنْتُمْ عِندَ اللَّهِ مُصَدِّقِينَ لِمَا بَعَثْنَا مِنْهُ وَتَكْلِفُوا مِثْلَ حِمْلِ الْكَافِرِينَ
 فَكُلُوا مِنْ ثَمَرِهِمْ مَا عَمِلُوا عَلَيْهِمْ وَلَا يَكُنْ لَهُمْ عَلَيْهِمْ كُفْرًا كَبِيرًا

See also verses: 2:41, 2:92, 2:97, 2:101, 3:3, 3:50, 3:81, 4:47, 5:40, 5:48, 6:92, and 17:1.

Table III

		must pertain to how he was created (<i>khalq</i>) by Allāh ﷻ
ii.		<i>must not</i> be "new" information that is being revealed for the first time.
iii.	The ground (<i>wajh al-shabāh</i>) found in Adam ﷺ.	is not merely more renowned (<i>ashar</i>) than in 'Isā ﷺ in a relativistic sense, but is rather extremely well-known to the addressees, intimately familiar to them, and famous in an absolute manner in its own individual right
iv.		is more complete (<i>akmal</i>) than in 'Isā ﷺ
v.		relates divinity for other than Allāh ﷻ
vi.		categorically proves that the absence of biological paternity in 'Isā ﷺ does not merit a case for the latter's alleged divinity.
vii.		proves "vi." with cogency in a manner that does not leave open any door for rebuttal.
viii.	Adam ﷺ	is the pinnacle in terms of possessing the ground (<i>wajh al-shabāh</i>) according to the knowledge of the addressees.

Knowing the above eight conditions will enable one to identify what the ground must be and what it must not be.²⁹¹ The identification of the ground at this point is no longer a guessing game where we childishly veil our eyes with our hands and naively say "It is not known what the ground could be here." This is because whatever is *not* "known," is immediately disqualified as the ground in this verse in view of the stipulations put forth above. It is now a matter of what *must necessarily* be the ground considering the outline formed above.

291. Šadr al-Sharīʿa al-Mahabbī states in this vein:

(إِذَا عَرَفْتَ أَسْيَابَ نَبِيِّهِ عَرَفْتَ أَسْيَابَ رَّبِّهِ)

Ubaid Allāh b. Mas'ūd al-Mahabbī, *al-Washāʾiḥ* (Istanbul: Dar Rah al-Ḥadīth, 2000), 67.

Discussion on the *Najih al-Shabah* in Adam ~~not~~ being Prevalent

In this regard, I consulted with very thoughtful "Rogers" like Dr. Mark A. Smith,²⁹² David Livingstone,²⁹³ Jack Collins,²⁹⁴ Robert Wilson,²⁹⁵ Mark Noll,²⁹⁶ and Richard Averbeck²⁹⁷ throughly able to expound on and asked about them the following question: "According to your scholarly opinion, would you say that prior to the theory of evolution becoming prevalent, it was 'extremely well-known' to Christians around the globe both scholarly and laymen alike that Adam was an original creation without a set of biological parents?"

Foythre replied saying "yes, they thought Adam and Eve did not have biological parents, on the basis of Gen. 1:7 and 2:21-22." Olson said "So far as I know, as a historical theologian, all people—hence, that Adam was the original human being and was created *de novo*—by God." Smith replied, "Yes based on what I have read about the pre-modern era." Livingstone likewise said that "most Christians believed that Adam was specially created and was the father of the entire human race." He also stated that "he was pretty sure that many of the confessions of faith dating from the Reformation contained belief that we are descended from Adam" and that he does not "think that any entire denomination of Christianity adopted the pre-Adamite theory." Similarly, Collins informed me that "the vast majority of Jewish and Christian scholars and scientists took it for granted that Adam and Eve were the literal parents of the entire human race, and that they did not have parents themselves." Wilson replied by stating that "it is likely that both Christians and Jews accepted the idea

292. American philosopher, theologian, New Testament scholar and professor of Systematic Theology at Westminster Theological Seminary.

293. Chair of Christian Theology at Baylor University.

294. Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis at Princeton Theological Seminary.

295. Professor of Intellectual History of the Queen's University of Belfast and author of multiple works on evolution including a book on Adam.

296. Professor of the Old Testament at Covenant Seminary and author of publications on evolution and Christianity.

297. Former Chair of Yale University's Department of Religious Studies and currently professor of Religious Studies and the Old Testament at Yale University.

298. Professor Emerita at Baylor University and author of works dealing with Darwinism and Christianity.

299. Professor of the Old Testament and Semitic Languages at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School.

that Adam was an original creation without a set of biological parents. In short, they understood the Genesis creation story literally. When I replied by asking William if he believed it to be so, I know even amongst average Christians throughout history, he replied with, "I would say yes. Not stupid that the "assumption throughout Christendom was that God created Adam and Eve directly (some scholars even thought it was important to ask if Adam and Eve had a navel hole button, since they would not have had ordinary parents)." Avethock replied saying, "Yes, as far as I know before evolutionary theory developed, Adam was considered an original creation of God without parents, etc."

William Lane Craig, the renowned Christian apologist, philosopher and theologian, writes towards the end of his landmark work on evolution and Adam: "after a detailed genre analysis of the *primaeva*, history of Genesis 1-11 and Paul's New Testament (NT):

The ordering presence of genealogy, continuing in persons who were indisputably taken to be historical and the teaching of Paul in the NT about Adam's impact on the world, which bursts the bounds of a purely literary figure, oblige the biblically faithful Christian to affirm the historicity of Adam and Eve. Adam and Eve are asserted to be the fount of all humanity, the genealogical ancestor of every human being who has ever lived on the face of this planet.³⁰⁰

Peter Enns³⁰¹ states that there was a "consensus" for two thousand years regarding the "historical Adam" being an original creation.³⁰²

The Christian Arab poet, Unūn al Taghlibī, who died approximately 558 years before the birth of the Prophet ﷺ, referred to all of humanity being "from the children of Adam" in one of his poems.³⁰³

300 William Lane Craig, *An Overview of the Historical Adam* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2021), 303.

301 American Biblical scholar and theologian. He has written widely on hermeneutics, Christianity and science, historicity of the Bible, and Old Testament interpretation. He completed his PhD at Harvard University and is currently a senior fellow of Biblical Studies for The Biologos Foundation.

302 Peter Enns, *The Evolution of Adam* (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2012), 111.

303 Unūn al Taghlibī states:

قد كنت أسبق من جزوا على مدين
من ولد آدم ما لم ينجسوا ربي

In the 6th year H. 91, the Prophet ﷺ sent his letter to al-Narrān with a letter to the Christian ruler of the Kingdom of Aksum al-Narrān al-Najshī, inviting him to Islam. In his letter, he ﷺ informed al-Najshī that Allah ﷻ came with no partners and that He ﷻ was created *ex nihilo* – to how Adam ﷺ was created *wholly*.¹ It is noteworthy that his letter was sent after the revelation of verse 3:59. The Prophet ﷺ explaining to a regional foreign Christian how Isaac is not divinity by drawing an analogy between his creation and the creation of Adam ﷺ. If use of the same analogy as verse 3:59 would only make sense – he had reason to believe that this Christian ruler also shared the same beliefs as the Christians of Narrān – namely that Adam ﷺ was created without biological parents. Therefore, it is entirely plausible to derive from this letter that the prophet

Louis Cheikho, *My arm in Answer you quote al-Hamīd* (Leipzig: Dar al-Mashriq 1991), 192-94.

Indirectly, al-Ghazālī, after quoting a stanza from the famous Arab poet al-Akhtal al-Taghlibī d. 691, mentions in passing that whatever poets utter are indicative of that thing being from the most manifest of things, whereby all of mankind understands it.

وما سطق به الشعراء يدعي أنه من الخبيات التي يشرها الله خلق في دركها

Abū Hamūd al-Ghazālī, *al-iqtisād fī al-ʿirqad* (eddah Dar al-Minhaj, 2009), 252.

304. Abū Bayhaqī narrates:

وفي كتابي عن أبي عبد الله الخفاف في الجزء الذي يحار به ربه ينفذ عنه قال: أخبرني أبو الحسن محمد بن عبد الله النخعي، يروي عن حماد بن محمد بن عبد الله بن محمد بن حميد قال: حدثني عن أبي الفضل عمر بن محمد بن إسحاق قال: بعد رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم عمر بن أبي أمية القميري في الحاشي في بيت جعفر بن أبي طالب واصحابه، وكتب معه كتاب قسم الله الرحمن الرحيم من محمد رسول الله إلى الحاشي لأصحابه كتب فيه سلام على أبي أحمد عبد الله بن عبد الله بن موسى بن يحيى وأبيه بن يحيى بن آدم روح الله وثقه الله ما دمرهم بسبب الطيبة لخصيه فحسب يعقبي فدفنه من روحه ودفنه كتب حادي آدم بيده ونقحه واني أفكره (إن الله وحده لا شريك له وإبراهيم علي ذكركم وإن يعقبي بن موسى بن يحيى حادي في رسول الله، وقد بعثت إليك من علي جعفر ومعه له من نسخة كتابه ما دمرهم بسبب شجر بني أعراب وجوراء إلى الله وقد بعثت ونصحت فأقبلوا بصيحتي والسلام على من أقيم الهدى.

Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, *Dar al-Nabawīyya* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 2008), 2, 308-309.

concerning Adam ﷺ was not an isolated one but known to Christians across the lands.

From the beliefs of the Muslims at that time, there are narrations by the Successors of the Followers¹⁰⁵ (*tabi' al tābi'in*). For example, Muḥammad b. Jarir b. al-Zabayr b. al-Awwām (d. 113 h) explicitly states verbatim that Adam ﷺ was created "without a mother or a father" in his commentary of verse 159.¹⁰⁶ The word "Ādam" occurs in the Qur'ān twenty-eight¹⁰⁷ times with the last chronological mention of him within the context of his creation occurring in verse 159. Familiarity with the name "Ādam" reached such an extent that once after describing to his Companions what angels and jinn were originally created from, the Prophet ﷺ simply stated "and Ādam was made from what was [a nasy] described to you"¹⁰⁸ without proceeding to list any details. It was as if he was saying that there is no reason to reiterate anything about "Ādam" ﷺ due to the frequency of his creation having been previously described to you. This conforms to how Ṣadr al-Sharī'a counts the sheer frequency of sense-perception of the ground being a primary reason for the simile (*ishbāh*) being immediate and intimate.¹⁰⁹

105 The third generation of Muslims.

106 Al-Tabarī narrates:

حدثني حميد قال ثنا سماعة عن أبي إسحاق عن محمد بن جعفر عن ابن جابر عن
عيسى بن عبد الله قاسم (كتمش آدم خلقه من تراب ثم قال له كتمش فيكون خلق من ريت
ولا تمش من حمة ير) دوز قال: خلق عيسى من غير ذكر فقد خلقت آدم من تراب مثلك
انصرة من غير أبني ولا ذكر مكانك تلى عيسى حب آدم وشعر وشعر عيسى خلق
عيسى من غير ذكر يا عجب من هذا.

Muḥammad b. Jarir al-Tabarī, *Jamī' al-Bayān fī Ta'wīl al-Qur'ān* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 2009), 3:294.

107 The Prophet ﷺ stated:

خلفت الملائكة من نور، وخلق الجن من نار، وخلق آدم من ماء، وصف بكم

Muḥammad b. al-Hajāj, *Sahih al-Imam Muslim* (Jeddah: Dar al-Minhaj, 2013), 8:220.

108 Ṣadr al-Sharī'a states:

بعض التشبيهات قريب من بعضه، عريضا واسيحا، قريبه وشبهه، كقول وجه الله
متكررا على الخلق.

Ubayd Allah b. Mas'ud al-Maḥbūbī, *al-Waṣṣal fī al-Sharḥ* (Dār Bayn al-Ilm, 1420), 67.

All the above suggests that both Christians and Muslims already held the belief that Adam ^{عليه السلام} was created without a set of biological parents and that this was a part of the theological milieu of that time. For the sake of argument, if the premise that Adam ^{عليه السلام} did not have any parents was not well known, or even completely unknown, it would be unreasonable to verse 1.61 to ask the Prophet ^ﷺ to issue a call towards self-imprecation *on the bida* with anyone who disputes the non-divinity of Isa ^{عليه السلام}.

Thus, to claim that the ground in *Adar* is, as the vehicle is something other than him not having a set of biological parents results in severe implications, unbecoming for Allah.

Using Islamic legal theory (*uṣūl al-fiqh*) and the *qarinat al-ḥujj* to confirm the Ground

In addition to the science of *balāgha*, several other sciences speak at great lengths about the use of simile or analogy as reasoning. The discipline of logic (*mantiq*) refers to it as “*amthul*” while in Islamic systematic theology (*ʿālam*), it is called “*al-ghaib al-ḥaṣṣ shahid*” and in Islamic legal theory, it is referred to as “*qiyās*”. Abd al-Rahman Habannaka al-Miṣrī says that Muslim legal theorists (*usūfiyyūn*) are particularly concerned with the use of similes and have developed principles and supulations defining it and how to identify the ground “*illa*” (*ratio legis*) in their terminology – either by way of what the text itself denotes, through consensus (*ijmāʿ*) or by what is most befitting to the context, or other accepted methods of legal derivation. “One such method is *al-ḥmā*”. Al-ʿaṭṭāzī defines *al-ḥmā* as a method of determining the ground *ratio legis* by noting that if a specific

309 3.61

فَلَمْ يَخُفْ يَوْمَ ذَلِكَ بَعْثُ الْفَلَاحِ
وَالْبَاقِ نَوَارِكُ الْكَافِرِينَ

310 The issue of consensus was discussed in an earlier chapter

711) 'Abd al-Rahmān Habannaka al-Mīdānī states:

ب. علماء حنابل رحمه الله عظم من عسى يوضح صوابه ويخمد شره ويبار كل من يتعلق به، ويخلصه من بعده (إلا في حق من يدينه على الخطأ بشرعي يرجع إلى نظر أولي الأئمة) وفي سببها الوصف بـ «سبب» في الاستعداد بالهدى والسير والتقسيم أو بغير ذلك من المرات.

Abu al-Raihan al-Biruni: *al-Mas'ala al-Mawdu'at al-Ma'rifat al-Ma'rifat*. Dar al-Qadisi, 2015), 289-291.

characteristic was not the ground, then the statement would not have any semantic value – consequently, it would be highly far fetched for the specific characteristic to not be the ground.³¹² Others added that what is meant by being far fetched and non-beneficial is that without this specific characteristic being the ground, the statement would not correspond to the *muqāda al-haṭ*.³¹³ Al-Mardāwī³¹⁴ (d. 885 h) and Ibn Najjār al-Futūḥī (d. 970 h) explain that far-fetched here means that the usage would be alien to the eloquence (*fasāḥa*) of the Qurʾān and would then imply that Allah *as* used words not in their proper context, while it is known that the speech of Allah *as* is transcendent above what is trivial and useless.³¹⁵ Again, bearing

312 Al-Taftazānī states:

رَأَى الْإِسْمَاءَ فَهُوَ فِي يَصْرٍ بِحُكْمِهِ لَا يُمْكِنُ هُوَ أَوْ يُظَاهَرُ سَمْعِيًّا كَانَ بَعِيدًا
عَنِ التَّمَثِيلِ دَقًّا لِلتَّجَعُّدِ. إِنْ لَمْ يُمْكِنَ عِلَّةٌ لَمْ يُمْكِنِ

ʿAlā al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Tahwīṭ* (Beirut: Maktaba al-ʿAsrīyya, 1995), 1:158-159.

Muḥibb Allah al-Bihārī (d. 1119 h) states similarly:

عَرَفَ الْإِسْمَاءَ بِالْإِقْتِرَانِ بِمَا لَوْ يُمْكِنُ هُوَ أَوْ يُظَاهَرُ عِلَّةً كَانَ بَعِيدًا

ʿAbd al-ʿAlī al-Anṣārī al-Laknawī, *Fawāṭih al-Rahmūt* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2002), 2:350.

313 Ibn al-Amīr al-Sanʿānī (d. 1812 h) states:

وَأَعْلَمُ أَنَّ حَقِيقَةَ انْتِزَاعِهِ وَالْإِسْمَاءَ هُوَ أَنَّ يَصْرِي الْوَصْفَ مُلْغَوْضًا بِهِ حُكْمُهُ وَلَوْ مَبْسُوطٌ
لَمْ يُمْكِنَ هُوَ أَوْ يُظَاهَرُ سَمْعِيًّا عَنِ ذَلِكَ الْإِقْتِرَانِ بَعْدَ وَقُوعِهِ فِي الشَّرْعِ مَعْرُوفَةً بِأَسْبَابِ
الْكَلَامِ وَمُطَابَقَةً مَقْصُودِ الْحَالِ.

Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Sanʿānī, *Ḥabāt al-Sūf al-Sharḥ Biḥya al-Amīl* (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1988), 191.

314 Al-Mardāwī states:

هُوَ اقْتِرَانُ الْوَصْفِ بِحُكْمِهِ لَا يُمْكِنُ هُوَ أَوْ يُظَاهَرُ لِسَمْعِيٍّ لَكَانَ دُونَ الْإِقْتِرَانِ بَعِيدًا عَنِ
مَصَادِقِهِ كَلَامٍ لَمَّا عَرِضَ وَاقْتِرَانُهُ بِالْمُطَابَقَةِ فِي غَيْرِ مَوَاقِعِهِ سَرَدَ كَلَامَهُ عَنِ الْحَشْرِ الَّذِي لَا
مَائِةَ فِيهِ

ʿAlā al-Dīn al-Mardāwī, *al-Tahwīṭ Sharḥ al-Tawḥīd* (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2000), 13324.

315 Ibn al-Najjār al-Futūḥī says:

remind what the context is a reason for the revelation's query. In verse 159, the question posed by the Christians of Najrān warrants a satisfactory answer. Al-Taftāzānī in his discussion on al-īmā states that when a question has been posed to the Lawgiver, it warrants a timely answer which is fully appreciated and satisfies the needs of the questioner.³¹⁶ Al-ḥay further expounds under his discussion on al-īmā that for Allah *swt* to provide a useless answer is impossible (*imkān*) for two reasons. Firstly, because He declared: "Did you think that We created heaven?"³¹⁷ and secondly because there is consensus that it is impossible for Allah's *swt* speech to be without value and meaning.³¹⁸ Moreover, the context itself suggests that the very

لا يدع هو أمر الوهم بحدك ولم يحكر الوصف أو بغيره بتفسيره لكان ذلك لا فائدة
تعبه من تصحيح كلام الشارع وكان بيانه بالألفاظ في غير موضعها مع كون كلامه
شارع مبرها عن الجنو الذي لا فائدة فيه

Muhammad b. Ahmad a. Futūbī, *Sharh al-Kawakib al-Jawāhid* (Riyadh, Maktabah al-
a. Ubaykan, 1993), 4:125.

316 Al-Taftāzānī states:

وذكر محمد جواب له ببعض عرصه بدلا يرمي خلاه السؤال عن الجواب ودخير بين
عن وقت الحاجة فيكون السؤال مقدره في الجواب

Sa'd al-Din al-Taftāzānī, *Sharh al-Fatāwā* (Beirut a. Maktaba al-Asriyya 2005, 2:158).

Luckwisc, Abd al- Ali al-Anṣār al-Laknawī in his discussion on al-īmā states that an answer that does not provide this would be meaningless.

لما كان الجواب معني

Abd al- Ali al-Anṣār al-Laknawī, *Fawā'id al-Rahmāt* (Beirut Dār al Kutub al-
al-Ilmiyya, 2002), 2:348.

a. Laknawī then gives examples of how al-īmā indicates the *same logic* (illa) or
near case here (the ground with a shahab) (ibid. 3:183-4).

317 al-Mu'manūn, 115.

محبهم ثب حقيقهم عين وأنظم إلي لا ترجفون

318 Al-Rāzī states:

العبث على الله تعالى محال منزه (لا حرج و يعقون) ان العرف يقول يقول الله فحسبهم
ما حسمهم ثبث وأنظم إلي لا ترجفون. وأما المعقول فهو أن العبث بغيره والسفه

word that precedes verse 359 being "the Wise" *al-Hakīm*) which occurs again in verse 362. Indeed, it is a cause for reflection as to why *Al-lah* *sw* has placed verse 359 between two reminders that He is the Wise, which is the very opposite of speaking in nonsensical terms. Al-Qurtubī defines the use of *al-Hakīm* in verse 358 as One whose actions are never incoherent, inconsistent or unintelligible. Rather, He is masterful in His literary style and composition.³²⁰

In sum, what has been shown in the preceding pages is that although verse 359 utilizes an analogical argument containing an implicit premise, i.e., the ground, it is the theologically constrained rhetorical demands of this same structure that necessarily leads to identifying it in a manner that precludes all other possibilities.³²¹ Given this, alleging that the ground in

صلى الله عليه وسلم والخلفاء على الله تعالى محال

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Mahsul fī līm Usul al-Fiqh* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risala, 1996), §173.

320 Al-Qurtubī states:

لمسح من الخلاف مبرم اسرر منقن التاليف والنظم، وحكيم الذي أنعمه بحكمته منقنة
ولا تفاوت فيها ولا اضطراب لوضع كل شيء موضعه.

Shams al-Dīn al-Qurtubī, *al-Ansāfi Sharh Asmā' Allāh al-Husnā wa Sifātih* (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-Arabiyya, 2008), 305.

Al-Rāzī states that Allah *sw* being *al-Hakīm* means that He is transcendent from doing that which is unfitting for Him by virtue of being the Divine:

أن الحكمة عبارة عن كونه مفضيا عن فعل ما لا ينبغي

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Arudh Lawāmī al-Bayyināt Sharh Asmā' Allāh wa Sifāt* (Egypt: al-Maṣba'a al-Sharabiyya, 1906), 210.

321 In this respect, despite verse 359 being an apparent example of a "*mujaḥḥaliyya*" where arguments needn't consist of certain (*yaqīnī*) premises but can rather suffice with mutually agreed-upon premises (*muṣallam*), it is by way of our primary doctrinal principles which we know to be certain, that come to safeguard any implicit premise, i.e., the ground, in this verse from being false. *Abd al-Rahmān Ḥabannaka al-Mulāni* highlights this crucial point on taking into consideration these decisive, sacred principles on which the entire edifice of this religion rests:

هذه المبادئ لا ترقى إلى حقيقة حاكمية مرتبة العين العام، ويستحق هذا الاسم نعم في
اعتبارنا تعدييم الشرائع الربانية وما ثبت فيها يقين أم لا، وضعه ذلك في اعتبارنا من
كثيرا من القضايا المشهورة برقي ببيده، بشرحه ناعمة إلى مرتبة العين العام تكون

Objections

Defending the Necessary Ground (Wajh al-Shabah)

One objection usually put forth by Muslim evolutionists against the ground arrived at above is that it can alternatively be the "special process" whereby the first rational ensouled man, Adam (ﷺ), was created through a series of evolutionary steps as popularly delineated today by evolutionary biologists, and in like manner, Isa (ﷺ) was created through his own "special process" without a biological father.

First, in addressing this interpretation, it is important to bear in mind the requirements of *taḥāḥa*, as defined above: specifically the requirement of being free from any "semantic convolutedness" (*ta-ta'add al ma'nawī*). Al-Taṭāzūnī asserts that semantic convolutedness occurs when the sentence does not affect a quick transition of meanings into the mind of the addressee. This occurs due to a semantic gap where the words being used do not reasonably allow the addressee to arrive at the intended meaning, mainly due to a series of far-fetched, concealed, and subsumed meanings with no external indicators present to unveil those layers.¹⁰ For the Muslim evolutionists' alleged interpretation to semantically flow in the mind of the addressees of verse 3:59 and to simultaneously meet the requirements of the *maqadāt al-ḥāl*, the addressees would first have to understand that in

321 Al-*Ḥāzīnī* states:

وَمِنْ فِي الْأَسْفَلِ عَطْفٌ عَلَى قَوْلِهِ (إِنَّمَا فِي السَّمَاءِ) فِي لَا يَكُونُ الْكَلَامُ ظَاهِرًا، أَيْ، بِهِ عَلَى
حَرَرِهِ خَلْقٌ وَهُوَ فِي الْمَنَاقِلِ الدَّهْشِ مِنْ عَيْنِ الْأَوَّلِيِّ بِمَعْنَى تَحْسِبُ بِنَعْمَةٍ وَتُشَالِي الْغُصُورَ
وَتُغْنِي بِسَبَبِ إِزَادَةِ الْمَاءِ السَّعِيدَةِ مَقْصُورَةً، وَالْوَسَائِلُ الْكَثِيرَةُ مَعَ خِفَاءِ الْقُرْآنِ بِإِدَالَةٍ عَلَى

Sa'd a-Dīn al-Tanāzari. *Makhtasat al-Ma'ani*. (Karāchi: Maktaba al-Bushra, 2010), 147.

addition to Ādam ﷺ having a set of biological parents (as per the Muslim evolutionists' claim), he has also evolved from prehistoric hominids millions of years ago, and prior to that, from mammals over two hundred million years ago, and so on, until they eventually evolved from asexually reproducing life, lacking a biological parent akin to ʾĪsā ﷺ organisms over five hundred million years ago. In other words, as per this interpretation, the "samutude" here in this verse has nothing to do with "Ādam" ﷺ himself anymore, but rather demands the addressee to readily imagine the evolutionary steps of man dating back tens of thousands of years ago and upwards to hundreds of millions of years ago.³⁷ Moreover, such an interpretation

37 It is important to note that the word "Ādam" ought to be understood in the way it was understood by those who received the revelation. Al-Rāzī explains that Arabic lexis and grammar are of two types: (1) Those words that are in common usage across the generations, and their meanings are self-evident (*sharḥī*), such as "heaven" (*al-samā*) and "earth" (*al-ard*). These words were coined in the past and further known during the time of the Prophet ﷺ. Skepticism about the meanings of such words is not even worthy of a reply; and (2) Rare, unfamiliar words which are very few in number. Al-Rāzī then asserts that most words and their derivatives found in the Qurʾān are of the first (i.e., type and that only this type ought to be used in matters of doctrine.

من بدعة والنحو على قسمين: جدهم المبدول، المشهور والمعتمد الضروري، حاصل منها في الأرمية الماضية كانت مرصوغة هذه المعاني، فبما محمد أنصت بآله بأن لفظ السماء والأرض كانا مستعملين في زمان نرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم في هذين اسميتين، ووجد تشكوكاً في ذكرهما، حارة محرم شبه الترمجائية العادحة في الحساب التي لا تتحقق، وجواب وثابتهما لألفاظ العربية واضرب (أي معرفته) الأحاد (إد)، عرفت هذه الأمور، أكثر ألفاظ العرب، وهو وتصريفه من القسم الأول، فلا جرم قامت الحاجة به، وما القسم الثاني قليل جداً، وما كان كدفع فإنا لا نسلك به في مسائل القضية، وسنستنبطه في القضايا، وثبت وجوب العمل بالطل بالاجماع، وبذلك الإجماع بأنه، وأرداه لعلاب معلومة لا مظرومة، وبهذا الطريق يروى الإشكال والله أعلم.

Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī ʾIlm al-Fiqh* (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1997), 1:216-217.

Likewise, al-ʿAnūdī (d. 634 h) describes this first (i.e., type of words being decisively known through mass-transmission (*al-tawātur al-qatʿī*).

Ḥasan al-Shāfiʿī, *al-Madkhal ila Dirasat ʾIlm al-Kuṣūf* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1963), 164.

Al-Taftāzīnī also states that words of this type are known via mass transmission (*tawātur*).

begs the question: Why even mention 'Ādam's ʿas being analogous to 'Isa ʿal when the former's own physical process of creation was a largely no different than that of any other man? If indeed the proposed *thi* verse is to strike a "similitude" in the mind of the addressee between the "special" physical process of 'Isa ʿal being created without a biological father and the "special" evolutionary process of mankind as a whole, then the verse could have simply sufficed by using a number of other analogies such as: *'Isa ʿal's* similitude is just like the similitude of the addressees of his verse, just like the similitude of man, just like the similitude of Muhammad ʿs, or even like the similitude of 'Isa ʿal himself.³¹³ As such, this interpretation by Muslim evolutionists fails to fulfil the requirement for semantic compatibility to uphold the *maqāḥ* of the Qur'ān. Moreover, it fails to consider the fact that

لقد لم نسلم عدم موثر في نكل فإن سبها هـ هو موثر بقية كملقي أسماء والأرض وعمر
كقاعدة رفع الساعن وصرفا

Ṣaḍ al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Faḥr al-ʿal al-Tawḥīd* Beirut: Lāz al-Kaṭib al-ʿIlmiyya, 1996), 1:274.

313 See footnote above where both al-Mardāwī and Ibn Maʿār al-Faṭūḥa state that for 'Ādam to use words that are unsuitable for the context impugns the Qur'ān's eloquence.

314 Once the *muqaddā al-ḥal* is established, potentially speaking, a number of individual words/phrases (*ʿirad*) can be brought forth to fulfil *ḥal muqaddā al-ḥal*. Thus, if one particular word/phrase is then singled out to be used (*khūṣūṣiyya*) then there must be a specific advantage associated with it. Al-Taftāzānī explains

و هذا هو الأمر الذي يان يعتبر مع الكلام الذي يادي به أصل المراد خصوصية ما وهم
مقصود حال. وتحقيق ذلك أنه من جربيت ذلك لكلام الذي يقتضيه الحال

Ṣaḍ al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtasar al-Maʿānī al-ḥarūḥi* Maṭṭabat al-ʿAshra 2010), 1:53.

Al-Durūqī comments on al-Taftāzānī's words above and further elaborates concerning the meaning of the particular word/phrase that is ultimately selected ("*khūṣūṣiyya*"):

أقول: ما يدير ي يلاحظ وعصه³¹⁵ ر اشرح عد. أن أنه لا بد في بلاغة الكلام
من كبر التكلم وخصوصيات معصه. نسلم، ولا يمكن في البلاغة خصوص من غير
عصه. فإن وجد من غير عصه. ثم يمكن معنى حال، ولا يقال لكلام حيث: به معصه
مقصود الحال.

(قوله: خصوصية). لأن المراد بها النكته والمزية المختصة بالمقام.

the direct addressees of the verse had no knowledge whatsoever about the theory of evolution. Peter Enns writes regarding Paul of Tarsus (d. 67 AD) a writer of multiple books forming the New Testament including Romans 5:12-21 and Corinthians 15:31-52, and 15:44-49 that deal with human origin, that the supposition that Adam ﷺ may have instead evolved "does not preserve Paul's theology" because "this would hardly have occurred to Paul."¹²⁵ In other words, using "Adam" to denote the human evolutionary process has no precedent, not in the Muslim tradition nor in the Biblical tradition. When speaking about what contributes to "difficulty in understanding" (*shubhat al-fahm*) that impedes the quick transition of meanings into the mind of the addressee, al-Dusuqi mentions the foremost cause being its lack of use by the skilled rhetoricians (*al-balaghah*), and what is not in accordance with their style of rhetoric (*uslub*),¹²⁶

As such, given this interpretation has no prior precedent coupled with a plurality of concealed and ambiguous sub-meanings with no external indicators available towards clarifying them not to mention failing to fulfill any of the mandatory conditions outlined earlier for the vehicle (*mahabbah bulū*), it will therefore necessarily be rejected.

(هو) وخميق ذلك) بمعنى حال هو الكلام الكلي يشمل على الخصوصيه ومعنى مطبقه الكلام لذلك المقصود يكون الكلام حرفي صادر من الله الذي يقبضه لخطاب يشمل على الخصوصيه من أفراد ذلك الكلام الكلي الذي يقتضيه الحال من ذلك المقصود صادق عليه

Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Dusuqi *Hāshiyat al-Dusuqi alā Mukhtasar al-Mawānī* (Cairo: Bulāq Miṣr, 1855), 195-97.

Thus, to ignore the "khusūṣiyya", i.e. the particular selection of "Adam" ﷺ by Allah ﷻ in this verse, and to casually bypass it and ignore it is completely at odds with the rules of *balāgha*.

125 Peter Enns, *The Evolution of Adam* (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2012), 120.

126 Al-Dusuqi states:

اعلم أن المدار في صعوبة الفهم على خفاء الصرائح كثرت الوسائط أولاً لا على كثرة الوسائط فقط فإنها قد تكثرت ولم هناك صعوبة في فهم المعنى الثاني كما في قولهم تلاق كثير أم ماد كناية عن كرمه فإن الوسائط فيه كثيرة مع أنه لا تعقيد فيه وخفاء ذلك أثر بعدم خفاءه بواسطة جريان الكلام على أسلوب السقاء واستعماله وعدم جريانه على أسلوبهم واستعمالهم

Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Dusuqi, *Hāshiyat al-Dusuqi alā Mukhtasar al-Mawānī* (Cairo: Bulāq Miṣr, 1855), 182-83.

Refuting a Material Figure for Adam ٣١

Another objection that is often heard is that verse 30 can only be used to show that Adam ʿā did not have a biological father like ʿāḍ but cannot be used to indicate he did not have a mother.

Al-Taṭāzūl and Ṣadr al-Sharīʿ al-Mahbūb both state that when using *tashbīḥ*, if the intention is to regard both the referent and vehicle as equals in terms of the ground, i.e. without favouring or treating the vehicle as being superlative (*akmal*) over the referent, it is not eloquence (*balāgha*)³²⁷ to leave the use of simile (*ashbūḥ*) or the use of resemblance (*tashābuh*)³²⁸.

Al-Dasuqī explains ‘resemblance’ here as words that indicate equivalence between two or more entities, such as saying something resembles (*tashākūḥ*) or is similar (*amāthāl*) or is equal (*tasaww*) or is parallel to

327 Ṣadr al-Sharīʿ states:

نسبه في جميع المواضع غير ان قص النكاح في سورتي عورتين هذه تشوب كل وقت
 بقر نسبه يرجع الى النسبه فيكون هذا مشابه في تشبيه الذي بين مساوية
 صريح من الظروف أم تشبيه الخاص بالكامل فلا ينعكس

ʿAbd Allāh b. Masʿūd al-Mahbūb, *al-Wushūḥ* (stanbul: Dār Bāb al-Ilm, 2020) 67-68.

328 Ibn Ya-qūb al-Warrāq states that when ‘*ahsan*’ is mentioned in the sentence of *balāgha* then it entails obligation (*muṣṭab*):

او لا احسن في غير بلاغه متروك

Abū al-Abbās b. Ya-qūb al-Warrāq, *Mawāhib al-Faṭīḥ fi Sharḥ Taḥḍīs al-Adīb* (Petrot: Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 2003), 2083.

The Mosul-based Iraqi specialist in the science of *balāgha*, Muḥammad Dhannan Yunus al-Fathi, confirmed to me through private correspondence that ‘*ahsan*’ was a requirement so long as there is no external factor or *qarīnā* to prevent it.

329 Al-Taṭāzūl states:

في رد جمع بين شيئين في امرين لا يفر من غير قصد بل كقول احمد عبد الله والاحمر
 بعد ما وجدوا في انهم يفر من امرين في الجمع في قوله تعالى والاحمر في الحكم بالمشابهة
 بل كل واحد من الشيئين مشبه بالآخر من ترجيح أحد المتشبهين في وجه
 المشابهة

Ṣaḍ al-Dīn al-Taṭāzūl, *Al-Mawāhib al-Faṭīḥ* (Karaç: Maktabat al-Bayna, 2010), 260.

(*tadāru*) something else.³³⁰ However as we clearly see in verse 3:19 Allah *sw* does not use words of *tashābuh*, but instead uses "*mathaf*" and "*kāf*" which are particles of *tashbih*.³³¹ Therefore, the assertion that Allah *sw* intended 'Isā *sw* and Ādam *sw* to be equal in terms of their parentage is proven false. Additionally, it was explained above why the *taqrīr* form of *tashbih* in this context is necessary, which requires the vehicle to not only be better known (*ashar*) than the tenor, but that it also be more complete (*akmal*) in terms of the ground. Al-Taftāzānī states that 'if the ground being proposed is neither accepted by the addressee, i.e. alone being unknown to them' nor found to exist more prominently in the vehicle or to be more complete in that regard, then it is an interpretation that must be rejected (*marḍūḍ*).³³² Al-Ghazālī reiterates the same sentiment as al-Taftāzānī.³³³ The importance of the vehicle, i.e. Ādam *sw* being "intimately familiar" to the Christians of Najrān cannot be overstated.

330 Al-Dūsūqī states:

بمعنى أن يسحق بعض التشابه ما ورره من التماثل والمشاكل والتساوي والتضارع وكلاهما
سواء لا ما كان به فاعل ومفعول مثل شابه وسادون وضارع فإن فيه خلق النقص بالرتبة

Muḥammad b. Ahmad al-Dūsūqī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Dūsūqī alā Mukhtaṣar al-Ma'ānī* (Cairo: Bulāq Miṣr, 1855), 2:210.

331 Al-Taftāzānī states:

(وأدانه الكاف وكان ومن وما في معناه) مما يسبق من أمثاله ومثله وما يؤدي هذا المعنى
(والأخص في نحو الكاف أي في الكاف ومفعول كلفه نحو رمش رشب بخلاف كأن وسائل
وتشابه

Ṣa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Ma'ānī* (Karachi: Maktabat al-Bushra, 2010), 2:51-52.

332 Al-Taftāzānī states:

(أما مقبول أو مردود) معطى على المقبول (وهو بخلافه) أي ما يكون ماصراً عن مادة
الغرض بأن يكون على شرط يتفقون كما سبق

Ibid., 2:78-79.

333 Al-Ghazālī states:

فكلاً أصلي هذه القياس محسوس لأنه غير معلوم ونعيم الخلق يورث بالعلوم الخفية وما ذكره
غير جلي ولا مسلم

Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī, *al-Qisṣat al-Mustaqim* Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 2007, 76.

not be a strong form of argument against the polytheists for there lies no rationally guiding principle that truly prevents them from affirming yet another divine in addition to *lā ilāh*.¹³⁸ If they had retorted that Adam *ʿā* is also a son of God, thus implying him too as divine,¹³⁹ then this line of argument against the Christians of Najrān would have immediately fallen apart. But lacking *lā ilāh* parentage gives greater force to the argument in dispelling any relationship between divinity and parentage whatsoever.

Using Unsubstantiated Evidence

An additional objection that arises is that verse 3:59 may simply be a style of argumentation whereby a certain belief of the interlocutor is turned against him without oneself necessarily believing it to be true.¹⁴⁰ That is to say that the widely held belief of that time regarding Adam *ʿā* not having any biological parents is used against the Christians of Najrān in this verse without Allāh *ṣ* assigning any truth value to this belief.

This objection can be refuted by the sheer fact that Allāh *ṣ* explicitly utilizes the phrase "according to Allāh" (*ind Allāh*) in verse 3:59. Exegetes such as al-Biqā'i (d. 885 h) explain that this phrase means that Allāh *ṣ* has the omniscience and omnipotence to execute anything.¹⁴¹ Of the twelve

¹³⁸ Abd al-Rahman al-Dimashqī, al-Hanafī, *Ḥaṭṭ al-Washāh fī Ḥim al-Ma'arifa wa al-Bayān*, Istanbul: Dār Bāb al-Ilm, 2020, 232-233.

¹³⁹ This is not a whimsical hypothetical argument: well-known Christians such as Brigham Young (d. 1877), Joseph Smith (d. 1844), and others were known to affirm the divinity of Adam *ʿā* in addition to *lā ilāh*.

¹³⁹ This alludes to what is known as the *makāfi* type of argumentation, as defined previously, where all that is required is the premises to be widely known (*maṣhūr*) and accepted (*maṣṭūf*) – not that they be congruent with reality. Al-Dusūqī describes it as:

(وما جدي يتألم من الشهادة ويستصعب) – جوهر دأن لشهودك لا يصبر فيها حقيقة الواقع

Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dusūqī, *al-Tarjūm al-Shafī ila Tadḥhīb al-Mantiq al-Kāfi*, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Harabī, 1936, 422-423.

However, this does not then entail that the premises *cannot* be true. Al-Shurūbī (d. 1348 h) comments in this vein:

لا شهرة مبدعاته أو تسليبه لا ينال أن تكون يقينية

Abd al-Ah al-Lakḥawī, *Sharḥ Baḥr al-Uḥm* (Kadwān: Jar al-ʿIlm, 2017), 730.

¹⁴⁰ Al-Biqā'i states:

12) Unique meanings for *inda lya* appear in the Qur'an – all of them when used in relation to Allah – so indicate congruence with Allah's knowledge. Allah – Himself – emphatically declares:

"With Him are the keys of the unseen—no one knows them except Him. And He knows what is in the mind and a secret. Not even a leaf falls without His knowledge, nor a grain in the darkness of the earth or anything—green or dry."⁴⁰

He also said,

"He created all things and has perfect knowledge of everything" 4

A. Sharqawi explains that Allah ~~knows~~ all details as they truly are – including the processes by which things were created and came to be.⁴ It

١٠٠٠

الحديث في Umar al-Buḥārī: *Nuzūl al-Durār fī Tawṣūḥ al-Aḥdī wa al-Suwar* (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, 1984), 9:234.

34. A. Isayn b. Muḥammad al-Dunghari, *al-Waḥy al-ḥaqīqī al-ḥaqīqī al-Qurʾān al-Karīm* (Beirut: Dār al-Ilm, 1983), 334-335.

342 6:50

وَسَدَّ مَضَاجِعَ الْعَيْبِ لَا تَعْبُدُ إِلَّا هُوَ يُغْفِرُ مَا فِي كَلْبٍ وَالتَّخَرُّمِ وَمَا يُغْفِرُكَ مِنْ وَرَقِهِ لَا يَغْفِرُكَ رَدَّ حَبْلٍ كَلِمَتِ الْأَرْضِ وَلَا رَغَبٍ وَلَا يَأْبِسُ إِلَّا فِي مَجْلِبِ مُبِينٍ

747 6.10.1

سَمِعَ السَّمْعُ وَالْأَبْصَارُ وَأَيْضًا نَفْسُكَ وَأَنْتَ وَمَنْ مَعَكَ لِلَّهِ صَاحِبَةً وَتَحِيَّةً كُلَّ شَيْءٍ بِغَيْرِ

344 Al-Sharqōwī explains:

[illegible]

And Allah is Highest of all know, knowledge of Shari'ah, and knowledge of medicine, and of Arabic or Sanskrit. Carry On all these, 2017, 2017

345 Al Sharḥawī states.

would be naïve to suggest that Allah ﷻ would use categorical propositions containing untruths³⁴⁴ while He Himself mentions in the Qur'an that

(قُلْ إِنَّمَا أَنَا بَشَرٌ مِّثْلُكُمْ وَأَنَّ اللَّهَ يَعْلَمُ الْغُيُوبَ) (٢٥٠-٢٥١)
 أَن الْمَعْلُومَ لَوْ هُوَ غُيُوبٌ كَأَنَّهُ حَالَتُهُ أَلَيْ يَجِدُ عَلَيْهَا كَذَابًا وَكَذِبًا

Ibid, 250-251.

344. Al-ʿAnūdī states that supposing a report about something emanating from personal divine speech (kalām ḥusnā) with Allah ﷻ was wrong (contrary to what that thing truly is, then there are only two options: either the report is mistaken even though Allah ﷻ has knowledge of that thing, or it is mistaken while He does not have knowledge of the thing. The latter option is impossible as it implies that He is ignorant of some things – which is rationally impossible. If the former, then it would be impossible for the One who knows a thing not to have a true personal report about it. This is known by necessity. In such a case, if the report contrary to reality also subsists in Him, then it would result in both a report that is true as well as a report that is false subsisting in Himself regarding the same thing in the same respect. This again is known to be necessarily false.

هو معقول عند رب العالمين لقائم بنفسه بأمره على خلاف ما هو عليه به يخفى
 أن يكون ذلك مع العلم به أو لا مع العلم به لا خبر بل يقال لا مع العلم به ولا
 كان له تعالى. فاحتمل العلم بالأمور وهو ليس كذلك في حد ذاته بل كان ذلك
 مع العلم به. فلو كان عادته بتلقيه بتسليم أو لا يقول بنفسه إلا خبر عنه على ما هو به
 وهو معلوم بالضرورة. وعنده ذلك فهو قائم بنفسه لإخبار عنه على خلاف ما هو عليه جازمه
 كونه عادته بخبر عنه على ما هو عليه بقوله لا يخفى الخبر بصدق وكاذب. بالنظر في
 شيء واحد من جهة واحدة؛ وذلك معلوم بطلانه بالضرورة.

Sayf al-Dīn al-ʿAnūdī, *Aḥkām al-Aḥkār fī Ḥuṣūl al-Dīn* (Cairo: Dar al-Ḥadīth wa al-Waṭṭaʾiq al-Qawmīyya, 2004), 2:83-84.

The above quote of al-ʿAnūdī concerns the divine attribute of eternal, personal speech (*kalām ḥusnā*) being safeguarded from falsehood. As for the revealed speech (*kalām lafẓī*) such as the Qur'an consisting of created utterances which convey the meanings contained in His personal speech, its immutability from falsehood is also a necessary as it signifies and conveys the personal speech. In other words, if being safeguarded from falsehood is a rational necessity in the personal speech of Allah ﷻ, while simultaneously believing in the Qur'an that we recite is divine revelation corresponding to said personal speech and mass-transmitted from a true prophet, it then necessarily follows that this Qur'an must likewise be free from falsehood, lest it cast aspersions on the truthfulness of the personal speech which it directly indicates or on the prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ. Abd al-Hakīm al-Siyāḥoti (d. 1067 h) explains

"I alsohood cannot approach - from before - or from behind it,
[it is a revelation from a Lord who is Wise and Praiseworthy]" 4

"Whose word is more truthful than Allah's?" 4 and

"Do they not reflect upon the Qur'ān? If it had been from [any] other than Allah, they would have found within [much] contradiction."⁴⁰

It is worth highlighting here that verse 4:82's use of *muḥimma* *ghayri* *Allah* is diametrically opposed in meaning to verse 3:59's use of *maḥda* *Allahu*. Al-Shawkānī (d. 1250 h) comments on verse 4:82 saying that amongst these "contradictions" is when words do not correspond to reality (*muṭāwāqif il-wāqif*), which is a characteristic found in the speech of mortal men.⁴¹ Furthermore, the concept of civility demands that the Divine be attributed

وَمِنْ بَعْدِ مَا دَانَ الْكُفْرُ عَلَى صَدَقِ كَلَامِ النَّفْسِ وَلَا شَكَّ أَنَّ مَا أَتَتْ لِعَيْنِ النَّفْسِ حَقٌّ
عِنْدَ الْأَعْيَانِ وَالْعِبَارَاتِ دَوْرًا بِالنَّسَبِ إِلَيْهِ وَمِنْ بَوَاقِ كَوْنِهِ دَوَالٍ عِنْدَهُ رَأْيُهُ لَا كُتِبَ فِيهِ
أَنْ لَا يَكْثُرَ فِيهَا يَصْدَ كَذِبٌ إِذْ قَوَاعِ الْكُذْبِ فِيهِ دَوْرُ النَّفْسِ بِمَعْنَى كَوْنِهِ دَوَالٍ عِنْدِهِ
وَالْأَصْحَابُ مَا قَالُوا يَكْثُرُ الْكَلَامُ يَنْقُضُ دَبِيلًا عَلَى حَقِّهِ نَفْسِي الْقَائِمُ بِدَانِهِ نَعْدُو فِي
بَعْضِ الْأَمْرِ بَعْدَ مَا تَقَرَّرَ عِنْدَهُمْ مِنْ امْتِنَاعِ الْكُذْبِ فِيهِ فَلْيَتَأَمَّنْ

Abd al-Hakīm al-Siyākūtī, *Hāshiyah alī Sharḥ al-Mawāḍiʿ* (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Azhariyya lil Turāth, 2011), 8-102-103.

347 4:42

لَا يَأْتِي سَطْرٌ مِنْ شَيْءٍ يَدِينُهُ وَلَا مِنْ خَلْقِهِ مُتَّبِعٌ مِنْ حَكِيمٍ حَبِيبٍ.

348 4:122

وَمَنْ نَعْدُو مِنْ اللَّهِ يَبْلَا

349 4:81

أَمَّا عَدُوٌّ لِقُرْآنِي وَحْدًا مِنْ عَمْدٍ غَيْرِ اللَّهِ يُوحَدُ فِيهِ "مُتَّبِعًا كَثِيرًا"

350 Al-Shawkānī states:

(وَمِنْ كَانَ مِنْ عَمْدٍ غَيْرِ اللَّهِ يُوحَدُ فِيهِ خِلَافٌ كَثِيرٌ) شَيْءٌ يَدِينُ وَتَنَاقُضٌ وَلَا يَدْخُلُ فِي
هَذِهِ خِلَافٌ مُعَادِيرِ الْأَيَاتِ وَالسُّورِ، لَارْتَادٍ فِي خِلَافِ التَّنَاقُضِ، التَّنَادُ وَتَعَدُّمُ تَصَادُقِهِ
لِمُتَّاقِعِهِ، وَهَذَا عَنِ كَلَامِ نَبِيِّ لَا سِيَّاهُ: إِذْ ظَالٍ وَيُعْرَضُ قَائِمُهُ لِلْأَخْيَارِ بِالنَّجَبِ فِيهِ لَا يُوَحَّدُ
بِهِ صَحِيحًا مُطَابِقًا لِمَوْفَعِ لَا الْقَلْبَ الْمُسَدِّدِ. وَهَذَا خَرَجَ عِنْدَ بَنِي حَمْدٍ وَمِنْ حَرَمٍ وَابْنِ
سَبْرٍ وَابْنِ فِي حَادِثٍ عَلَى ضَمَّةٍ وَمِنْ كَانَ مِنْ عَمْدٍ غَيْرِ اللَّهِ لَوْجَدَ فِيهِ خِلَافٌ كَثِيرٌ (بِقَوْلِهِ)
بِإِنْ قَوْلِ اللَّهِ لَا يَخْتَلِفُ وَهُوَ حَقٌّ لَيْسَ فِيهِ بَاطِلٌ.

with perfect and complete attributes. This entails that the Speech of Allah ﷻ is perfect and to even hint that His words assert falsehood would be an explicit defect (*naqs*). Likewise, to believe that Allah ﷻ is attributed with omnipotence necessitates that He not be incapable (*ajz*) of basing His arguments on that which is true, instead of resorting to assertions of falsehood. Finally, to believe that Allah ﷻ is omniscient necessitates that He knows that which is undoubtedly true, as opposed to being ignorant (*jahl*) or oblivious (*nuswā/wasw*) concerning the details of His very own creation.³⁵¹ Allah ﷻ Himself castigates those who follow mere conjecture

"Most of them follow nothing but conjecture. And surely assumptions can in no way replace the truth. Allah is indeed All-Knowing of what they do."³⁵²

He further reprimands those who formulate arguments based on an unfounded basis:

"And they argue, 'Had the Most Compassionate willed we would have never worshipped [the angels]. They have no knowledge in support of this claim. They do nothing but lie.'³⁵³

Based on these verses, Muhammad Abū Zahra (d. 1394 h) states that the Qur'an uses syllogisms whose premises and conclusions are certain (*yaqīn*) and true (*ḥaqāq*) with no scope for presumption (*ẓann*).³⁵⁴ Thus, it comes as no surprise that Abū al-Ḥusayn refers to the argument used by Allah ﷻ

Muhammad b. Alī al-Shawkānī, *Fath al-Qadīr* (Beirut: Dār al Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 1997), 1:621.

351 67:14

أَلَا يَعْلَمُ مَنْ خَلَقَ وَهُوَ اللَّطِيفُ الْخَبِيرُ

"How could He not know His Own creation? For He alone is the Most Subtle, All-Aware."

352 10:36

وَمَا يَشْعُرْ أَكْثَرَهُمْ بِالْأَنَّهُمْ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ مَنْ خَلَقَ شَيْئًا: إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَزِيزٌ بِمَا يَعْمَلُونَ.

353 43:20

وَقَالُوا بَلْ أَتَيْنَاهُم بِمَا عَدَّتْهُمْ مِنْ دُونِهِ مِنْ عَلَمٍ وَإِنْ هُمْ إِلَّا يَخْرُصُونَ

354 Muhammad Abū Zahra states

القرآن معبر عن الخطأ في كل معادلاته وبتحججه يقينية لا محالة. ينظر فيها: "إِنَّ الْقُرْآنَ

against the Christians of Najran as establishing a decisive binding proof.³⁵⁵ Supposing that Allah ﷻ makes false assertions would result in all of the above-mentioned assertions. Therefore, as per verse 4:82, Muslim evolutionists must choose between either affirming that the Qur'ān is "from other than Allah", or that Allah ﷻ made a mistake both of which are *kufr*.³⁵⁶ This, once verse 3:59 states that the "similitude" mentioned is "according to Allah ﷻ" then it leaves no doubt that the "similitude" is indeed true and the premises being used in this line of argument are similarly true.

Against Mythologizing the Qur'ān

Yet, others have borrowed arguments from Christian evolutionists and Muslim reformists to allege that perhaps Allah ﷻ is merely stating all of this is "true" but only according to what fictionally took place in the 'story of Adam ﷺ'. The parable is that there is a widely popular "mythical story of Adam ﷺ" known to us of how he was created, and that Allah ﷻ is merely affirming what is 'true' within this fictional parable. Therefore, *inda Allah* only means with respect to what occurs in this "fictional story of Adam ﷺ".

This belief can be repudiated by first noticing that the latter part of verse 3:59³⁵⁷ speaks about the creative action (*khalaq, takwīn*) of Allah ﷻ in that

«نُحْيِي مِنَ حَتَّىٰ نُعِثَ كُلَّ مَن فِي الْقُرْآنِ حَقَائِقَ يَقِينَةٍ وَلَا يَمِيعُ مِنْهَا جَهْدٌ إِلَّا مِنَ الْبُتُونِ وَقَدْ لَامَ عَلَىٰ مَخَالِفِهِ أَهْلُهُمْ يَسْجُرُونَ الظَّنَّ وَإِنْ لَهُمْ إِلَّا يَخْرُصُونَ»

Muhammad Abū Zahra, *al-Muḥṣaṣ al-Kubrā al-Qur'ān* (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1998), 397-398.

355 Abū al-Su'ūd states:

(ما جاءك من العلم) أي ما يوجهه بحجبا قطعيا من الآيات البينات

Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Imād al-Hanafī, *Ishā'at al-Aḥl al-Salīm al-Mawḍi'at al-Kitāb al-Karīm* Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya 2010, 173.

356 Abū al-Mu'in al-Nasafi describes those who affirm contradictions (of Allah ﷻ and His Kalām).

«مِنْ حَوَرِ أَهْلِ التَّضَافُصِ فِي الْقُرْآنِ أَكْثَرُ مِنْ أَمْرَيْنِ: أَحَدُهُمَا جَمْعُ الْقُرْآنِ مِنْ عِنْدِ عَمْرِائِهِ وَآخَرُهُمَا تَعَدُّهُنَّ إِذَا اخْتَلَفَ بِجَمْعِهِ الْإِخْلَافُ أَيْ كَقَوْلِ الْقُرْآنِ مِنْ عِنْدِ غَيْرِهِ حَيْثُ يَبْدُو الْإِخْلَافُ وَمِنْ يَحْتَلِ مِنْ عِنْدِ غَيْرِهِ وَكَلَّا الْأَمْرَيْنِ كَقَوْلِهِ صَرِيحٌ بِإِلَهِ الْعَصَمَةِ»

Abū al-Mu'in al-Nasafi, *Tabṣirat al-Asfāḥ* Damascus: al-Jāmi' al-Islāmī, 990-129.

357 "He created him from dust, then he said unto him: Be, and he became."

خَلَقَهُ مِنْ تُرَابٍ ثُمَّ قَالَ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ.

He attributes this act of creating Adam ²³ directly to Hisse ²² ("He" of the words "He created" (*shaqqa*) "He" (*huwa*) and "so he became" (*fa yaaqan*) denote actual physical occurrence and precludes it from being a fictional story of creation."²⁴ Furthermore, his creative act in this description occurs immediately after Allah ²⁰ strikes a similitude between "sa" ²¹ and Adam ²³ it thus follows that this creative action bears a correlation with what Allah ²⁰ has just stated regarding Adam ²³ in that this creative action necessarily indicates (*dalil*) what Allah ²⁰ has just turned about Adam ²³ in

198. As Chazal explains that when Adah ~~he~~ gives a command such as in the case of "Kash" then it must be that the existence of what is being commanded is not the possible, as opposed to being ~~it~~ up the impossibilities ~~statement~~.

وہابی لاہور۔ یہ فقہ بھی یہیوں بدنامہ ہے۔ فقہ بھی مستحیل و حودہ۔ یہ بھی علم و حودہ۔
وہابی ختم بحال

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, *al-Ihtishaf fi Fiqah Ibadah* (Dār al-Minhaj, 2009), 201.

This further corroborates that the creation of a human without any biological parentage on Earth is from the rational possibilities, for reasons detailed in the first part of this study.

359 An action does not signify (tell) anything or comment on something's truth value unless it's intended as such by the agent of the action. For example, the action of a teacher placing his pen on the desk does not intrinsically signify much. However, if the students were previously informed that when the teacher places his pen on the desk it signals the end of class, then his action would signify a specific meaning: the class has ended. This action is in fact indicating the meaning in the agent's personal speech or mind, which is in accordance with his knowledge. Similarly, when Allah ﷻ says that he created Adam ﷺ from dust and through the divine fiat "Be!" *Kun*, as stated in the latter part of verse 359, then, in addition to this creative action being a manifested physical reality, it must also be congruent with what the verse is speaking about earlier regarding the fact of parentage of Adam ﷺ. This action cannot be at odds with that or else it would result in contradictions and ignorance in Allah's ﷻ speech. Therefore, the stance of some Muslim evolutionists who allege that the verses about human creation lead to an irreconcilable incongruence (*muṭānāsib*) is undeniably false because they have failed to understand what is necessarily required of actions that Allah ﷻ explicitly attributes to Himself in the Qur'ān.

So id Fūda captures this crucial point

وخرید حقوقی شد. مقرر شد علی به مدتی سه ماه در آنجا بماند و علی بعد از آن به زادگاه خود بازگردد. علی بعد از مدتی به زادگاه خود بازگشت و به علی گفت که در آنجا به خوبی گذشت و به علی گفت که در آنجا به خوبی گذشت و به علی گفت که در آنجا به خوبی گذشت.

concern has been established that this act of creating indicates what Allah ﷻ has stated it too will necessarily carry the same qualities that the speech of Allah ﷻ necessarily carries, i.e., that it cannot be untrue or be described with ignorance as explained before. Therefore to suggest that this creative action by Allah ﷻ never occurred would amount to saying that it is unreal – an obvious impossibility. To suggest that Allah ﷻ is merely following along in this parade would imply that all the verses that were revealed prior to 159 and speak of the creation of Adam ﷺ are likewise unreal. Such a notion would result in gross misunderstandings of the fundamentals of Arabic grammar, let alone Arabic rhetoric and stylistics.

Additionally the idea that these verses that speak about the creation of Adam ﷺ are fictitious and are to be understood as a legions of morality is not only absurd for the reasons stated above but resembles the approach of disbelievers in interpreting the Qur'an. Ibn al-Athir (d. 631 h) states that one of the wisdoms behind Allah ﷻ narrating incidents of previous prophets in the Qur'an is because "surely in this is a reminder for whoever has a mindful heart and lends an attentive ear"¹⁶⁰ and so the one who suggests that Allah ﷻ is merely narrating fictitious parables has adhered to the deviation of those who said "these revelations are only ancient fables which he has written down"^{161 162}. Al-Ghazali remarks that the one who

عليه الكشف عن خلق في نفسه من النار يسبح أن يكون غير ذلك فهو حقا بعض
دلائل أن عرف ذلك بالعلم مستحيل فرض أن دلائله على ما يدور عليه ليست دلائله
صحيحة لأن ما دلت عليه عملا هو كلام الله تعالى وكلامه لا يمكن أن يكون كذب قط

Sa'id Fūda *al-Sharh al-Kabīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Dhakhīr, 1014), 468

360 50:37

يُنْزِلُ فِي ذَلِكَ لَمْ يُكْرَى لِمَنْ كَانَ لَهُ لَيْسَ أَزْ لَيْسَ أَوْ لَيْسَ شَيْءٌ

361 25:5

وَقَالُوا نَسْمِعُ أَذُنًا غَيْرَ أَنَّنَا نَعْلَمُ بِشَيْءٍ وَإِنَّا نَكُفِّرُ بَنَدًا

See also verses: 6:25 8:24, 23 8:25 3:27 68:46 17:68 19:68 20:68 81:11

362 Ibn al-Athir states:

هذا الحكمة وادب القصص في القرآن مجيد (وإن في ذلك لذكرى لمن كان له قلب أو عقل
السمع وهو سمع) وإن طر هذا الصانع من الله سبحانه وادبه كره الحكايات والأساطير بعد
من أنزل بربع من محكمات بينها حيث قالوا هذه أساطير الأولين اكتتبها

Abū Muḥammad al-Kāmil al-Tarṭūsī (Beirut: Dār al-Ḥadīth al-Ilmīya, 987)

1 3

includes the parables (*amthāl*) and stories (*qisas*) of the Qur'an as being from the ambiguous (*mutashābihāt*) verses of the Qur'an— even farther from the truth.³⁶³ Al-Shāṭibī further comments that since the Qur'an refers to itself as a criterion (*furqān*) for judging good and evil, guidance (*hidāyah*), a clarification (*bayān*), and an exposition (*tibyan*), the idea of it containing false parables is rejected.³⁶⁴ Finally, Allāh ﷻ rejects this belief about the fictitious nature of the "story of Ādam ﷺ" outright within just two verses wherein He states that "certainly this is the true narrative"³⁶⁵ thereby leaving no merit to this line of argument.

In conclusion, the creative act (*ʿAdāyah/ʿalāyah*) of forming Ādam ﷺ from dust without any biological parents occurred in reality in accordance with how Allāh ﷻ affirmed it through His divine speech in this and other verses:

"Brevity is a great charm of eloquence"³⁶⁶

Another objection leveled is, "Why didn't Allāh just explicitly say that Ādam did not have parents in verse 3:59?"

Brevity and subtle allusions are marks of eloquence in the Arabic language, so long as there isn't a genuine need to state the obvious. There are many works that are entirely dedicated to those words that have been left unstated in the Qur'an due to a variety of reasons.³⁶⁷ Al-Zarkashī mentions that one of the reasons why something may not be explicitly stated

363 Al-Ghazali states:

ولا يسميه قوطب... «وليتشابه القصص والأمثال» وهذا أبعد.

Abū Ḥamīd al-Ghazālī, *at-Mustasfī min Ihn al-Uṭīl* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risālah 1997), 1:102

364 Al-Shāṭibī states:

لديني على صحبته من نفس حكاية رابر رها، فإن العرس شيء بمرعب، وهدى، وبرهان،
ربوب، وتبيان لكل شيء، وهو حجة على الخلق على الجملة والتفصيل، ولأطلاق والمعروف
هذا المعنى يأتي أن يحكي فيه ما ليس بحق ثم لا يبه عيبه.

Abū Shāq al-Shaybī, *at-Munāfiqūt* (Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn Aṣṣān, 1997), 4:160

365 3:61

يٰٓهٰذَا هُوَ الْحَقُّ

366 Marcus Tullius Cicero (d. 43 BC)

367 See Abū al-Raḥmān al-Suhaybī, *at-Taṣīf wa al-ʿAḥād fī al-Duḥmā fī al-Qurʾān min al-ʿAsmāʾ al-ʿAḥād* (Parables: Names of the Names and the Names of the Names), (Riyāḍ: al-ʿUlūm, 1992).

that there is no value in even mentioning these other similarities since they are not the actual intended ground of the simile.³⁷¹ Additionally, what is worthy of noting here is that those exegetes who did list these fifteen similarities included within this list how both Isā ﷺ and Ādam ﷺ lack a biological father³⁷² but never did they include the two possessing a mother as a commonly shared similarity. They further included both to be similar in that neither of them was created through the typical phases that other humans are created by.³⁷³

An easy way of ruling out the possibility of any proposed ground (wajh al-shabah) is to consider how well it fulfills the eight conditions for a valid tashbīh in verse 3:59 listed above in Table III. For example, of these eight conditions, proposing that the wajh al-shabah could be the “special evolutionary process” that Ādam ﷺ allegedly descended from (as discussed previously) would only fulfill conditions i. and v., yet utterly fails to meet the remaining six conditions. Even if one obstinately decided to reject the reports about the *reason for the revelation* on grounds that each report is a lone-narrator report (*ahad*), and therefore not beyond reasonable doubt, this proposed interpretation would still fail to fulfill the remaining five conditions. As such, it will undeniably be rejected. On the other hand, “lacking parentage” fulfills all eight conditions and thus qualifies as the one and only ground.

Analogical Reasoning and Verse 3:59

Another objection that has been raised is that verse 3:59 is essentially a type of analogical reasoning, and these are known to not yield certainty.

Abu Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī, *at-Taysir fi al-Tafsir* (Beirut: Dār al-Ṣubab, 2019), 4:84.

371. Al-Qasab stated:

فإن ما ذكره في صفة نبي الله (عليه السلام) مع آدم عليه السلام

Muhammad b. Ali al-Qasab *Nukat al-Qurʾān: Dalaʾil al-Bayān fi Anwār al-Taʾwīl wa al-Ahkām* (Cairo: Dar Ibn al-ʿArabi, 2003), 1:218-219.

372. Abu Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī states:

واستوي في استيفائهما عن أب يحويان منه

Abu Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī, *at-Taysir fi al-Tafsir* (Beirut: Dār al-Ṣubab, 2019), 4:83.

373. Abu Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī states:

لا يهتما به بخلقهما أو أرا كغيرهما

ibid., 4:84.

Using other Verses to Suggest Ādam ﷺ could have Evolved

The verses used by contemporary authors like Anwar Sherrif and Muhammad Shahmor do not decisively express anything of this nature. When discussing the implications that the theory of evolution presents, it would not be permissible to hold fast to ambiguous meanings of select verses while casting aside verses, such as 3:59, that speak to the heart of the matter in decisive terms. Within the list of eighty verses of Sūrat Āl-ʿAʿrāf that address the Christians of Najrān, Allah ﷻ seems—in whose hearts is deviation following the ambiguous verses seeking to spread doubt—through their false interpretations.¹⁷⁷ As Zarkashī, under the section on balancing between what may potentially have multiple meanings versus those with a single meaning, lays forth a guiding precept. When contentions arise, it is mandatory to return things to their objectively known roots.¹⁷⁸ Al-Qaḍī Iyāq further lays down a principle that after a legitimate proof (*ḍalīl*) has been established, it is not permissible to regress and bring forth indecisive and ambiguous meanings which seemingly counter the afore-established evidence.¹⁷⁹ These same verses that speak to the creation of humanity that are relied upon by

الأخبر عني سيبويه في أدلة النقيب تعيين العلة فصلاً

ʿIsmāʿīl b. Muṣṭafā al-Kalanbawī: *Hāshiyah ala Sharh al-Dawānī atā al-Aqā'id* al-ʿAdabiyya (Turkey: Dar al-Ṭibāʿa al-ʿAmra, 898), 1273.

377–378

هو الذي نزل عليك الكتاب، وأنه، أي، محمد ﷺ، هو مَن الكُتِبَ رَأْسُهُ مُشَبَّهٌ مُنْذَرٌ
تَدِيرُ فِي قُلُوبِهِمْ رَيْغٌ فَيُحْضِرُونَ مَا يَشْبَهُهُ مِنْ تَلْبِيسٍ كَلْبِيٍّ وَتَلْبِيسٍ دَاوِيٍّ دُونَ بَيْعَتِ دَاوِيٍّ
إِلَّا أَنَّهُ مِنَ الرِّسَالَةِ فِي تَلْبِيسٍ يَقُولُونَ: وَمَا بِهِ كُنْ مِنْ عَذْرَاءٍ دُونَ بَدْعٍ أَوْ رُوحٍ أَكْبَرِ

178. A Zarkashī states:

الأمثلة التي يجب ردها عند الإشكال إلى أصولها

Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī: *al-Burhān fi Tafsīr al-Qurʾān* (Cairo: Dar al-Hadīth, 2006), 371.

379. Al-Qaḍī Iyāq states:

بحرير ما قام الدليل على خلافه باطل

Iyāq b. Muṣā, *ʿamal al-Muḥim bi-Tafsīr al-Mustafī* (Cairo: Dar al-Waḍāʿ, 1998), 787.
This principle highlights the folly of those who take verses such as 3:141

وَقَدْ خَلَقَكُمْ أَثَوَرًا

Muslim evolutionists have already been shown to be incomplete in their view with one another in numerous works.³⁰ Muhammad Bakht al-Mufī (d. 1454 h.)³¹ his book on reconciling the apparent contradictions between science and scripture states that scholars such as al-Razi saw that what is compulsory is the one only procedure to figuratively interpret what is written in the Quran and Hadith when its outward import opposes that which is certain.³² Consequently, in consideration of verse 3:59, those verses that speak about 'Adam' as being created from earthly matter (i.e. from dust without parents), will be taken literally in the absence of definitive (yaqīnī) evidence suggesting otherwise.

"He truly created you in stages of development"
and interpret 'stages' to indicate the human evolutionary cycle and subsequently take it as a "proof" against verse 3:59.

380 See for example Ibn Kathīr's *al-Bidāya wa-n-Nihāya* in the section dealing with the creation of man.

381 Bakht al-Mufī states

مكلام (مما نرى ومثله غيره صريح في أن الملام لا يصرح في التّأويل في ذكر ما كان
ظاهره من الآيات والأحاديث على خلاف البقوى.

Muhammad Bakht al-Mufī, *Tawfiq al-Rahman* (Leedah: Dār al-Minhaj, 2016), 393.

An example of this would be regarding the verse:

حتى إذا بلغ مغرب الشمس وجدته تغرب في غيabi فوجد فوجد فوجد فوجد

"[until] he reached the setting point of the sun, he found it to be setting in a spring of murky water where he found some people" (8:86)

A. Razi states in his *Tafsir* under this verse that the evidence for the sun being round, located in outer space, being larger than Earth, that no group of people are sitting by its side etc. are all known with certainty. Therefore, it would be necessary to interpret this verse figuratively and that the sun were to appear as if it were setting into "a spring of murky water", not that it actually set within it.

The preceding chapters were adhering to the opinion that Adam's biological parents can result in some or all of these egregious consequences – especially grave implications unbefitting for Allah the Creator and the Omnipotent, al-Qadir, the All-Wise, al-Hakim, and the All-Gracious, al-Qadir al-Qadus.¹⁸⁴ It is imperative to understand that the crux of the argument put forth here did not primarily rely upon a –arm to the –arm from the onset, thereby bypassing altogether the scholarly series for reviving up or consensuses that predate the theory of evolution. Indeed, the probative force of the argument put forth rests upon the perennial belief of what rationally must hold true regarding the will, consciousness, intelligence, wisdom, and speech of the one and only divine. Allah ﷻ. What actually results from using this approach is a vindication of the scholarly consensus on the original creation of Adam ﷺ, both *before* and *after* the rise of the theory of evolution.

It was further demonstrated how the arguments put forth for Adam ﷺ possessing biological parentage reflect ignorance of a variety of subjects. Al-Sanusi remarks that the origin of all misguided opinions results from a lack of mastery particularly in the sciences of Arabic semantics, the one (al-*agha*) and being unable to properly apply the rational sciences (al-*umūm al-‘aqliyya*) in harmony with the exigencies of the Shar‘i. Al-Sanusi concludes by stating that despite lacking in all of this, what further compounds the issue is having the audacity to nonetheless delve into matters requiring not only knowledge of additional areas and advanced concepts, proper training, and a good opinion of those instructing therein, but also

يكون فيه بريد من كلامه تهافت وتناقص يدع بعضه بعضاً. أو ينتهي بالكلام إلى حد يلزمه دفع المعلوم ضرورة أو إثبات ما يستحيل كونه.

Al-Sanusi, Malik b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, *al-Kalām fī al-Jadal*, Cairo: al-Bahār al-Falāhi (1979), 553.

184. Once it has been established that there is no equivalence between how Adam ﷺ was created and the rest of humanity, the inductive reasoning initially used can no longer be upheld. Burhān al-Dīn al-Bukhārī highlights this point succinctly:

تعبت بعديت بالساهل من تكوّن ناس ذوات النسيبة بينهم كسند القيد فيما بيننا. فلو كان آدم من نسل من يكون ناسداً

Burhān al-Dīn b. Maḥmūd al-Bukhārī, *Maḥab al-Tawḥīd li-Qawā'id al-Tawḥīd*, Amman: Maktabat al-Ghannam, 2011, 275.

185. Recall that this was the only prerequisite required for the reader to benefit from the current monograph as stated in the introduction.

Divine support.³⁸⁶ Can “Divine support” reasonably be expected when one continues to intentionally dismiss the Muslim community’s consensus even after its reasons are made clear? Allah ﷻ forewarns the believers:

And whoever defies the Messenger after guidance has become clear to them and follows a path other than that of the believers, we will let them pursue what they have chosen, and we shall admit him to Jahannam, which is an evil place to return.”³⁸⁷

Adherence to the opinion that Adam ﷺ possessed biological parentage results in imputing gross ignorance to virtually all Muslims before the advent of the theory of evolution. Islamic scholars have asserted that there lies no doubt in the invalidity of a doctrinal opinion that has hitherto never been held and moreover diametrically opposes what has always been regarded as a theological tenet. For the truth of a given matter could never have been concealed upon the entire Umma beginning from the era of the Prophet ﷺ, now, only for its polar opposite to be made clear today.”³⁸⁸ Al-Bāqir-ānī comments on the degree of stringency that he noticed from scholars before him, stating that they would not retain anything they were not sure was truly found in Mālik’s (d. 193 h) or Muwatta’ al-Muzani’s (d. 264 h) *Mukh asar* al-Mubarrid’s (d. 285 h) or Maqadub. Euclid’s geom-

386 Al-Sanūsī states:

لَا تَسْمَحُ بِظَهْرِ بَابِهَا وَعَدَمُ إِيقَانِ عِيَانِهَا وَالْبَيَانُ وَبَعْدَ مِنْ تَرْكِهَا الْعُيُومُ الْعَقَابِ
عَنِ مَقْصُودِ التَّجَبُّهَاتِ الشَّرْعِيَّةِ، ثُمَّ الْجَوَابُ: مَعَ عَدَمِ تَبَيُّنِ كُلِّهِ عَلَى حَقِّهِ، فَهِيَ بِحُجَّتِ
عُيُومِ عَدِيدَةٍ مُمَكَّرَةٍ مُتَقَدِّمَةٍ بِتَأْيِيدِ اللَّهِ مِنْ غَيْرِ خَدِّ عَنِ أَهْلِ الْعُيُومِ وَحَسَنِ دَبِّ فِي
النَّبِيِّ مِنْهُمْ أَصْلَ لِكُلِّ ضَلَالَةٍ وَكُفْرٍ وَالْعَيْدُ يَلَّاهُ

Muhammad b Yusuf al-Sanūs: *Sharh al-Aqida al-Kubra* Beirut Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2006), 224-225.

387 4:15

وَمِنْ بَشَائِقِ التَّرْسِ، مِنْ بَعْدِ مَا تَقَيَّنَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ سَبِيلَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ بَوَلَّاهُ مَا كَوَّلَى
وَمَصْبُوهَ جَهَنَّمَ وَمَصْدَقُ مَصْرُوقٍ

388 Al-Subkī states:

هَؤُلَاءِ لَا يَمْلِكُ لَهُ شَيْءٌ مِنْ سُلْطَانِهِ وَبِهِ فِي يَوْمِ الدِّينِ فِي بَيِّنَاتِهِ وَبَيِّنَاتِهِ
أَصُولُ عَلَى الْأَمَةِ مِنْ رَأْسِ مَسِيٍّ حَتَّى إِلَهَ عَلَيْهِ رَسْمُ يَوْمِ الْيَوْمِ وَيَصْهَرُ بِهِ

Iqbal Dina Subki, *Fatāwau al-Subki* Beirut Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2015), 1165

etry, Ptolemy's *Almagest*, and Arabic poetry let alone the Book of Allah! To suggest that the early Muslims, one and all, would not only be aloof in understanding the reality of Adam's original creation, but would embrace what is contrary to it is inconceivable.

For all the above reasons, the necessary nomic judgment (*wājib ḥukm*) that "all humans possess a pair of biological parents" will not overturn the certainty of Adam's being an original creation³⁸⁹. This is a certain (*yaqīn*) judgment obtained through scripture and demonstratively grounded in what must hold true for Allah. The epistemic value it provides regarding the specific creation of Adam is greater than the epistemic value generally provided by the necessary nomic judgment that "all humans possess a pair of biological parents."

At this juncture, Muslim evolutionists are left at a crossroads to decide if they will accept the truth or will obstinately tarry on in delusion despite Allah informing them that they were never "witnesses to: *the creation of their own selves*"³⁹⁰.

389. Abū Bāqillānī states:

وَكُنْتُ مَا لَا يَجِدُ الْعَقْلُ وَتَسْكَبُونَ وَتَسْتَعْرِفُونَ وَتَحْتَدِيهِنَ وَالْعِلَاسَةُ وَتَحْمِلِينَ يَسْتَحِرُّوْنَ
أَنْ يَنْصَحُوا بِسُوءِ مَا نَبَى وَتَحْتَصِرُ الْمَرْيَةَ الْمُتَصَبِّ وَتَحْمِلِينَ رَقْدَ بَيْتٍ مِنْ ذِكْرِي
حَبِيبٍ وَمَنْ يَرَى بَرْدَ عَلَيْهِمْ يُوَدُّ الشَّادَ الَّذِي لَا يَعْرِفُونَهُ وَلَا يَعْلَمُونَهُ يَحْقِيقُ مَعْرِتَهُمْ بِمَا
تَعْلَمُونَهُ هَذِهِ الْكُتُبُ مِنَ الْأَسْرَارِ الظَّاهِرِ الشَّهِيرِ هَذِهِ مَعْنَى بِالْمَادِ وَالْمَدَارِ الْكُتُبُ الْإِلَهِيَّةُ
أَوَّلِي يَدْنِي

Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī *al-Intiqār fī Qur'ān* Amman: Dār al-Fath 2003, 113, 12.

390. Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī states that preponderance can never be given to what diametrically opposes certainty (*yaqīn*):

قَالَ الْإِمَامُ الرَّازِي: أَوَّلًا يَجُوزُ التَّرْجِيحُ فِي الْأَمْرِ الْيَقِينِيِّ لِذَلِكَ الْيَقِينِ لَا تَعَارُضُ فِيهِ إِلَّا أَوْ
تَعَارُضُ يَقِينِيَانِ لَيْسَتْ مَدْلُوحَتَانِ فَيَجْتَمِعُ بِلْتَقَائِهِمَا فَلَا رَجُودَ لِقَائِهِمَا مِمَّا يَبِينُ عَقْلِيًّا أَوْ
نَفْسِيًّا أَوْ عَقْلِيًّا وَنَفْسِيًّا

Zakariyya b. Muhammad al-Anṣārī *Fath al-Rahmān Sharh Luqata al-Aḥad* (Amman: Dār al-Nūr, 2016), 95.

391. 18/3.

مَا أَشْهَدُهُمْ خَلَقُوا شَتْرَبَ وَأَرْجَى وَلَا خَلَقُوا أَنْفُسَهُمْ

Coincidentally, al-Qurṭubī states that this verse is a refutation of those scientists who embark rashly and impetuously into such matters.

In parting, given the many intricacies surrounding the topic of "Evolution and Islam" found in our times, it is highly advised that authorized instructors of Sunni doctrine address this matter in an exhaustive manner.³⁹² For it is an issue that begins as a mere prick of a thorn, but when left unattended, has the potential to metastasize into a theological malady as regrettably experienced and witnessed by so many today.

Success is from Allah ﷻ alone.

Completed on:

February 2, 2023/Rajab 10, 1444

فتضمن الآية الرد على طوائف من النجسين وأهل الطبايع والمتحككين من الأطباء وسواهم
من كل من ينخرط في هذه الأشياء.

Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Qurtubī, *al-Jamī' li-Ahkām al-Qur'an* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2013), II:3.


392 Sa'īd Fūda advocates the need for contemporary topics that impinge on Sunni doctrine to be addressed when teaching 'aqīda.

إن ذكر مسائل تتعلق بالمساراة التي ينادون فيها بين الرجل والمرأة في هذا العصر ومسائل تتعلق بطريقة الحكم ونظرة الإسلام نحو الديمقراطية ونقد العلمانية ونحوها من نظرات تؤثر على حقيقة الإسلام كمسألة تاريخية الأحكام الإسلامية أقول: أما أرى أن إيراد نحو هذه المسائل واجب الآن في علم التوحيد وعلم الكلام.

Sa'īd Fūda, *al-Sharh al-Kabir* (Beirut: Dār al-Ḥisākhā'ir, 2014), 2:1058.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Tahseen N. Khan was born and raised in the Philadelphia region. He completed the renowned *Dars Nizāmī* curriculum mainly through private, in-person studies under numerous authorized Islamic scholars. He currently resides with his family in the suburbs of Chicago while working full-time as a chemical engineer and pursuing advanced studies in Islamic theology under the tutelage of his teachers.





Soon after the inception of the theory of evolution, Muslim scholars were met with the challenge of reconciling Islam's traditional beliefs concerning the origin of man with certain dictates of the evolutionary narrative. Perhaps the most gripping and pertinent of these was the issue of assigning biological parentage to Ādam (ʿalayh al-salām). For over 140 years, Muslim scholars have sought to preserve belief in the original creation of Ādam (ʿalayh al-salām) by formulating a variety of rejoinders focusing on different aspects of the theory of evolution and through an array of apologetics. Oftentimes, many of the arguments were directed foremost against fellow Muslims who sought to make way for evolutionary theory through differing hermeneutical approaches.

This monograph investigates the original creation of Ādam (ʿalayh al-salām) by utilizing the logical two-tier approach of Muslim dialecticians whereby firstly, the mere rational possibility (imkān) of a human being created without biological parentage will be demonstrated, and secondly, to prove its actual occurrence (wuqūʿ). The author takes a critical approach to prove that irreconcilable theological inconsistencies would arise from denying Ādamic originality, thereby proving that belief in his original creation remains certain (qaṭʿī) notwithstanding the demands of the theory of evolution.



PHILASUFICAL PUBLICATIONS